

Bussy in the Deccan

BUSSY IN THE DECCAN

Being extracts from "Bussy and French India"

by A. MARTINEAU

Translated

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With a preface by

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P R E F A C E .

Professor Alfred Martineau is a leading example of an administrator who has utilised his spare time in the pursuit of History. His work among the historical records in Pondicherry and his labours since his return to France are well known and it is my great good fortune that when my own researches into Deccan History took me to Paris, I enjoyed the privilege of almost daily contacts with him. At that time — it is now exactly 10 years ago — Professor Martineau was engaged in writing the book, extracts from which are now being presented to the English reading public, thanks to the efforts of Dr. Miss Cammiade. I particularly recall with pleasure and gratitude that in order to help me in my own work, Professor Martineau did not hesitate to place at my disposal the voluminous notes in his own hand, representing a lifetime of research, upon which this book is based. To those acquainted with the professional jealousy among research workers — a jealousy easy to understand — this selfless devotion to the interests of research and of assistance to those engaged in it, are indications of the way in which he invariably helped those many students of the History of French India who once gathered in Paris

This work on Bussy is the first ever written in French — an irony of history quite in keeping with the manner in which the French treated their Empire builders. Of these, so far as India is concerned, Bussy was the last. Nurtured in the traditions of Dupleix besides being a friend and contemporary of both Dupleix and Lally, though at variance with both of them, he was destined

to see the beginning of the end of French domination over India an end signified by his own recall. When he returned to India in 1788, twenty years after the death of Dupleix the real battle for India was already lost

Dr Miss Cammiade has rendered signal service to those unable to read Prof Martineau's book in French by rendering extracts from it into English which I am sure will be widely read and appreciated by even a larger circle than that interested in the history of the Deccan. To those so interested particularly to the people of Hyderabad these extracts will be of special interest as Bussy was intimately connected with the history of His Exalted Highness' Dominions

This book like many others, owes much also to the inspiration of M Gaudart whose work among the archives of Pondicherry does not stand in need of any introduction. Thanks are due also to my friend Dr Yousuf Husain Khan of the Osmania University for the help he has unstintingly given in revising and comparing the extracts in English with the French originals

ALI YAVAR JUNG

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BUSSY S ORIGIN AND THE BEGINNING OF HIS MILITARY CAREER

It is almost traditional to seek and attribute wonderful beginnings to great men of History. This manner of thinking was frequently justified in the eighteenth century, when, from want of education, only few men of the lower ranks of society were able to rise to distinction. Most of those who did come forward belonged either to the middle classes or to nobility without much fame or whose ancestry dated back to only a few generations; the greater number of those who belonged to the latter classes were none the less illustrious in bravery or in distinguished services than other men bearing great titles. Such was the origin of our hero, who though of fairly common rank reached fame more by the outstanding characteristics of his mind than by his wealth and who played a greater role in our colonial History than any other man up to our present day.

Charles Joseph Patissier, known later as the Marquis of Bussy and Castelnau, was born on the 8th February 1720 at Angienville, now-adays a small village of one hundred and ninety inhabitants situated near the Villers-Cotterets Forest, in the province of Aisne, in France. His father, who took the name of Bussy, was a small lord who possessed no other wealth than his sword. His mother who belonged to a still lower rank, was Sophie Passavat.

Nothing is known of the childhood days of Bussy, but his career can be followed from the thirteenth year of his life. At this age he held a lieutenancy under his father who was at that time a Colonel of a battalion at Soissons. The latter died in 1735 leaving but very little

wealth to his widow and their three children, one girl and two boys. Fortunately the Controller general Orry took a great deal of interest in this family for reasons unknown to us. Young Bussy who had nothing more to hope for in France joined the service of the French India Company and started for the islands. His family did not intend Bussy to spend all his life in Colonial services. They knew well that an officer could rise to high rank only in Europe, but the family was struggling against hardships and poverty so it was hoped that Bussy would soon return from India with sufficient money to hold the rank in accordance with his birth right.

In 1736 Orry suggested that Bussy should go to the Islands of France and Bourbon. When Bussy reached those Islands on his way to India, he refrained from following the two common example of useless inactivity set by many others. Bussy was convinced that a true officer should possess wide knowledge he tried hard and unremittingly to get a perfect learning. So he travelled extensively throughout the French settlements both on the Malabar and on the Coromandel coasts. By so doing he earned the esteem and goodwill of the various commanders, which thereby put him on the high road to both fame and wealth. In one of his writings of later date Bussy says that these journeys had served as means to put him in touch with the dealings of commerce through which he had met with sufficient success to be satisfied.

The agents of the company acted perhaps through orders when initiating this young man to commercial dealings in which he would have been at a loss to invest the least penny of his money; this is what we are led to conclude from his own writings, nevertheless absolutely certain that in order to watch his new-born interests Bussy had to show himself very observant, hard-working

and wise. So, he had obtained, from the very start of his active life, such practical training as would enable a super-mind such as his to derive the utmost benefit. He was always wide awake and allowed no opportunity to slip through in the novel atmosphere into which he had been led by fluke, and while employed in commercial enterprises he studied the mysteries of Indian life, which knowledge turned out to be one of his greatest assets later on.

However it was not while residing in the French Islands that Bussy did acquire the deep knowledge of the qualities and defects of the natives, which enabled him later on to carry on the ponderous duties of government while residing in the Islands. In 1732 there were no aborigines but merely 2,000 Europeans and about 5,500 black slaves in Bourbon. The same might be said of the Island of France.

Bussy resided only 4 or 5 years, utmost, in those Islands. The exact dates of his arrival and departure are not known. In the closing of a general statement of accounts, made at Paris on the 30th Octobre 1736, regarding expenses which had been met on account of the Islands of Bourbon, Bussy's name is mentioned as that of an Ensign drawing 540 french pounds, while from another such document drawn up at Port-Louis in the Island of France on the 2nd October 1737, Bussy's name is again to be found in a list comprising five sub-lieutenants. But there is no indication as to whether he was garrisoned at Bourbon or in the Island of France. From the above documents we know that he must have landed in those Islands between October 1736 and October 1737.

The exact date of his arrival in India is likewise unknown. Facts lead us to believe that it must have been about the end of 1741. It was in this year that La Bour-

donnais, the Governor of those Islands came to the Malabar coast to crush Prince Bargaret who was a continual source of annoyance to the French settlement at Mahé. It is probable that Bussy took part in this expedition which ended on the 22nd January 1742 by a treaty concluded with Bargaret, and that Bussy stayed back in India either in regular service or at his own choice.

Though the exact date of Bussy's arrival is not known it is certain that he was at Pondicherry in 1712 and remained in India up to the time of his departure for France in August 1760. War having broken out in 1744 between France and England the quarrel soon reached Asia. Bussy was present at the siege of Madras and that of Pondicherry although the exact part he played in these two circumstances is unknown and the fact is that his name is not mentioned in any of the four attacks made by the French on Cuddalore. Among the works of fiction we must not overlook the books of Judith Gautier specially *L'Inde éblouie* (*Dazzled India*) and *La conquête du Paradis* (*Conquest of Paradise*). The author was well aware of the chief sources from which the historical facts of the times were drawn. She followed these facts to a certain extent without adhering rigorously to them always. In her tales history and fiction appear side by side and often blend. Judith Gautier did not hesitate to transform our hero into a brave and bold knight who dares and easily overcomes every obstacle. Such as Tanorède in *Jérusalem délivrée* so does Bussy appear by his graceful manners, his charming spirit and the bravery of his deeds. Bussy played the most important role in the quarrels between La Bourdonnais and the officers of the expedition after the capture of Madras. But he will be found greater still and more resplendent when he is seen riding through the Carnatic to snatch from death the young and hand

some queen Oursavie of Bangalore, who believing she had been deserted by Bussy and thereby considering herself as a widow was about to immolate herself on the funeral pyre. The flames already surrounded her on all sides when Bussy appeared on his rapid steed and carried her off. As a token of her gratitude the young queen had Bussy crowned at Bangalore. Fortunately the fiction ends there, as it would have been impossible to Judith Gautier to adapt the rest to facts. Judith Gautier wrote with style and it is not indifferent to the history that Bussy had inspired one of her books. a little admixture of legend is not out of place even in the most authenticated glories.

Leaving fiction aside let us return to facts. When peace was signed between France and England, the siege of Pondicherry was raised. But as the season was not favourable to the immediate return of both English and French troops to their home countries, they were placed at the disposal of Indian Princes who were contesting for the power at the time, the one at Tanjore and the other in the Carnatic, although there was no actual antagonism between the French and English. The French were at first most successful in this new method of conquest or domination. They triumphed at Ambur on the 4th August 1749 over Anaverdi Khan, the nawab of the Carnatic against whom had risen Chanda Sahib, a pretender to the throne whom the French supported. This was the real first occasion in which Bussy distinguished himself. Six months later he took part in the siege of Tanjore under the command of Goupil. This siege had not been undertaken with sufficient vigour, meantime an enormous army led by Nasir Jang, the Suba of the Deccan, came from the North. The French troops being seized with fear raised the siege and took refuge in Pondicherry. The greater

part of the army reached Tirvady on the banks of the Ponnear on the 10th of March and was saved.

This was the first contact of Bussy with the forces of a country where he was shortly to be come illustrious from the very outset not so much in warfare as through his political abilities in which his superiority is unquestioned

Let us follow him in his new role whereby he attained both glory and wealth This was the starting point of the part played by Bussy in the affairs of Deccan

WAR AGAINST NASIR JANG, THE SUBA OF THE DECCAN

1st March to December 1750

Shortly after the French army had reached the banks of the Ponnear, within a few miles of Pondicherry then it was confronted by Nasir Jang's army The French army was so small that several officers and a great number of soldiers dreaded being smashed up, if a battle were to be waged. They deserted stealthily one night and reached Pondicherry in disorder D'Auteuil who commanded the French troops took counsel with Latouche and Bussy at 11 p.m They unanimously resolved that the remaining faithful troops should also retreat Bussy was sent ahead to bring this news to Pondicherry

The French were in a very critical situation, but for their good luck, Nasir Jang did not move Dupleix took advantage of this calm to negotiate with the Suba but to no avail, although the Suba withdrew his troops owing to some internal troubles in his own government. So the French were left unmolested (April)

Within a couple of months war — real war — broke out on another part of the Country. To avenge his discountenance, the Suba drove the French out of Masulipatam (May). In his turn, Dupleix, wanting to take revenge and having the support of Chanda Sahib, sent an expedition to Villupuram and Trivady to test the real strength and feelings of the Suba. These two places were occupied without combat; but the English seeing the French approaching Cuddalore which belonged to them and fearing for their own safety, joined sides with Muhammad Ali, son of Anaverdi Khan, the opponent of Chanda Sahib. Two battles were fought at Trivady within a month's interval (one on the 30th July and the other on 1st September). In the first battle the English and their friend Muhammad Ali were defeated, while Muhammad Ali, whom the English had left to himself, was thoroughly crushed in the second. Following these two defeats Muhammad Ali retired within his own territory as if he were disinterested in the happenings of the country; the English too were quiescent at Cuddalore.

Dupleix resolved to take advantage of this inactivity, which might only be short lived, to march on to further success. A couple of days after the second battle, Dupleix ordered d'Auteuil to despatch Bussy with six or seven officers, two hundred soldiers, fifty Kaffirs and half the number of the troops and sepoy with orders to march against Arcot, via Villupuram and Gingy. This expedition was merely to force Nasir Jang to set free his nephew, Muzaffar Jang, whom he had held a prisoner ever since his retreat from Pondicherry.

Bussy was at Villupuram on the 5th September. Dupleix did not at that time intend to take Gingy which he considered worthless, since he said that there was "nothing" in that place. First Bussy and later d'Auteuil and Latouche

made Dupleix change his mind and besiege Gingy Writing to D Auteuil and Latouche on the 2nd September Dupleix said "I would never have thought that such an expedition might have been envied by anybody but since you are of opinion that it would be worth the trouble you may join Bussy and carry out your idea just as you please" Two days previously Dupleix had told d Auteuil and Latouche that he had agreed to that expedition only 'to please Bussy (Versailles Records No. 3746) So this memorable undertaking, which even now-adays shines with particular brilliancy in the Colonial achievements of the French in India, had been determined somewhat at a venture

Although the political importance which the town had held at the beginning of the Century (I) might have considerably dwindled yet with its situation between the Eastern and Western Ghats, with the Palar in the North and the Ponnear in the South and owing to its natural defences which with those of Daulatabad are the strongest in India, Gingy command a vast open region both on the East and on the West so that its political importance might become again very great

We shall not attempt to describe Gingy in this work; this has been done many times. It would suffice to say that the town itself which is small in area had been built at the foot of three steep hillocks lying in a semi-circular plan, the Chandra Dourgam the Rajagiri or king of Mountains and the Krishnagiri The Rajagiri hill lying between the two others, is a very scraggy peak rising abruptly to 245 meters above the plains. The only way to it is through a narrow doorway cut in the thickness of the

(I) Gingy now-adays is but a tiny village of five hundred and twenty five inhabitants. It still has some remains of the very imposing walls and monuments.

rampart, beyond which a foot path only 2 ou 3 meters in width, winds round one hill in the East and borders on a precipice in the North before reaching the summit. At one spot the foot path gave access to nowhere and the opposite side could be reached only by means of a wooden bridge, eight meters long, thrown across the abyss. At the very top there are yet a temple, a reservoir supplied by rains, a public granary and some guns. Nothing was easier to defend, even had the entrance door been taken by assault. A few brave and resolute men would be ample to impede or repulse a whole army along the narrow foot-path which encircled the hill. If the place were carefully guarded it would fall only to treachery or famine. The conquest of this almost inaccessible rock had tempted Bussy as much for the brilliancy of the stroke as for the political outcome of the attack (1).

Dupleix moreover was convinced that the town could easily be taken. He was well acquainted with its detailed topography and all its various means of defence. In March, the proceeding year, Dupleix had maintained there, during a few days, a European Sergeant named Saint Marc with ten French soldiers, twenty East-Indians and Fifty Sēpoys (2) and from certain information he had gathered from them he said that "there were several demolished places (probably in the ramparts) and that entrance through one of those breaches would be quite easy". Therefore Dupleix did not want a regular siege, as at

(1) The highest peak at Gingy is two hundred and ninety five meters above sea-level and one hundred and twenty five meters higher than the summits of the two peaks

(2) When Nasir Jang reached the Carnatic the "Quelidar" of Gingy handed over the town to him without the least difficulty, but Saint Marc was very courteously requested to go back to Pondicherry which he and his troops reached on the 18th March

Tanjore ' The taking of Gingy is not as hard as one may think The attack should be unexpected, I think merely the Sepoys could easily carry it through' (Letters from Dupleix to d Auteuil dated 11th and 12th September)

Bussy was in sight of the town on the 11th September at 9 A M and he encamped three miles away from the hillocks Hardly had he been at rest than he was informed that Muhammed Ali had reached the town of Gingy from the west and was just then between that town and the French army After rambling about in the region of Tirvanamalai for several days the Nawab rallied bits of his army and was able to reconstruct a fairly imposing one of seven to eight thousand cavalry two thousand infantry one thousand English Sepoys and eight guns served by English gunners or European deserters Bussy determined on immediate attack in spite of the small number of his men and without waiting for the reinforcement which d Auteuil was bringing along The enemies defended themselves much better than they had done ten days previously They did not fall back at the first cannonade and even had the daring to approach the French troops to within the range of pistols—Firing was renewed and began to make confusion in the ranks of the enemy , the battle developed slowly but surely to the advantage of the French enemy when the sound of the firing being carried far away was heard by d Auteuil He hastened his steps and soon the united forces of Bussy and d Auteuil facing those of Muhammed Ali gradually drove them back to the walls of Gingy and by degrees within the town itself into which the French troops followed them By this time night had fallen and the cannon which had been vomiting fire on the French troops from the heights of the three hills ceased firing effectively

To keep the army awake the French artillery thundered a part of the moonlit night, D'Auteuil and Bussy waited for complete darkness to set in before starting to attack all the three hills simultaneously. The Krishnagiri and the Chandra Dourgam peaks have fairly mild gradients but the Rajagiri stands out like a lighthouse whose stairs must be ascended after the door has been battered. How is it then that the Rajagiri fell so easily? The door yielded to a few crackers, the military outpost was captured, while no further resistance whatsoever was met with along the winding pathway encircling the hill. Yet the French had no secret spies in the place and nor was there any treachery. The French success was partly due to the moral dismay which had overwhelmed the enemy ever since the 1st September and more especially to their absolute indifference to the cause of Muhammed Ali. What did it matter to them whether Muhammed Ali or Chanda Sahib were to be the Nawab of Arcot? Fortune had smiled on the French the day previous, it were wiser to let things go on and not stand in the way of fate. Dupleix writing to Brenier, the officer commanding at Gingy, on the 16th September said: As to the spot from which the rock was scaled, undoubtedly we were dealing with men willing to allow things to occur, because the number of those who entered was insufficient to cause the Governor to lose his head" (Versailles Records No. 3751).

Even to the officers who had taken part in the attack, the matter seemed quite simple. On reading the official report jointly signed, on the day after their achievement, by d'Auteuil, Bussy, Law and Latouche it does not seem that they realized that they had crowned themselves with fame. We give below this too abbreviated account.

"I (d'Auteuil) divided the troops and placed the Sepoys on the outskirts. I put in position the artillery and the two

mortars which were very gallantly attended to by M Galland While Messrs de Saint George Very and Lenormand were ordered to scale one of the forts (Rajagiri) as soon as the moon had set, which they most valiantly carried out. The Dragoons under Puymorin were meant to give support to those who had to blow up the doors of the main fort, which I was to force through with Latouche and Bussy In the meantime the enemy was firing heavily muskets and guns and throwing in a large quantity of rockets. Six of our men had already been killed and some wounded when I sent M de Rouvray to reconnoitre the doorway This brave officer was shot through the body while returning and died the next day

Mr Law having reported the execution of the orders we remained in our positions till moon set, which had been fixed upon as the Signal for action on all sides. In the meantime Mr Galland belaboured the enemy with grenades. About 4 A M I heard shouts of "Long live the king from one of the hill tops they came from Messrs St. Georges, Very and Lenormand who had performed that part of the attack which had been entrusted to them

'I had then the doors of the chief fort blown up Behind these doors was a fairly large town After some musket firing the enemy took fright and fled In less than an hour we were masters of all the place The fugitives took shelter in their fortresses on two hills (the Krishna giri and the Chandra Dourgam) which were at the back of us and they held out for awhile But Mr Law and his Dragoons soon forced the remainder of the enemy to flee and we were left the unmolested owners of Gingy and all its fortresses

The French had only eleven men wounded and 10 killed as for the losses of the enemy they were not known In a

letter dated 15th Dupleix said that the eight thousand men killed; but this figure seems exaggerated.

On the next day Bussy whose initiative had been such a success, received the most hearty congratulations of Dupleix who wrote; " You deserve the highest rewards and I shall do all I can to have them bestowed on you " (1) Not with standing this the Governor was not fully convinced of the worth of Gingy. In a letter to Engineer Sornay, Dupleix declared officially that he did not intend staying at Gingy, but would remain there only such time as would be necessary to force the Suba to conclude peace as he was convinced that the smartness and rapidity of that brilliant action would make a deep impression on the Suba.

END OF THE WAR WITH NASIR JANG DEATH OF THAT PRINCE, THE ACCESSION OF MUZAFFAR JANG. THE APPOINTMENT OF BUSSY TO ACCOMPANY MUZAFFAR JANG TO THE DECCAN.

Nasir Jang did in fact seem disposed to come to terms and sent peace proposals to Dupleix. One cannot say that the latter received these proposals with pleasure. Dupleix had already come to some understanding with certain dignitaries at the Suba's court, to get rid of the latter by a violent death and it was secretly agreed that no better opportunity could be found than that of a battle, when a murder might be easily attributed to an unhappy accident. Dupleix writing to d'Auteuil on the 7th October said

(1) Bussy was raised to the grade of Captain on the 3rd November 1750 and that of Colonel on the 15th November 1752 (Deront-Resumé des Brevets, Provisions etc No 185 and 321).

“I have their oath and their signatures. The plot come from them and not from me ’

Owing to rains which fell abundantly during a whole month the roads were impracticable, so there was complete inactivity for this length of time. At last Latouche who was commanding instead of d Auteuil suffering from gout was able to start out on the 15th December. He crossed the sixteen miles which lay between the French army and its enemy in a single night's march. Bussy also took part in this expedition.

The battle began at once the enemy made a stout resistance. Nasir Jang had placed his artillery in the foreground with the infantry behind it, while the cavalry occupied the wings. Latouche took similar dispositions, the Sepoys and the Cavalry formed the wings, and in the centre were the French soldiers under Villéon with Bussy to the right and Kerjean to the left. Latouche watched the whole proceedings.

How was Nasir Jang killed in the encounter? Reports do not tally. The commonest one says that Nasir Jang having heard that the Nawabs of Kurnool and Ouddapah were keeping themselves in complete inactivity had gone to bring them to a sense of their duty and had threatened them having previously passed orders that Muzaffar Jang should be put to death. One or other of these two Nawabs replied impertinently to Nasir Jang and in the confusion which followed Nasir Jang was wounded and thrown off his elephant. His head was chopped off at once and presented to Muzaffar Jang who was immediately hailed as the Suba. The latter realized, in an instant, the extreme inconstancy of human things. Muzaffar Jang had every right to the throne as he was the grandson of Nizam-ul-Mulk and hence nephew of Nasir Jang the second child of a great ancestor and founder of a dynasty.

Muzaffar Jang, who was very grateful to Dupleix both for his deliverance and for his elevation to the throne, came to Pondicherry a few days later where he was given a very imposing ceremonial reception. In token of his gratitude Muzaffar Jang gave the Command of the whole coast, from the river Krishna to Cape Comarin, to Dupleix. As the Carnatic came soon under his command, Dupleix could, if he would, grant it to Chanda Sahib. This Prince was thereupon named Nawab of Carnatic. More substantial satisfaction was given to the army, while more than a million, from the treasury of Nasir Jang, was distributed as gratuity among the officers and soldiers.

When all the entertainments were over, Muzaffar Jang who did not lay much trust either in his troops or in his subjects, requested Dupleix to send a European detachment to accompany him to Hyderabad ; he felt that he would have a better hold on his own army if he had a foreign one to back him. Dupleix hesitated a while before entering into this new line of action, which might be fraught with danger. He had however made up his mind by the 5th of January and agreed to what Muzaffar Jang wanted. The Suba showed his gratitude, for this new sacrifice, by further favours. Besides granting to Dupleix letters patent of Governor General of South India, he confirmed the gift to the French Company of Mazulepatam with its dependencies that very day on authenticated documents. He further ordered that the pagodas which were minted in Pondicherry should be legal tender in the Carnatic, at Mazulepatam and at Golconda. He still further decided that the revenues of the province of Arcot, which were his, should from thenceforward be cashed in Pondicherry. Greater trust than this could not have been shown to the French.

Muzaffar Jang left Pondicherry on the 7th January but his camp was raised only five days later. He was waiting for the European detachment which had been promised to him. The Governor did not intend to withdraw his word but he needed time to choose and equip his troops also to appoint the right man as the leader who should be something more than a common soldier. The mission that had to be filled at Muzaffar Jang's court was as much political as military. To carry this out successfully the leader should not only be a good captain but also a refined diplomat.

Dupleix hesitated between Prevost de Latouche and Bussy in his choice the importance of which the near future was to reveal. These were the two officers who had distinguished themselves the most in the late events and though the daringness with which Gingy had been taken fell entirely to the fame of Bussy yet the choice seemed to point to Latouche who possessed solid and constant qualities which were appreciated by all. But unfortunately Latouche was small of stature and of mean appearance he was retiring by nature and very little expansive, in short he was a man very little pleasing in society. Bussy on the other hand was more refined and more attractive in his behaviour his free and easy ways pleased many and earned him many friends he did not believe that military virtues excluded certain civil qualities. At the time Bussy was a common officer like many others, who expected to rise or become wealthy by the hazards of war. He offered his services to Dupleix to command the French troops and represent the French at Muzaffar Jang's court. Dupleix immediately accepted his services. He knew the value of the man, but no one could foresee that by his political ability and by his military achievements Bussy was about to earn immortal glory both for

himself and for the French Government under Dupleix. For both Dupleix and Bussy the choice had been a most fortunate one.

Dupleix paid three more visits to Muzaffar Jang before he left for the Deccan. During the last of these visits, Muzaffar Jang clothed Dupleix in official native dress, then leading him into his Durbar or council hall, fastened his own sword and dagger, quiver and buckle on Dupleix. He also presented Dupleix with an elephant and a horse which had been the gift of the king of Persia to Nizam-ul-Mulk.

Three days later, on the 15th January, the French detachment, under Bussy, also left Pondicherry. It consisted of three hundred french soldiers and about two thousand sepoy. Let us follow him in his adventures.



BUSSY IN THE DEGGAN



BUSSY IN THE DECCAN.

1751 to 1754.

FROM PONDICHERRY TO AURENGABAD.

(12th January - 18th June 1751)

The first point to be considered was whether it would be wise for the French to split up their army and start into the unknown before having finally dealt with Muhammad Ali. Both sides of the question might be upheld and it would have been interesting to know which opinion Dupleix had backed. But unfortunately history is silent on the subject. It would no doubt have been wiser and more prudent to settle up all matters with Muhammed Ali before starting out on a new and distant campaign. But this Prince appeared so weak, so foresaken, so resigned to impending subjection that Dupleix was of opinion that it would not be worth while sacrificing to this doubtful and fleeting danger, all the advantages to be gained by the protection that would be given to Muzaffar Jang. The Suba of the Deccan was the lawful sovereign of the whole of Southern India. If his position were to be consolidated, would not that of Muhammad Ali be thereby weakened? Even if the English were to take up the cause of Muhammad Ali, what military or moral resistance could they offer to the triple alliance consisting of the Suba, the French and the Mughals? It meant failure no doubt. Future events could reveal how fallacious this idea may have been. Muhammad Ali resisted much better than he had been expected to do, in the meantime the French

troops were going further and further away into the Deccan without there being any possibility of recalling them

The splitting up of the already too small French army might prove disastrous, as it really happened to be and Dupleix had misgivings as to whether he were not playing a dangerous game. Two days after the French troops had left, Dupleix reminded the Suba of his promise to grant Muhammad Ali a suitable settlement within his own dominions. Dupleix thought that this would be the only way to estrange Muhammad Ali from the English. If this could be attained, Saunders and his counsel could be set aside. Were Muzaffar Jang able to make the English feel that they were at his mercy, that would be quite enough. When Muzaffar Jang had been at Pondicherry he had informed the English of his accession to the throne, but they had taken no notice of this. So it was not necessary to be forbearing with them. There was but one way of answering their want of civility: they should be threatened of being driven out of their settlements. The Suba was asked not to hesitate. Muzaffar Jang threw himself wholeheartedly into the plan of Dupleix but to no avail. Muhammad Ali had since long made up his mind to look for support from the English. All steps taken to win him over were to him so many proofs that the trust laid in him was failing. The departure of a French detachment for the Deccan served only to raise his hopes of resistance, since by splitting up his troops Dupleix was from a military standpoint openly and visibly weakening his forces. Bussy who had been informed of these happenings, was advised to be as courteous as possible to Mohfous Khan who had remained a

prisoner at the Suba's court so that his brother might make up his mind to depart from Trichinopoly of his own free will

The French troops continued marching onwards slowly but surely; as for the Suba's troops their fidelity was not quite guaranteed. When the Pathans left Pondicherry, they had promised Dupleix that they would remain faithful to Muzaffar Jang, while the Nawab of Kurnool is said to have had tears in his eyes, but no sooner had they crossed the frontier than all their bitterness returned with the remembrance of their disillusion. They believe that they had not obtained their proper share of the treasures of Nasir Jang. By the end of January they laid new claims and to back them they tried to get the French soldiers to desert; the Nawab of Kurnool wished to form a company of Europeans. Dupleix had to threaten Muzaffar Jang, that if these desertions did not stop he would recall his troops. Muzaffar Jang was too unsteady on the throne to impose his authority on those who had raised him to it. While declaring that those rascals were not to be feared, Dupleix told Muzaffar Jang to make such promises as would lull them or put them to sleep till such time as he would be the absolute master when he should not hesitate to chop off their heads. In fact Dupleix had very little esteem for the one, as for the other the more one knows of them the more one despises them, wrote he to Bussy on the 3rd February

This paradoxical state of affairs lasted only a few days. Hardly had the army crossed the Ruichena (Krishna). the Pathans realized that they were in close proximity to their homes, then their hopes rose, they thought that the day had dawned in which they ought to renew the

outrages which had succeeded so well against Nasir Jang They sent secret orders to the Polygars of their dominions to assemble and place their guns in the defiles.

Cuddapah was reached on the 14th February Its Nawab revolted taking for excuse some depredations committed by Muzaffar Jang's army The Suba's artillery was held up and the vanguard pillaged, Bussy's munition chariots were similarly treated The Nawabs of Savanour and Kurnool immediately joined the Nawab of Cuddapah

What was Bussy going to do? Dupleix had advised him always to act as a mediator in the variances which might arise among the Nawabs. Bussy therefore tried to mediate and sent a trustworthy Indian Christian named Agi Abdulla who had been recommended to him by Dupleix to negotiate with the rebels. Muzaffar Jang did not wait for the return of Abdulla nor would he listen to the advice of Bussy who told him not to expose his life unnecessarily but marched towards the enemy When he was about two leagues from his camp he met Abdulla who brought him the apologies of the Pathans Probably Muzaffar Jang did not believe in the sincerity of the Pathans and turning a deaf ear to all he continued his march He was closely followed by Bussy who however could not reach him in time. A few gunshots were enough to rout the Pathans The Nawabs of Savanour and Kurnool were slain but the Nawab of Cuddapah managed to escape. Muzaffar Jang's victory was absolute, but sad to say he himself was killed during the combat either by an arrow which pierced his eye or by being stabbed by the Nawab of Kurnool just when he himself was about to be cut down by Muzaffar Jang's own sword

In the short action Bussy had only one man wounded, while the Suba had 60 to 80 wounded and 30 Killed. The losses of the Pathans are unknown.

Muzaffar Jang's successor had to be chosen According to the laws of the Empire, this choice was the prerogative of the Court at Delhi But Delhi was a long way off, while immediate steps had to be taken lest the army be left to fritter away and the dynasty of the Nizam be exposed to extinction. There was time enough to obtain the investiture from the Great Mughal. Muzaffar Jang's natural successor was his son, a boy who at that time must have been between 5 and 8 years of age. The sole defence of this boy lay in the disinterestedness of his uncles A very fragile weapon indeed Gaziuddin, the eldest of the uncles was at Delhi and though his father had been dead for the past three years, he had never claimed his rights to the throne. He might be overlooked altogether. His three other brothers were Salabat Jang, Nizam Ali and Basalat Jang. These three met the same day and placing Bussy in their middle, they exposed to him the dangers of leaving the army without a leader even for half an hour and all three affirmed that they were willing to hold the throne, which the late events had left vacant, only through Bussy. Salabat Jang was a "duffer", according to Dupleix's opinion; Nizam Ali was more brilliant and had greater genius, while the third was far too young to be thought of. Logically Bussy designated the eldest Salabat Jang was immediately accepted, unopposed, by the whole army. Ramdas Pendet who had been the Dewan of Muzaffar Jang; the *boxis* or chief general, and all civil and military officials promised adherence to him and took service under him. Never had power been more complaisantly nor more rapidly transmitted.

The New Suba was not long in giving proofs of his gratitude to the French, he too dreaded either treachery or desertion by his troops. With utmost submission and humility not exacted of him but which is an Oriental way of behaving, he said that he wished to hold his dominions only from Dupleix and that he was quite willing to give all the treasures of Golconda and even the whole of the Deccan to the French. In fact he confirmed all the grants made by Muzaffar Jang and placed under French control all the territory lying between the river Krishna and Cape Comorin in other words the whole of the Carnatic, Madura and Tinnevely over which he had but nominal sway. Besides all this he also ceded the territories of Nizampatnam Guntur Acclemanar and Narzapur which completed the French settlement of Muzulipatam. He sanctioned the re-establishment of the French factory at Yanson while he gave to Dupleix himself as a personal gift, the port of Mafuz Bandar on the Coast of Orissa. On the recommendation of the French the young son of Muzaffar Jang was not forgotten, to him were conferred Adony Raichur Bijapur Kurnool Cuddapah and other less important territories.

The plans of Dupleix and those of Bussy were in no way altered. Both deemed without any previous understanding that the French would derive great advantages from the late revolution. Even by the 24th February Dupleix wrote to Bussy that there was nothing else to be done but to march on to Hyderabad maintain Ramdas Pendet in his position and assure the new Suba that the French desired only peace.

Continuing Dupleix wrote "Keep it foremost in your mind that you are the law maker in that army, do not abuse but let all things concur to attain the end I desire

Your whole object, and mine, should be to retain the possessions of the Company and increase them whenever possible; this must be your main purpose in whatever circumstance you may be placed... Once every thing settled, affect great courteousness to everybody and do your most to draw to yourself the friendship of those people", (Versailles Records, No. 3748 - 24th January).

Even before the above letter had reached Bussy, the latter was already foreseeing the whole of the Deccan will be at his feet Writing on the 21st February Bussy says: "I think the moment for us to achieve great things has come. From the highest to the lowest the whole army trusts in you alone and in the French nation If you but make up your mind, the treasures of Golconda shall be ours on our arrival there I am of opinion that the nation can derive great benefits from the last revolt... The most extraordinary things are promised to us if we but go to Golconda It is too late for us to withdraw, all our energies will have to be spent extending the glory of the French name and the welfare of the Company I am sure we shall never meet a better opportunity I shall do whatever lies in my power to attain the above mentioned ends. My earlier letters could not speak of these advantages, but thanks to the genius of Ramdas Pendet, to the fear of French arms, to the veneration in which our nation is held and to the absolute conviction that they can do nothing of themselves if we were to abandon them, we are in a position to dictate the law and to draw all profits, even greater ones than those we had hoped to obtain during Modin Khan's (Muzaffar Jang's) life time. If you think, as I do, that we should continue to accompany the Nawab, our gentlemen and I are willing to sacrifice ourselves".

On the 22nd he added My hands are tied for the time being, but once I am in possession of your further orders, let me act and you will be pleased with my management While in Pondicherry you will be able to govern Golconda and its dependencies as if you were there I foresee too many good things to believe that you would take any other view but that of supporting the new Nawab Though we have but a handful of men we hold sway over everybody round about us (A C C. 282 p 8-11)

Dupleix and Bussy far from being in any way vexed by the revolution of the 11th February (1) were on the contrary able to draw the most favourable omens from it without any previous understanding among themselves, but merely through their knowledge of the Indian mind The necessity which forced the new Nawab to lean solely on the French forces justified their trust. This community of feelings existed between Dupleix and Bussy at the time when the French troops were really engaged in the Deccan, and as there had never been the least shadow of any jealousy or rivalry between these two men but only an equal love for their Motherland and the same longings for glory there is nothing astonishing that such close understanding should have remained unimpaired till 1754 and that it should have brought about the most brilliant results

However it almost happened that Bussy should have had to leave his duty Shortly after the 14th February

(1) A letter dated 8th March from Dupleix to Bussy leads us to infer that the latter had for a moment thought of bringing back the French troops to Pondicherry after the death of Muzaffar Jang But in reality Bussy did not wish to proceed further without receiving explicit orders to do so. Yet the very next day he wrote to Dupleix that as it was necessary to accompany Salabat Jang to Golconda, he was marching on.

Bussy fell seriously ill and applied for leave to return to Pondicherry. Dupleix sanctioned the leave on the 6th March, but at same time he warned Bussy that, in his own interest and for the glory of the king, it would be far better if he could stay where he was (Versailles Records—N^o 3748).

Bussy did stay back but fell among other rocks. It happened one day that Bussy was obliged to refuse admittance to Ramdas Pendet in his tent and the latter felt sorely offended at this affront. Some French officers too complained that they were being haughtily treated. Last but not least Bussy had beside him a nephew of Dupleix, named Kerjean, who was the captain of the Infantry. In addition to the personal merits of this officer, his close relationship to the Governor gave Kerjean a sort of right to advise which Bussy resented very much, while Kerjean was equally displeased not to be consulted. He thereupon opened his mind to his uncle who, with due consideration, wrote to Bussy that by conferring with Kerjean on thorny matters Bussy would thereby show deference to Dupleix himself and that Kerjean was quite capable of tendering useful advice. This note was courteous and cautious, but in a private letter dated 17th March from Dupleix to Kerjean he more definitely regrets that Bussy should not have been more circumspect in certain circumstances. Dupleix added: "it is extremely difficult to be both firm and kind, long practice in commanding alone can make a man attain that middling stage whereby he can be affable while being absolutely firm"

The ending of this letter, for which Dupleix asks great secrecy, is still more suggestive. It says: On reaching Golconda Bussy might have to push up to Auiengabad; but Dupleix feared that, having become too exacting,

Bussy might demand exorbitant conditions from the Suba. That would be a mistake. The new privileges which might be agreed should not exceed those which had been settled at Pondicherry at the time of the departure of the troops for Hyderabad. Those conditions were ample the more so as the Suba had promised to double the gratuities on arrival at Golconda. To exact still more would be tyranny. If Bussy went beyond Kerjean was to try and bring him back within limits, with as much tact as possible, but if he were not successful Kerjean was to take command of the troops and lead them on to Aurengabad.

This rigorous measure, so unlike to the character of Dupleix was probably due to his desire to favour Kerjean but it might also have been that Dupleix thought Bussy whose health had not been completely restored might wish to enjoy peacefully the small fortune he had already hoarded up. Dupleix already imagined he saw Bussy on the way to France via Mazulipatam no sooner he arrived at Golconda. Writing again on the 2nd April to Kerjean Dupleix said 'Probably Bussy thinks his fortune as made and only dreams of retirement. With such thoughts in his mind Dupleix dictated the line of conduct Kerjean was to follow when he would be in command of the army. Dupleix recommended Kerjean to be always generous good and firm and also to affect disinterestedness. Be affable and polite to everybody said he as though Bussy had been wanting in these qualities.

Undoubtedly Bussy was on the verge of disgrace at that moment and even during a whole month but it is probable that he was not aware of the contents of those above mentioned letters from Dupleix to Kerjean. This enabled Bussy to continue having unbounded trust in

Dupleix. There was nothing offending in the advice Dupleix had given to Bussy on the art of governing, since similar observations are not met with in their further correspondance. We must conclude that the advice given did not fall on deaf ears.

Kerjean's hopes were shattered with the improvement in Bussy's health; while one more success in middle April still further consolidated Bussy's position.

The army, marching slowly on its way from Cuddapah to Hyderabad, had reached Kurnool on the 26th March. The Nawab of Kurnool had behaved treacherously both to Nasir Jang and to Muzaffar Jang. The defences of that town had been neglected and its walls crumbled in ruins, it was guarded by 4000 men who tried to resist the French troops but they were easily overcome and most of the men were put to the sword.

This however was not the main factor which restored Bussy in the eyes of Dupleix. About the time when Kurnool fell into the hands of the French, a report was brought that a Maharatta army, 20,000 strong led by Balaji Rao, the chief general and prime minister of the Raja of Sattara, had encamped between the River Krishna and Golconda to intersect the route. That army had been purchased by Gaziuddin who wanted to make sure of the future for himself, but as the men were badly paid, they did not want to fight. Bussy might have taken advantage of their state of mind to attack them and he might have been victorious. He preferred to acquire peace by means of a ransom, he knew that success at war was inconstant and that he did not have sufficient men to stake on the future of Deccan. The orders he had received, as also the interests of the French demanded that he should begin by firmly establishing Salabat Jang's

internal authority. He attained these ends by having 2 lakhs paid to Balaji Rao. Thanks to this amount the Maharattas retired and Salabat Jang was able to consider that his supremacy of the Deccan was a matter of days or weeks.

Following this transaction the army entered Hyderabad peacefully on the 12th April. Salabat Jang was greeted with full oriental pomp and recognized as the sole unopposed Suba of the Deccan. All Governors and even those of distant provinces took their oath of allegiance to him.

In accordance with what had been agreed upon at Pondicherry before the departure of the troops, gratuities were disbursed from the Suba's treasury to Bussy to his officers and to others as well. Orme says that Bussy was given 2 250 000 pounds while an ordinary ensign received as much at 120 000 pounds (1). A missionary the Revd Theodore received a sufficient amount of money to enable the Capuchins to complete their church at Pondicherry. But Ramdas Pendet who had to superintend all these liberalities, was raising all sorts of difficulties to the repayment of Rs. 689 64½ which Dupleix had advanced to Muzaffar Jang, it must also be said that Ramdas doled out the gratuities in spite of himself.

What conclusions did Dupleix draw from these early events? His correspondence will give us an insight.

One of his first letters invited Bussy to obtain a firman from the Mughal confirming all the French territorial possessions as also the concessions made to Dupleix.

(1) The exact sum paid to Kerjean is unknown, but at about the same time he sent Rs. 2,53 000 or 607 200 pounds to Masulipatam. Vincens received 200 000 Rupees or 480 000 pounds.

self and to his wife (1). Dupleix would have wished that Ramdas Pendet and Salabat Jang should place their riches at Mazulipatam under pretence that they would be safer there, but in reality to have a greater hold on these two men. Bussy was recommended to guard Golconda very carefully as it would give a firmer grip on the Deccan. Salabat Jang was asked to write, as Muzaffar Jang had been made to do, a threatening letter to Saunders informing him that he and his countrymen would be driven out of their factories if they continued upholding Muhammad Ali. Concerning this prince Dupleix still thought that a compensation should be offered to him, in the Deccan. Ellore and Rajamundry were first thought of but as these towns were too near Madras, after due consideration the final choice rested on Chicacole.

Nizam Ali showed some signs of independance which led Dupleix to fear that his intelligence might one day become a source of serious trouble to Salabat Jang, so he asked Bussy whether it would not be safer to lay hands on him as a precautionary measure; he might either poison or stab Salabat Jang.

(1) Three villages in Devaracottah, a dependency of the island of Divy, were ceded to Madame Dupleix. The renter, who had been enjoying the incomes of those villages, had recourse to mean and unfair tricks. To cut short all trouble, Dupleix ordered Bussy to demand the Devaracottah and its dependencies be leased out to the French for 7,000 pagodas which was the revenue derived from them in Nasir Jang's time. Till all the arrangements were made, Dupleix requested Friell, the head of the factory at Mazulipatam, to seize Devaracottah immediately. Matters were soon settled to the satisfaction of Dupleix, but no sooner had the villages been put in possession of Madame Dupleix than she handed over the incomes to the Company.

Mofuz Bandar, a port on the Orissa Coast, was given to Dupleix. He was about to change the name to Dupleix Bandar but became aware that the revenues were insufficient for its upkeep, so he renounced the ownership.

The court of Suba was then divided into three clans respectively represented by Ramdas Pendet Sayyid Lashkar Khan and Chanavas Khan. All their intrigues were openly known to Dupleix. Ramdas being the Dewan had most money and so was able to have many friends. The government of Aurengabad had lately been invested in the hands of Lashkar Khan. Dupleix believed this man to be honest and might some day be made to succeed Muhammad Ali. Chanavas Khan had once upon a time been one of Nisir Jang's councillors. But he was not a favourite at that moment. Dupleix who foresaw things from afar, was of opinion that if close friendship were to be established with Ramdas Pendet, Salabat Jang might, if necessary, be made to feel that if he did not have French support Muzaffar Jang's son would reign in his stead. If the partisans of both Ramdas Pendet and Lashkar Khan were more or less equal Bussy should so manoeuvre between the two as to have the French exempted from paying the Moghul any rent on their settlements in Bengal. Since Bussy was daily going further and further away from Pondicherry it would no longer be possible to be sending him definite instructions so all other matters were left to the prudence of Bussy.

"You are fully acquainted with the sort of people you have to deal with. Dupleix said, cautious firmness with an admixture of affability will lead you wherever you please. (Letter dated 24th May). "You have my fullest trust my feelings have not changed, they are the same as ever. I feel proud to have contributed to the making of the wealth of such a chivalrous man as yourself. (Letter dated 27th May).

In the meantime the army had taken up marching once again and was on its way to Aurengabad, the real capital

of the Deccan ever since the kingdom of Golconda had been destroyed by Aurengazeb in 1687. It being a new journey, Bussy, Kerjean and Vincens had asked the Suba for further gratuities. We know Dupleix strongly disapproved of such extortion; no sooner he came to hear of their demand he wrote both to Bussy and to Kerjean (letters dated 30th July) that it was the best way to bring about the hatred of the French, that their greed would surely be looked upon as an evil act by the Indians, and would weaken their esteem of French intervention and services. In case the Suba had spontaneously offered them new gratuities, they might have accepted them, but not otherwise. Dupleix had no objection to such rewards being paid to subordinates, and he even insisted on this being done.

Ideas and feelings were in a confused state during the march to Aurengabad. Chanavas Khan, being displeased with the Suba, whom he took for a weak and dishonourable Prince, handing over his territory to infidels, had escaped from Golconda and arrived at Aurengabad in a state of mind which forebade evil. A rumour was abroad that Gaziuddin had obtained a firman from the Mughal investing him as the Suba and that he was on his way to take possession of the State. Fortunately a man came from Delhi on the 15th May bringing titles of lawful authority to Salabat Jang. The evil-minded rightly said that this man was a false messenger and the firman a concocted document made at Salabat Jang's court. In fact it would have been impossible to write to Delhi and receive a reply within the period of time which had elapsed since the death of Muzaffar Jang. Dupleix himself had doubts about the authenticity of the firman and attributed the forgery to Ramdas Pandet (letter dated 27th May). Whatever be of this, the document produced the anticipated results.

Salabat Jang received the Emperor's messenger with the greatest regard, Bussy himself and all his officers paid their homage to him while a salute was fired by the artillery

The entry of the army into Aurengabad on the 18th June was hailed by general acclamation, even the discontented kept silent. The town which for the past three years had been deprived of its Suba since the death of Nuzam ul Mulk rejoiced at being once again the capital with all the pomp the ceremonies and festivities which usually accompany every new reign Orme says that people flocked from all parts to hail the Suba and that there were no less than a million inhabitants in the city during several days

Bussy had done well in concluding the treaty with Balaji Rao two or three months earlier Salabat Jang stood as the unopposed master of the Deccan both internally and externally

FROM THE ARRIVAL AT AURENGABAD TO THE MURDER OF RAMDAS PENDET

By the entry of the French troops into Aurengabad all that Dupleix had wished for had been accomplished From Aurengabad the French were dominating all the Deccan, and, if Salabat Jang complied with, the settling of the Carnatic matters would be a mere play

At first Dupleix showed his gratitude towards Bussy Writing to him on the 4th August he said I have read with pleasure the small account of your entry into

Aurengabad. Nothing is more honourable than what happened there. I am sending to France some interesting extracts from your letters which will surely be read with much satisfaction. Be of good cheer, dear Bussy, you are acting with grandeur and dignity. This duty could not have been entrusted to better hands. I thank you most heartily and I request you to continue always as you have done till now"... ..

"In truth, there is nothing more glorious in the reign of our king. These events, well related, will occupy a pre-eminent place in the records of his reign".

"All that you say regarding the glory to be derived by the King and the nation is perfectly true and if they be indebted to me for the idea, what do they not owe you for its execution. I have told you many a time that I cannot thank you sufficiently, or too often entreat you to continue and finish what you have so well begun".

The undreamt of horizons suddenly sprang up in the imaginative mind of Dupleix. Aurengabad was closer to Delhi than to Pondicherry. Why should the French not extend their supremacy over the whole of India? When 1,100 kilometres had been crossed without the loss of even a single man, except through illness, it seemed quite easy to march right up to the Moghul capital. Yet Dupleix did not mean to wend his steps in that direction. Bengal seemed more easy of conquest and more useful to the French interests.

Alivardi Khan, who had been reigning in Bengal since 1739, left in Indian History the name of having been a daring and resolute man. In spite of several misadventures, his enterprises were so cleverly conducted that they eventually ended to his advantage. It was just the very reason for which he might, either by fancy or by ambi-

tion, upset everything Would it not be to the interest of everybody to overthrow this man and substitute a more quiet and complacent prince ?

The candidate was ready at hand, it was Salabat Jang The prestige he had lately acquired in the Deccan would facilitate his accession Dupleix opened his mind to Bussy on the 4th August. The moment to take vengeance for all the affronts the French had received at Chander nagore, had at last arrived he said Alivardi Khan's power was but an enticement and with the help of the French troops Salabat Jang could easily be triumphant

What benefits would the French not reap from this revolution ! When Salabat Jang would be set up in Bengal the French must obtain possession of all the villages round about Chander nagore whose revenues brought in 100 to 200 000 Rupees. The French settlements of Pondicherry Karikal Mahé and Mazulipatnam had started and developed in this manner The French Indian Empire would gradually be formed by such successive additions.

As a matter of course Bussy was to be appointed to carry out these expeditions. As Dupleix had reasons for believing that the Company would not fall in with his ideas, he requested Bussy to submit them directly to the Company, they would distrust his proposals coming from him, he could even say certain things which were not permissible to Dupleix (letter 4th August)

The scheme was grandiose. But Dupleix does not seem to have taken the time to mature it nor did he seem to have attached much importance to it, since, while exposing his plan to Bussy he earnestly implores for secrecy. However it is sufficient that he had the idea to say that, owing to his generous ambition for his country and for himself,

Dupleix lost all sense of reality no sooner an idea has struck his mind. Without consolidating the results achieved he was ever willing to advance further. The French had not yet begun the siege of Trichinopoly at the time, and Muhammad Ali continued to be a threat to them in the Carnatic.

Besides, the internal matters, in the Deccan were not really disquieting but they were none the less causing some anxiety. The success of the French had increased their prestige, but it had also developed a certain amount of national spirit among the people. Who were these Frenchmen who remained back in the country less to protect it than to domineer it? To test the feelings of every one, Dupleix suggested to Bussy a rather ingenious plan, a rumour was to be discreetly spread that the French having completed their task were on the eve of departing and permission to return to Pondicherry was to be asked in open durbar. It was a necessary trial. No doubt that the Suba would want to keep back the French, but what would be the attitude of his ministers and the mighty men of his Kingdom? Dupleix expected that, even if these wanted the French to go away from the Deccan, they would refrain from expressing their wish; on the contrary they would probably request the French to give up their proposals of departure. So they could stay on without being told that they had other aims than simply that of protecting the country. Their enemies themselves would have to pretend believing in the disinterestedness of the French.

Dupleix made known once again to Bussy his strong determination that no new reward was to be demanded of the Suba, as the price for the continuation of their services (letter dated 8th August). Bussy and other

officers had made enough money and thereafter only gratitude was to be shown to the Nawab (1).

Finally Dupleix had the idea of getting Salabat Jang to write to the King of France and to the Controller General and send presents of 2 lakhs of rupees to the former and Rs 50 000 to the latter in order to produce a greater effect (2). It is well known that personally Dupleix never hesitated to make use of such means of persuasion, but instead of money he generally sent jewels, lace or curios from India.

Bussy was just as much aware as Dupleix of the feelings of the people at the Court of the Suba. He too knew that the French authority was accepted with some uneasiness even by the very one who benefitted by it. Immediately after his arrival at Aurengabad he took all the necessary measures not to fall a victim to surprise or treachery. He had chosen a fortress at the very extremity of the city from where he could have an eye on the whole country as residence for himself and the European soldiers. He had also imposed the strictest discipline the men were not to go out except at certain hours and in small batches, and even that only with permission.

Thus too frequent contact with the native population would be avoided and there would be less debauchery and quarrels. The slightest fault was very severely punished.

(1) Several officers who had become rich asked to go to the coast, but Dupleix refused to grant their request.

(2) Dupleix was very particular that presents should be in accordance with the dignity of the person to whom they were being offered. Following the agreement between Salabat Jang and Balaji Rao of the preceding April, both these had sent Dupleix a *serpeau* (Court dress). Dupleix deemed that the one sent by Salabat Jang was below his rank so he made him add 2 lakhs of rupees in order that it should not be said that the Prince did not know to show his gratitude (letter dated 27th June)

It made the Indians look upon the French no longer as rulers whose presence was a constant source of offense to their religious and national feelings, but as discreet friends who gave them good example of order and respect for laws. The authority of the French became greater especially among the lesser people who were resigned, before hand, to all sorts of despotism and it was not common to find the high class people entrusting their money and their belongings to the protection of the French soldiers.

As for Bussy, he had made good the former recommendations of Dupleix. Under the pressure of events and no less by contact with men so different to him in race, religion, and general ideas of life, Bussy had shaped himself so as to accomodate his character to the circumstances. While remaining distant and somewhat sceptic regarding the qualities of those whom he protected, he had by degrees become more yielding, more conciliatory and more "affable", as Dupleix used to say. He avoided being a nuisance to the Suba or to his ministers by frequent audiences, but in every transaction, of some importance, his "invisible but ever present" hand made them feel his occult power. He knew how to deal with the great Indian lords, who were so exuberant and at the same time so indifferent, and without being duped by them he showed them apparent deference which neither their titles nor their virtues called for. He behaved as though the initiative of the acts which he himself had inspired, really came from them and by flattering their self love he more easily obtained the concessions or the advantages he needed. Personally averse to unnecessary pomp, he never hesitated to appear before the Suba in the most stupendous ceremonial attire in conformity with the habits and traditions of the Mughals. Even in his private

audiences simplicity was strictly interdicted. He would always appear with due regard to the majesty of the Sovereign and the country he represented. This pageantry would make him laugh to himself and as he wrote himself during an hour of good humour he promised to laugh still more on his return to France when he would recall to mind all these pure vanities while enjoying a walk in the gardens of "Palais royal". If modern expressions could be adapted to past events it could be said that no man handled more skillfully or more delicately the forms of the protectorate or those of indirect government.

Bussy did not carry out the apparent threats made by Dupleix about abandoning Salabat Jang to his fate. Circumstances did not allow it. At the very moment when it seemed that the authority of that Prince had been solidly established both within his own government and outside it a new thunder bolt was being prepared by the Maharattas and from Delhi so much so that the French support became more than ever indispensable. Gaziuddin had not given up hopes of reigning. It was reported in August that he was approaching from the North with 150 000 men, while Balaji Rao who had been paid to withdraw but whose friendship had not been purchased was getting ready to help Gaziuddin and was on his way from Poona or Ahmednagar with an army of 100 000 men. Terror spread in Aurengabad in the twinkling of an eye, it seemed as if the Deccan had already been invaded from the North and from the West, the less temerous spoke of abandoning the city and handing over a part of the territory to the enemy. Bussy was the only man or almost the only one to believe that not only the danger was remote but that it could be frustrated, to attain this time should not be given to the Maharattas but they should be attacked in their own territory. An open

offensive should be substituted to an ever dangerous defensive. Have we not troops for an offensive and success? If Bussy had shrunk from open battle against Balaji Rao a few months previously, it was only because he did not want to leave to the chances of a struggle the throne of Salabat Jang which was unsteady at that time, but now that this Prince had no opposition within his own territory it was but right that his prestige outside his Kingdom should be restored as well and the provocations of the enemy be challenged. These words spoken without boast, but without weakness either, restored full confidence to Salabat Jang and preparations for the war were begun.

Dupleix looked with anxiety at the approaching war, it would upset all his plans regarding Bengal. Deeming it was still possible to avoid the war, he suggested to Bussy the idea of entering into negotiations with Tarabai, the aunt of the Raja of Sattara and Balaji Rao's enemy. This lady had played a considerable role in the affairs of her country and she had still great influence. she might be asked to use it now for maintaining peace. Simultaneously negotiations might be carried on with Balaji Rao also since there was no ill feelings towards the integrity of Maratha territory, as such. If the French were to derive any benefit from these intrigues or negotiations, they should ask that Bassein near Bombay be ceded to them or that the *Chotaye* (one quarter of the authorized land revenue) which the Marathas obtained on the Carnatic, Trichinopoly, Mysore, Tanjore, Cuddapah, Kurnool and other places be left to them. The latter would be the better alternative. It would mean sure revenues to the French. Once rid of the Maratha nightmare, Dupleix would be free to attend the Bengal affair.

Bussy saw no impediment to his undertaking both these enterprises. He hoped to finish quickly with Balaji Rao and be able to go on to Bengal by December or January "If a nimble army were to join us either in Bengal or at Balassore the conquest of Bengal would be infallible" wrote Bussy

Events did not allow the realization of these hopes. To prepare for the expedition took longer than was expected, since the army left Aurengabad only on the 8th November. It was the rainy season and it was not yet certain whether there would be war or not. Balaji Rao had a vakil near Salabat Jang through whom daily contradictory views were exchanged and they had almost concluded that war or peace would truly be decided only when the two armies would be facing each other. If Balaji Rao had his supporters beside Salabat Jang the latter too had his informers in the Maratha camp. Following the advice given by Dupleix, Bussy had started negotiations with Tarabai and other Marathas who moved by hatred or dread of the *pechoua* turned their hopes towards the French. These negotiations were going on favourably. In case of war, Tarabai was to send 30 000 men to join the French and she undertook to pay Salabat Jang's army once the Bhima or Ganga was crossed.

The party in favour of the war succeeded. However the causes were more remote than they appear to be. In 1750 when Shao, the Maratha King was on his death bed, he left the regency of his young successor to Balaji Rao the *pechoua* one of the seven councillors of the Kingdom. Tarabai a very energetic lady the widow of Ram Raja who died in 1700 and the aunt of the young Prince carried him away and shut herself with him in Sattara. She was accompanied by two of the Councillors

of the Kingdom. Balaji Rao raised 80,000 horsemen against her. War was prolonged without any decisive result. Tarabai, losing all hopes of victory, had turned for help to Salabat Jang when he had come to the throne. It was to break up this coalition, rather than with any hostile intentions towards the Deccan, that Balaji Rao had entered the country a short while before. We have already seen how peace had been brought about. On returning to the Coast instead of going on with the war against Tarabai, Balaji Rao settled in his winter quarters at Poona.

Appeals from that princess, no less than fear of seeing Balaji Rao joining Gazuiddin caused Salabat Jang to make up his mind, five months later, to raise an army. This army ought to consist of 100,000 horsemen, 50,000 foot-soldiers, 300 pieces of artillery, 30,000 peons all of whom were to be followed by more than 400,000 useless mouths to feed and perhaps 200,000 head of cattle and 300 elephants. These added on to the probable reinforcements from Tarabai would make a formidable mass.

Sayyid Lashkar Khan and the Rajas of Sutangy and Janogy who were subjects of Salabat Jang, but devoted to Balaji Rao, fearing that the latter might be crushed, advised him to come to some terms, but Salabat Jang would not hear of any proposal. They thereupon wrote to Balaji Rao not to despair, that peace would be made in spite of all, before the Ganga had been crossed (letter from Kerjean to the Controller General dated 25th December 1751).

Although sure of success, Bussy did not want to leave things to chance. He realized the important consequences to the French reputation which would follow on the slightest failure. By successive additions of small batches,

his army had become 500 strong but many were sick On the 11th September there were 100 men laid up in hospital owing to the abuse of arrack and also to fever caused by the rainy season Bussy ceaselessly called for reinforcements and Dupleix sent all he could through Mazulipatam from where a rocky, unhealthy road led to Hyderabad

While both sides were preparing leisurely for war a letter was received from Delhi this time it was a real official letter which confirmed Salabat Jang as the Suba of the Deccan The firman had been obtained from the Moghul court by means of very costly intrigues which overruled all the opposition made by Gaziuddin This document was received at Aurengabad on the 23rd September by the booming of cannon and firing of musketry Bussy offered the Suba 24 golden rupees in the name of Dupleix, which were accepted with tokens of very great gratitude.

The same messenger announced also that Dupleix would shortly receive titles more high sounding than substantial of "ZAFFAR-JANG" and AFIJAZARY MAIMARATA ' and the more effective dignity of Nawab of Arcot of which he had obtained the *paravanas* from Muzaffar Jang and Salabat Jang More than 100 000 rupees had been spent in paying those who had used their influence in obtaining the above and also the necessary proceedings. The firman whereby Dupleix was made Nawab of Arcot reached Aurengabad on the 13th October and was immediately despatched to Pondicherry

To crown all these successes Bussy proposed that two embassies be sent, the one to the King of France and the other to the Moghul Emperor Bussy volunteered to go

himself to the latter while Kerjean should go to Paris. Unfortunately Kerjean raised financial pretensions which seemed exaggerated; he deemed that he would make a sorry figure at the Court of Versailles if he did not carry 10 to 15 lakhs in presents. The requirements of the war held Bussy back in the Deccan, so with much regret both the missions had to be given up.

By wishing to extend the French diplomatic relations up to Delhi, Bussy was undoubtedly working for the glorification of the French name and for that of Dupleix; but he did not overlook and rightly so the personal advantages to his ambition or to his interests which resulted therefrom. Writing to Dupleix on the 11th September he said: "when you write to Europe, I hope you will mention my good will and my services so that I may be esteemed... I leave to your care to make me and my reputation known to the Minister and to the Company".

When about to enter into the war he thought it good to renew to Dupleix his feelings of fidelity and devotion. He said he would consider himself the happiest of men if Dupleix were thoroughly convinced by his zeal and would but give him his esteem and friendship. that would be the best reward for all his labours.

"You may rely on me" he wrote on the 23rd September to Dupleix, as on one fully devoted to you through gratitude as through inclination; I give you my word of honour that my only thought is to discharge, to the best of my abilities, the duty you have entrusted to me. Your noble feelings have made the rudiments of honour which lay forth in me and I am now guided by this principle alone".

In another letter dated 15th October he says: "A gallant man should be led by measured ambition. I have

this ambition Sir, but it will never go beyond your wishes I place in your hands my furtherance and my rise' (1).

Continuing he wrote The good fame of the French and especially yours is such that all Mohomedans and Hindus wish to be governed by our nation the former owing to our discipline and order in military matters, every one here being ambitious of the post of becoming our cipahi, the latter owing to our uprightness in contracts and in business At times I feel proud of my tiny negotiations but until and unless I receive your approval I shall always think I am being prompted by self love

"I take upon myself to have the whole country up to the river Krishna granted to the French by the Emperor himself, but we need European troops. I could if I wanted to have 50 000 cavaliers in my service within a fortnight's time and the best troops in the country. They know only those who pay them liberally and they all wish to serve under the French

Finally when submitting a sort of a report to Machault, the Minister on the events in which he had taken part Bussy said

"There is nothing more glorious or more fortunate than what is happening in India for the past few years Dupleix has been leading things so wisely and so sternly that he deserves the highest praise-

I am trying just now to have the French exempted from paying any duty at all throughout the whole extent of the Mughal Empire. Commerce and war should go

(1) Bussy's ambition was then to be raised to the rank of Colonel later on and for the time being to be made a member of the Superior Council at Pondicherry

hand in hand here as elsewhere. I do my utmost to secure the friendship of the chiefs whose territories border our settlements, so that they may favour our commerce (letter dated 15th September 1751. A.C.C. 283 P. 22-23).

Such were Bussy's feelings towards Dupleix and such were also his general views on the Deccan question at the time when the struggle with the Marathas started. Bussy wrote with the confidence and the calmness of a man quite sure of success

A general view of the troops was held on the 14th October. The French troops spent the day in a garden close to the city. The Dewan and a score of high personages visited them. The soldiers were very neatly dressed and they had quite a smart appearance. They were made to parade while a torch light display was given at dusk: the whole city was out to see them. The Dewan was delighted to see them and he assured Bussy that the review had brought about victory and millions to the Nawab. "Balaji Rao would not be long in finding thus out for himself".

Bussy writes: "I have obtained, from the owner of the garden who is a noble man, leave to spend the day therein. On arrival I passed orders forbidding the soldiers and the Sepoys from touching anything in that garden except an orange which a soldier had already taken. The gardener brought a complaint, I sent for the soldier and made him pay Rs 100 to the gardener. This went greatly to my credit. Such is the discipline I try to maintain everywhere".

Everything seemed to point to victory. Lashkar Khan who till then had been very hesitating, now openly proclaimed the necessity of war. Fakirs went about the

roads telling everybody that advantage should be taken of the presence of French soldiers to crush the Marathas the French had been sent by God to save country In the enemy camp Raja's widow and the chiefs were willing to give one quarter of the Carnatic to the French The Angrias bound themselves to stop all piracy on the French vessels and requested the French to establish a settlement in one of their harbours Many others who though not siding with the French, said that the affairs of the Suba were being led by God and that Balaji Rao was in a hopeless position.

At last the army started on the 8th November the next day it was at 2 leagues from Aurengabad The Maratha territory was two days ahead

At this solemn moment Bussy again made known to Dupleix that all would go well and that he could be depended upon

"The rank which I take good care to retain here must be pleasing to you. Whenever I accompany the Nawab I walk beside him while the other lords walk ten paces behind us. I cannot too often repeat that the great and the small overwhelm us with friendship. Some among them choke with jealousy but dread us. They undoubtedly elevate us and our nation to the highest pinnacle of glory I can only ask you to be reassured

I want, Sir to make a reputation for myself on a footing to that of a member of my family (1). I want to make the French nation illustrious for ever and to procure untold benefits to it, it is from you that the nation

(1) The exact member of his family to which Bussy alludes is unknown Probably he means the lord d'Orgy mentioned at the beginning of this book

draws greatness and privileges, but I would like to be at least the instrument which you made use of. Rely on me as on a son.

"I close this (letter) by requesting you to be easy of mind regarding the happenings of this country. I will take advantage of all for the glory of the King and the interests of the nation. I have more things in my mind than I can express to you, all your recommendations are ever present to my memory. So once again I pray you be easy. If whatever happens here were to obtain for me promotions and rank, I want them only for real work done so that my services be strong motives in your hand to obtain my advancement."

Meanwhile the army was plodding along with prudent slowness. It passed through Ahmednagar when Bussy ordered all unnecessary baggage to be left behind (2)

Wai had not yet been declared; this happened only on the 23rd November following a solemn meeting of the durbar. The Souba had a four hours' conversation with Bussy on the day previous and they had decided to hold a great council the next day. All the leaders of the army were there. On being consulted Bussy replied that the interests of the Suba demanded that Balaji Rao be destroyed. If the Council was of opinion that peace should be made with Balaji Rao, then the French would fight for their own interests. Let it be understood that this declaration of Bussy had been previously arranged between him and the Suba. The assembly thereupon unanimously sided for war.

(2) Kerjean writing says "It would be difficult to enumerate the equipage, the followers, the rabble, the fakirs and the baggage which followed us."

The army now set out at full speed towards Poona the Maratha Capital distant about 60 leagues from Aurengabad On the 26th the army was at 20 *cosses* from Poona and at only 10 from Balaji Rao's army The European troops were once again reviewed on the 28th November Out of 498 men including 101 who had recently arrived from Mazulipatam 80 had either deserted or died since the army had left Aurengabad 8 had already died The figures do not include a company of 57 men which had left Pondicherry and of which 20 were missing The total number of men was therefore 455 of whom 44 were absolutely useless for war service and had to be left behind at Ahmednagar Finally it was with only 411 men that Bussy helped Salabat Jang to engage the battle against the Maratha (1) (B N 9159 P 3-4)

The events which occurred then justified Bussy's provisions and constitute one of the most extraordinary chapter of the French Colonial History

On the very next day some skirmishes took place with Balaji Rao, who, according to the custom of his nation, ceaselessly vexed the adversary while refusing to fight Bussy had been giving his orders of march and of battle, but they were not carried out for two reasons first and foremost from want of discipline which is the general case in all Indian armies secondly from fear of the Marathas and owing to Salabat Jang's men wanting to be protected on all sides by French troops. So Bussy laid out his army in the following manner For the

(1) From a letter written by Karjean on the 25th December to the Controller General we learn that the French troops were made up of 300 infantry of whom there were 50 grenadiers, 60 artillery men, 48 Kaffirs, 32 East Indians, 6 white workmen 6 servants, 3 000 Sepoys of whom 500 were on horseback they had 10 pieces of 2 3 Swedish guns, 11 smaller ones, 2 mortars and 2 stone throwers. Popular imagination greatly multiplied these figures (A. O. C 283 p. 144 150)

Mohomedans. Aboulker Khan as advance guard with Sayyid Lashkar Khan at the rear; the troops of the Dewan and of some of the leaders to the right and to the left, each of these positions included at least 15,000 horsemen. The French were posted as an advance guard under Kerjean with 100 Europeans, Kaffirs and East Indians, 18 artillery men and 500 Sepoys commanded by Sheikh Ibrahim and 4 cannons Vincens, Aymard and Muzaffar Khan as rear guards with 3 cannons 70 soldiers and 300 Sepoys; on either side of the army 3 cannons 50 soldiers and 300 Sepoys under Degray to the right and Ruffet to the left respectively. At the centre stood Bussy, the Suba, his Dewan and 5 or 6 other chiefs with 5,000 horsemen. Bussy and Muzaffar Khan were to go to wherever the fight would be the most severe.

Thus at the time of the battle, Salabat Jang had at his disposal at least 60,000 men while the French had only 411 Europeans and 5,800 Sepoys. Balaji Rao had more or less an equal number of troops trained to fight according to the method in use since the time of the Great Sivaji

The army marched on for three days without encountering the enemy. On the fourth day some foragers, having gone out too far were attacked by the Marathas and had to turn back. The next day about ten keenly fought combats occurred at various places and one especially at the entrance of the Gate, where Kerjean knocked Balaji Rao head over heels. When relating this event to Dupleix, Bussy said that the Marathas ran up the hill sides on horse back as if they were so many kids. Beyond the mountains there was a vast plain. The Marathas troops, having reformed there, fell on the left of Salabat Jang's army throwing some confusion. Bussy ran up with 100 Europeans, 300 Sepoys and a few Indians,

but having stepped out too far and not receiving proper support, he suddenly found himself very exposed without being able to draw back. He called to help Degray and his footmen and, thus reinforced, he fell on the enemy with the dragoons. The Marathas fled in disorder after losing 4 to 500 horsemen. Salabat Jang now came up to Bussy and warmly congratulated him. The other leaders of the army likewise admitted that if it had not been for the French, Balaji Rao would have been victorious.

Bussy wanted to take advantage of this success to follow up Balaji Rao before he took any rest and attack him thoroughly, but the Dewan dissuaded him, fearing all his movements would probably be known to the enemy at once. But on the night between the 3rd and 4th December there was an eclipse of the moon. It is a time when Hindus perform ceremonies, a terrible uproar was being made in the Maratha camp to drive away the dragon which was devouring the moon. The Dewan himself agreed there would never occur a more propitious moment for the attack. Everything was immediately got ready and one hour after midnight Bussy and his men were suddenly in the midst of the enemy's camps which was only at one league away from that of the French. Balaji Rao was vainly warned by three rockets, three gun shots and about 50 *Alcaras* (messengers), he was however surprised and fled naked to the hills; he ran on foot for about half an hour when he succeeded in finding a horse on whose back he did a non-stop 7 leagues journey with the remains of his army. All that the Marathas possessed was abandoned in their camp. The rout of the enemy was as complete as the success had been on the French side. At dawn Bussy flung the pursuing of the Marathas to be done by some 10 000 horsemen from the Suba's troops.

Following this battle Bussy was received as a victorious general by the Suba. All the leaders of the army had assembled. The Dewan came to meet Bussy at fifty paces from his tent and before embracing him scattered a great deal of coin over his head, according to the Hindu custom. Then Bussy as also Kerjean, Vincens, Muzaffar Khan and Sheikh Ibrahim, who had particularly distinguished themselves, were led to the Suba. The latter moved forwards two steps to embrace Bussy, to whom and to the four other officers presents and jewels were offered.

Bussy writing that very day to Dupleix said: I need hardly mention all the honour which will be reflected on our nation as a result of what has just taken place. You realize this better than I can do Balaji Rao's reputation was such as made the Emperor himself tremble all over his body. His father had, as was the expression of the people, touched the gates of Delhi with his spear. All the veterans at the Durbar recalled stories since Tamarlain; they said they had never before witnessed the like of this victory I could not tell you how often the name of Nawab Governor (Dupleix) was called out; this nation rightly praises you; for it you have sacrificed your patrimony, your health and your family. It should never be forgotten that the glory which the nation acquires this day in this part of the world is due to your valour, your firmness and your wisdom You have been attracted here by your talent; therefore our success is not surprising; as for me the motives which guide me and from which I swear I shall never depart are the glory of the King and yours and the general interest of the nation.

“Fifty bearers have been sent to Delhi to carry these tidings. The great and the little of this army have written about this event to that Capital I would never end if I were to say how you and the nation are being spoken of;

you are rightly raised to the highest glory The effect produced by this event in this part of Asia is indescribable. Most of the Mohomedan and Maratha lords had already heard of the valour of our nation, but they thought all this was false or at least exaggerated Balaji Rao himself to whom had been told all that happened at the Carnatic did not believe the reports and attributed our victory over Nasir Jang to the treachery of the Pathans, he therefore has learnt to his shame what the French can do, though he said that they would not be able to prevent him from defeating Salabat Jang

The French victory of the 4th December was above all a moral success. The losses of the Marathas had not been great and the booty very small The Indian horsemen sent to pursue the fugitives refused to proceed unless the French also marched, but these were dropping through fatigue. If it had not been for this ill luck and if Balaji Rao's men were not as Bussy so picturesquely put it, like birds able to cover five or six leagues in less than one hour and half they could have been utterly crushed on the same day itself

The march to Poona was resumed on the 5th, after a day's rest. On the 6th the army was 10 leagues while on the 13th only 5 leagues away Balaji Rao was undiscernible. He usually set his camp at one or one and a half leagues away from the advancing army and would shift it further every second hour while he would be five or six leagues away on the following morning To keep him awake Bussy made our troops move here and there during the night without any particular motive but just to maintain the enemy in ceaseless dread

On the 10th Balaji Rao had a slight advantage He attacked unexpectedly a party of 10 to 12 thousand

Muhammadan horsemen, and he would have had a complete victory had not Vincens, and Aymard come to their assistance in time, with a detachment of 50 Europeans, 200 Sepoys and 2 cannons. By this move the Muhammadan horsemen were caught between the French and the enemy. The Muhammadans continuing to advance were soon mixed up with the men from the Deccan and great confusion prevailed for a while. The French could not use their arms lest the shots fell on the whole lot, Finally this had to be done. Everybody fled and the French were left alone on the battle-field. Bussy called back Kerjean from the rear-guard. The arrival of this new reinforcement made Balaji Rao realize that he would not secure the victory, so he beat a hasty retreat. The action had been brisk and Balaji Rao had 1 500 to 2,000 men either killed or wounded. The Muhammadans lost at least 900 men. Nazerbi Khan, their general, was wounded and a dozen officers killed. The French had 50 Sepoys and 20 Europeans wounded.

Balaji Rao greatly discouraged would have willingly concluded the peace on the morrow of the night attack which had thrown such confusion among his troops; but his friends at Salabat Jang's court longed only for the downfall of the Suba, but his victory had asserted his authority still more. To prevent peace from being concluded, these partisans did not transmit the exact terms which Balaji Rao would have accepted from Salabat Jang.

Treachery was evident, Lashkai Khan, Sultangy and Januji who had been placed as rear-guard had not moved at all during the battle of the 10th December. Unfortunately Salabat Jang's authority was not sufficiently well established as yet to dare adopt rigorous measures against these men. Salabat Jang could undoubtedly rely on the French, but they were so few and there was no guarantee

that they would always be victorious Neither Tarabai nor the other Maratha chiefs had sent the promised help. Army food was running short, the whole country had been devastated while the risk of the discouragement which slowly crept into the minds of the people might become generalised Peace became a necessity for the one party as for the other Balaji Rao might think that *we would reach Poona some day, if the war were prolonged* Would the Maratha empire resist such a trial? Already four or five Maratha leaders were preparing to settle in independent principalities in the North On the other hand Salabat Jang had to consider the moral confusion prevailing in his army and to guard himself against the secret treacheries which surrounded him

However the war was continued for some days more but Poona was no more the objective. The food question was daily becoming more serious. The country side was no longer overrun for laurels but for food The troops lived by pillaging and driving out the inhabitants of the villages and by taking all that they possessed More than 300 villages had thus been either burnt or ravaged, and grains in the blade were consumed to the extent of more than 20 lakhs in short the whole country was ruined

Balaji Rao did not know what to do, on whichever side he turned he met the French. He had already 4 000 men killed among whom were 34 chiefs, and 2 000 wounded, while the French had lost only 2 Europeans wounded and a few Sepoys

About the 1st day of January, Balaji Rao made new peace proposals But they were not accepted owing to the financial demands of Salabat Jang Balaji Rao knew the distress in which the Suba found himself and he preferred

Altho^{ugh} Poona had not been taken nor had the
supposed riches of Balaji Rao been handed over yet, this
peace was as none the less a success. The authority of both
Salabat Jang and Bussy was consolidated, but that of
Salabat Jang was at the cost of his independence he was
becoming more and more obligated to the French. So he
was losing in esteem what he was gaining in power. They
dreaded him more but they had less consideration for
him. Bussy on the other hand did not seem pleased. He
showed himself anxious and sullen during several days
avoiding to meet any one, Kerjean himself was unable to
read his mind. Was he put out with himself for having
been wanting in severity towards Lashkar Khan and
Janaji who had openly betrayed him? Or was he afraid
of being secretly blamed for not having completely des-
troyed the Maratha Empire? Or was it merely the long
weariness both of the body and of the mind followed by

once determined him to join Bussy and Salabat Jang. He promised to attack
by sea while the allies attacked on land. Unfortunately the war was decided
upon only at the end of November and, when Bussy's letter requesting him
to take part was signed in the meantime did not cut short these negotiations:
peace which would be for the future. In the month of March Salabat Jang wrote
plans were laid as follows: I note with very great satisfaction the new
to Lavora friendship and alliance with you and your nation. The fact
assurance of allied to those to whom I owe all, namely the French, is
that you are come to give myself entirely in your hands and to dread losing
sufficient for me. I admit, my Lord, that I had no knowledge of you or of
your friendship but Mr de Bussy not only wished that I should be allied
your nation, he welfare of my State but he has made me desire ardently to
with you for a true friend. You are quite right in saying that nothing could
be your intimate alliance. With the small number of French men around me I
resist our trip to overcome the most formidable difficulties, and to strong
have been able to possessions of my father I have had to take towns and fight
than me in the All this is the work of the French. What then will it not be
many battles, forces which are said to be rather important: shall have joined
when your fort (1861, p 150-161).

sudden relaxation and a great need of rest? No one can answer these questions with certainty.

Be that as it may, the events which followed soon brought him back to activity. The treaty which had been signed on the 17th January was broken of three days later. Balaji Rao wanted that a man named Sinnapetty, the only member of the Maratha Council who had sided with the allies and who had been passed into their ranks, be handed over to him. He wanted also that no reprisals be taken against Ragogy Bonsla for not keeping his word after promising to help the allies. He also asked to be allowed to detain, during two more months, the fortress of Nacer Termeque which was one of the five the Marathas had to restore. Not thinking of the shortage of food and munitions and the state of ferment in which the army stood, the Dewan refused to grant the above requests: yet to give some satisfaction to Balaji Rao, Sinnapetty was asked to leave the country, so he took refuge with Januji.

This was the concession for which Balaji Rao cared the least. The detaining of Nacer Termeque was much more interesting to him. This was the very spot the Dewan was bent on getting back. The army marched for three days without meeting the enemy. On the fourth day a ghat, which the greatest conquerors had avoided, was reached. The pass was made of devilish rocks and peaks surrounded by precipices. However the Dewan ordered to go through it. Balaji Rao tried once more to enter into negotiations. Seyid Lashker Khan and Januji were of opinion to give in instead of proceeding further. But the army had neither water nor forage; necessity obliged the army to go beyond and cross the ghat, the next day.

Vexed by this refusal Balaji Rao undertook to occupy several defiles and thus bar the passage of the Suba's

troops. The Marathas have already caused some troubles among the Muhammadan troops when Le Normand and Sheikh Ibrahim arrived to their rescue the former with the artillery and the latter with French Sepoys. They chased out the Marathas from their positions, scattered them on the plain and pursued them. When Kerjean heard the sound of the cannon, he hastened with some reinforcements and established himself strongly in the conquered positions. The honour of that day goes undoubtedly to Ramdas Pendekar who did not hesitate to enter the pass where he could easily have held back 10 000. The Suba showed his gratitude once again to Bussy by offering him some jewels as presents.

The Dewan had promised to Lashkar Khan that he would go no farther, but impelled by success he continued to pursue the Marathas the next day and the days that followed and he almost always beat them with very little loss on his side. The shortage of food once again opened up negotiations. This time they were effective and Januji had a conference with Balaji Rao and after six days talk peace was concluded.

Nothing was altered in the terms of the treaty of the 17th January except that Naoer Termeque would be handed over to the Suba after a delay of one month instead of two. The sole victim was the unfortunate Sinnapetty who had been recalled when hostilities had been reopened and who was again sacrificed.

After concluding peace Balaji Rao had gone to Poona while his brother went to Gujerat to force Sinnapetty to pay him one half of the *chotaye* (chouth) of that province. The Suba's troops returned slowly to Aurengabad and threefourths of them were dismissed. Salabat Jang invalided about 17 000 horsemen and 6 000 peons. The more impor-

tant leaders were allowed to return to their provinces. Januji went back after solemnly affirming his friendship towards the French. The army so disbanded was reduced at 12 000 horsemen and a few thousand *Kaitockers* (footmen). The French troops also were much reduced. Their help was no longer needed. Kerjean and Vincens took advantage of this to retire. They were replaced by Goupil and Mainville, who though not absolutely ignorant of Indian affairs had still much to learn about the Deccan. Kerjean was to return to France in view to relate to the King and to the Company the events which he had witnessed, but it was no more the pompous embassy he had yearned for. Before starting he reconciled himself with Bussy, whose succession he had often longed for and whose policy he had often criticised. As to Vincens he was ill and died on the following 16th August at Pondicherry aged 28.

Ramdas Pendet, who remained as the all powerful master, most secretly informed Bussy that he was only waiting for the French reinforcements to have Sayyid Lashkar Khan, Sultangy, Januji and the other chieftains, suspected of treachery, put to death. Bussy and Kerjean had no objections to this, but they feared he wont have enough firmness to carry out his intention when the moment came for it. Nobody was to be relied upon: the treasury was empty and seven month's pay was due to the troops. The Sepoys were quiet because they feared the French; but if the French were to turn their backs a revolution might break out. What could Ramdas do in such unfavourable surroundings? He undoubtedly had Indian wits and dissimulation, which were the talents needed to impose on the populace; but he was wanting

in judgment, at times. By despoiling some high personages of their jaghirs, he had got their backs up against himself

During all this time Dupleix had been following with great care and attention all the ups and downs of the struggle with Balaji Rao. He had strongly recommended to Bussy to conclude a treaty only at Poona, but he understood that the shortage of men and provisions had forced Bussy to make a compromise. This compromise might at some future date be useful to the French. If Salabat Jang's authority were to tumble down, who can say that the French might not need the support of the Marathas even if they had to share the sovereignty of the country with them? Consequently the measured and well thought out attitude of Bussy towards Balaji Rao received the fullest approval of Dupleix. He was deeply moved when he thanked Bussy for all the glory that he had won for the King and the nation as also for all the benefits which the Company would derive therefrom.

Dupleix made no more mention about Bengal. His mind was engrossed in more important matters. The expedition sent to Trichinopoly was dragging on in an unexpected manner. Law did not get along but was spending his time in useless manoeuvres which wearied the army. Now that peace had been concluded with Balaji Rao, Dupleix thought that the best solution would be to ask Salabat Jang for help and request him either to attack Mysore or march on to Trichinopoly or undertake both.

Salabat Jang fell in with these views. It was decided that Bussy was to start his operations from the source of the Krishna, attacking the Mysore on the back while an army composed exclusively of Indian troops would march directly against Trichinopoly through the Carnatic. The commander of this army was to be Neamet Ulla Khan.

a former *faussedar* (governor) at Rajamuudry who had, once upon a time, joined the English.

Writing to Dupleix about Neamet Ulla Khan Kerjean said : "He will soon be trained. During the last war with the Marathas, he was shown himself as the most stern, the bravest and the most honest of the men. He seems sincerely faithful to Salabat Jang, his relative and he wishes to ascend to some high situation. He is in good repute here and is the most polite and gracious Moghul known to me" (Letter to Dupleix dated 17th February 1752).

Neamet Ulla Khan, who was just then with his army near the source of the Bhima, started on the 28th February with 5 000 horsemen to join the main body of the army near Kurnool. He intended to go straight on to Trichinopoly but he had no money and would have been obliged to stop several times along the way to raise tributes. It meant so much time wasted for the war. To begin with, at Kurnool itself, he had to bring to subjection the Pathans who had taken advantage of the events in the Deccan to reassert a sort of independence; since October, they had been a source of great worry to Salabat Jang, while Muzaffar Khan, who has obtained the government of their country has been forced to give it up. In order to help the latter to get back his rights, Neamet Ulla Khan left for Kurnool in the early days of April with 2 000 horsemen and 4 pieces of artillery. The Pathans were easily overcome, but the march on Trichinopoly was not so easy. The army moved on very slowly as if it had been mysteriously warned not to take an active part in the war. By the end of April the Krishna had not been crossed. In spite of these delays Dupleix proclaimed that the immense army from the Deccan, supported on the East by that under Bussy, would shortly arrive at Trichinopoly. Was not this

a means to make the Mysoreans and Morari Rao wish to withdraw from the coalition into which they had entered?

These efforts were fruitless. Before it was known, for a fact, whether Neamet Ulla Khan's army was a real menace or merely a scarecrow a terrible revolution burst forth in Hyderabad, re-opening the whole question. Ramdas Pendet was murdered either on the 3rd or 4th May. This event, which might have the gravest consequences for the Deccan, obliged Bussy, as also Dupleix and Salabat Jang not to proceed further against Trichinopoly before their horizon had been cleared.

FROM THE MURDER OF RAMDAS PENDET TO THE TIME OF BUSSY'S DEPARTURE FOR THE COAST

From a rapidly held enquiry it was ascertained that the murder of Ramdas Pendet was due to some officers who were claiming in vain for the arrears of their pay, but public opinion, which was turning more and more hostile, attributed the crime to the French and to the Suba. Nevertheless owing to the presence of the French, there was neither tumult nor rowdyism in the streets, but order prevailed everywhere. The brother of the victim who was governor of Golconda, fearing a similar fate appealed to the French for protection, accordingly Kerjean deputed 50 men to guard him. A very interesting discovery was made a few days later. Romi Khan a Persian translator sent by Dupleix to Bussy found among the last

Dewan's papers, a letter from Chanda Sahib to the Moghul wherein he asks, for the firman of the Carnatic, another letter from the last Dewan himself to Muhammad Ali, in which he promises the support from Mysore and from Morari Rao, and other letters whereby Ramdas Pendet had undoubtedly tried to stop the march of Neamet-ulla Khan on Trichinopoly. This duplicity is easy to explain; the Dewan, having to bear ceaselessly the yoke of the foreigner, was all the more in a hurry to shake it off completely. (B. N. 9159 p. 60 and foll.)

Bussy was at Aurengabad when the murder occurred. He was not moved very much by the news as he was simultaneously informed that no serious outbreak had followed the murder. Just as a precautionary measure, he made a display of arms and published the speedy arrival of European reinforcements; then he set about to have a new Dewan appointed. None of the nobles at the Court was in favour of the French, but as it is better to have dealings with a known enemy than with a doubtful friend, Bussy thought that the best means to put an end to the intrigues of Lashkar Khan would be to raise him to power. Salabat Jang, who owed all to the French and who could not as yet manage without their help, would know to keep Lashkar Khan within proper limits by exerting a certain amount of control over all his doings. Bussy writing to Moracin says: "Now that Salabat Jang governs by himself or rather through us, what does it matter whether the new Dewan is a little more or less devoted to us than his predecessor was?" In this way, the death of Ramdas Pendet, far from being prejudicial to the French, turned to their advantage. Sayyid Lashkar Khan was appointed Dewan and a few weeks later he exchanged this title for that of Prime Minister.

To counteract his action, it was important to establish Salabat Jang in perfect security. Everything seemed to point to this the honour as also the interests of the French. No difficulty was forthcoming from Salabat Jang himself over the guardianship, he was fully aware that if the French were to abandon him his life would immediately cease being in safety. Ramdas Pendet's drastic end and the raising of Lashkar Khan were not conclusive to give Salabat Jang much confidence either in his own subjects or in his own government. Consequently he ceaselessly called for reinforcements but as the events at Trichinopoly were turning against the French, it seemed improbable that Bussy should be receiving any more troops so Salabat Jang spoke of going in person to Pondicherry and even to France to solicit aid from the King himself while offering him one half of his Kingdom in return, provided the other half be formally guaranteed to him. These anxieties of the Suba are made known in a series of letters written by Romi Khan to Dupleix between the 19th May and the 8th July, he said that the Suba slept neither by night nor by day while the Dewan neither eat nor drink pending the arrival of the reinforcements, but Romi Khan himself, reflecting probably Bussy's ideas was far from being so pessimistic. The fears of the Suba and those of the Dewan were their own too, the situation on the whole was not unfavourable to the French. From Romi Khan's saying everybody called down blessings on Dupleix and wished to be of his own religion to worship him, God showered honour glory and advantages on the French, verily things were happening in this part of India such as had never been seen in Asia before.

From the outset Dupleix had realized that no evil consequence would befall the French through the murder of

Ramdas Pendet. But as usual his imagination carried him away to the most unexpected consequences.

A revolution such as the one which had jeopardized the power of Muhammad Shah in 1738 was apprehended at Delhi simultaneously to the disappearance of Ramdas Pendet. An Afghan, named Ahmad Abdalli, had crossed the rivers of the Punjab. Nothing was ready to oppose him. There was terrible confusion at the Court and when it was necessary to march against the invader, the Great Vizir Mansour Ali was struggling against internal intrigues, the least dangerous of which was not that of Gaziuddin. The Moghul emperor might fall a victim to the torment, Dupleix asked himself whether it would be better to come to some understanding with Balaji Rao either to reinstate the emperor on the throne or to impede the further progress of the new invader into Bengal, to the prejudice of the Deccan and even of the Maratha kingdom itself. In either eventuality the allies could demand the city of Surat with a jaghir of 5 of 6,00,000 Rupees as the price of their help. The jaghir would be given to the French at the time of the sharing, while Salabat Jang would get Mysore. The advantages which were to accrue to the Marathas were not so clearly stated.

To return to the Deccan affairs, Dupleix approved Bussy's prudent yet firm conduct, but he was of opinion that for the safety of Salabat Jang himself, it would be preferable to imprison his three brothers within the fortress of Golconda under the guard of 50 Europeans and 200 Sepoys. According to Dupleix, these three were at the bottom of the various intrigues, as perfidious as they were secret, which most vitally sapped

the French authority—especially Nizam Ali. Nevertheless Dupleix totally refused getting rid of them through crime (letter to Bussy dated 15th July 1752).

As regards the reinforcements asked for by Salabat Jang, Dupleix was more than ever convinced that his personal power lay essentially in his having been invested as the Nawab of the Carnatic by the Suba himself, he was therefore all the more interested in giving support to that Prince, but what could he do when things were turning out so badly at Trichinopoly? In spite of all he was determined to uphold Salabat Jang by every means in his power, and it was this idea which urged him towards the end of May, to propose abandoning Trichinopoly to Muhammad Ali. Had his proposals been accepted, he would immediately have raised the strength of the European troops in the Deccan to 1,000 men

From more recent information it was learnt that if Lashkar Khan had shown himself unfavourable to the French at the beginning it was due to Ramdas Pendet who had methodically kept all others aloof in order to have himself more prized. He did not want the French to have any other friend apart from himself. Dupleix was convinced that by selecting Lashkar Khan, most of those who were dissatisfied would return to the French, while the nice ways of Bussy would do the rest. Bussy was asked to try and persuade the new Dewan that the French had no interested motive whatsoever and that their sole aim was and had always been to re-establish the Mohomedan reputation throughout India. To further these new relations, the happy developments of which would enhance French security, Dupleix had asked the Company to send such gifts as would attach Lashkar Khan steadfastly to the French, while Dupleix asked his own rela

tives to purchase other presents which he would offer personally to Lashkar Khan as tokens of good friendship, hoping that the Dewan would, through his loyal attitude, appreciate this indirect appeal to his intimacy.

Nevertheless Dupleix did not completely dupe himself with illusions, Lashkar Khan trustworthy to his previous attitude might, in spite of all the courtesy shown to him by the French, attempt to break Salabat Jang away from them and this Prince, docile to the advice of Lashkar Khan, might be led to reject the authority of the French even though he were to lose his own authority thereby. If such a thing were to occur, Dupleix held that the French should not withdraw gracefully leaving free entrance to their enemies, but it would be both difficult and dangerous to maintain French authority by means of force; this procedure should be resorted to only after all attempts to persuasion had been tried in vain. It was for this reason that Dupleix had recommended Bussy never to wound the Suba or the Dewan in their feelings of national self love and always to leave to them the semblance of complete independence

Dupleix writing to Bussy on the 5th June says: "What I ceaselessly request of you is, as far as possible, never to let the Suba realize that he is dependent on us; the stronger you are the more you should appear to be most obligated to him for all things and the more eager for his safety and the more ready to follow his orders."

To uphold Salabat Jang at all costs, seemed to have been the principle which dominated the policy of Dupleix. That man was the creature of the French, he was sacred to them. The French owed the investiture of the Carnatic to him; if he were to disappear all their titles might cease being lawful. The French and Salabat Jang were linked together by interests common to both of them.

Yet Dupleix noted with bitterness that although this policy was being applied intelligently by Bussy and that his attempts were understood by his officers who testified their admiration to him in their private letters yet there were also many sceptics even within his own staff, so he was afflicted without being discouraged

On the 5th June Dupleix wrote to Bussy; "By God's grace all things will turn to the best interests of the nation for which I am sacrificing so many years of my life Will she be grateful to me for this? God alone can say, because I am surrounded by people with vile motives who at the bottom of their hearts despair of the prosperity of the nation to which they belong and rejoice at its misfortunes. What is in store for them? They ignore it. Envy chokes them '

At the time when Dupleix wrote the above lines, the French were in a hopeless condition at Trichinopoly, but such was the interest he took in the Deccan affairs that in spite of imminent catastrophe at Trichinopoly Dupleix did not hesitate to send a brig to Mazulipatam carrying munitions The Revd Monjustin a chaplain the Surgeon Guyonnet another doctor two blacksmiths, two carpenters and a few coolies all of whom were to be sent on to Hyderabad left by the same brig But he had no soldiers to spare (2nd June).

Law's surrender ten days later might have had the most disastrous consequences in the Deccan had Dupleix not been clever enough to represent to Salabat Jang that if this misfortune had occurred it was because the French had preferred to uphold his safety by not shifting their troops which guarded his state and thereby they had run the risk of a failure at Trichinopoly There was no reason to be moved about it; if in the pride of their victory

Muhammad Ali and the English approached him, he should send them on to Dupleix, nothing was endangered. Reinforcements were daily expected to arrive from Europe and those which landed first would be immediately despatched to complete up to 1,000 men the French troops in the Deccan. The "DIANE" arrived in just then from France (21st June) carrying 45 officers and 900 men. Dupleix was willing to send 500 men to Bussy at once; and in fact he sent 460 within the next three months.

This presence of mind in an almost desperate circumstance is most admirable. The will power of Dupleix was never so lucid or so strong as when in the midst of adversity. Far from being down hearted by ill-luck, he sought, in the Deccan itself, motives for hope and means of retrieval. He understood, more than ever before, how wise Bussy had been in not harassing the Marathas to the worst limits. He now resolved to determine Balaji Rao to attack Mysore whose help had saved Muhammad Ali. If this were to occur, it was probable that the English would send succour to the *davelay*, but Dupleix would despatch an army from the coast so that the Mysoreans caught between two fires could not but yield. While informing Bussy of this project, Dupleix recommended absolute secrecy.

Thinking his task had been completed, Bussy was about to retire at this time. While he had such an intention he was informed that Gazziuddin, whose march on the Deccan had been announced several times previously, had at last started from Delhi with a large army. Bussy felt that the news of the disaster at Trichinopoly had been re-echoed throughout India, thus imposing new duties on him. He accepted to stay back and Dupleix thanked him very simply.

"The motives which have determined you to stay back are worthy of you I am under very great personal obligation to you I ardently desire that you should persist till everything is fixed and steady You must be pleased with my regards for you, they are what you have always known them to be, whilst I consider you now as the restorer of our glory which a heedless fellow (Law) had just disgraced (Letter dated 27th June 1752).

Bussy was not in full agreement with the policy carried on by Dupleix in the Carnatic. Under Bussy's suggestion Salabat Jang had written to Dupleix, as early as May saying that he thought it preferable to come to an agreement with Muhammad Ali rather than to go on stubbornly with this hazardous struggle. When Law's capitulation had become an accomplished fact, Dupleix informed Bussy (27th June) that he had not been disheartened by the event that as Chanda Sahib was dead, he (Dupleix) could now act directly in the interests of the nation that things would go on much better, and that he intended forcing Muhammad Ali to come to terms with him rather than submit to a treaty dictated by the late events, and that if it were true that Muhammad Ali were dead as the report would have it, he (Dupleix) would take officially the title of Nawab of Arcot. Bussy did not encourage Dupleix in this intention. He was of opinion that armed force would be necessary to carry it out and that it would be all the more difficult for him since his enemies were out in a victorious military campaign against him. By attending to this, Dupleix would no longer be able to help Salabat Jang and the Deccan army would be forced to withdraw to Mazulipatam. Both the North and the South would thus be lost.

Bussy writing to Dupleix on the 13th July says "wishing to style yourself as the Nawab of Arcot before

Salabat Jang be the peaceful possessor of the Deccan, is like plucking a fruit before it is ripe. Knowing the country as I do, if I do not fight against this project I would consider myself a mere flatterer. I speak frankly as my zeal for your interests and glory, as also for those of the nation, compel me to speak. I see your glory and crown about to be snatched away from you by this most unseasonable project, which while causing your hopes to vanish will simultaneously plunge us into an abyss of humiliation from which the nation shall never rise”.

Bussy also made it clear that if Salabat Jang could not hold his own in the Deccan, the English would reap all the benefits, the territories and the advantages which the French were enjoying at the time (B. N. 9150. P 12-13)

Dupleix followed Bussy's advice and refrained from styling himself the Nawab of Arcot, but he kept the title as something valuable which might prove handy on a future day; just then he even thought of giving it to Neamet Ulla Khan.

Bussy, having accepted to continue serving, was faced with other difficulties, not exactly new ones but difficulties which time had increased considerably; we mean financial difficulties which had already proved to be a stumbling block to Dupleix at Trichinopoly. The Suba's treasury was empty to wage war against Gaziuddin, it would be necessary to draw on the personal credit of Dupleix or from bankers who demanded high interests for their money.

Dupleix knew everything about the financial distress, but he did not despair. He told Bussy not to be uneasy regarding money matters; surely his personal loans were very great, but this was of little importance so long as the honour of the King and that of the nation had not

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been restored. This was the sole aim to be kept ever present in the mind. So far as Gaziuddin was concerned, Dupleix did not believe that his threat was a real one, this Prince was "too avaricious", he thought to rally a great number of men. Balaji Rao seemed to support him but apparently it was less to give real help than to make his intervention serve as a reason to claim advantages either for Gaziuddin or from Salabat Jang, he would help the one who offered him most. Accordingly Dupleix thought more than ever that they should keep in touch with the Marathas. One of Balaji Rao's wakils who resided at Pondicherry at that time strongly recommended a close alliance between his master and Dupleix. In so much as his words might have been sincere it was deemed proper to make use of his good dispositions. Accordingly when the wakil was about to go back to Poona (23rd July) Dupleix handed him a *serpeau* some pistols and egret studded with precious stones as presents to the pechoua. On his way the wakil would have had to pass Bussy's camp, they both should try to draw up a line of conduct. It might mean some expenditure to Salabat Jang but would the sacrifice not be rewarded by the consolidation of his authority against Gaziuddin? If, in spite of the help the French were once again willing to give him Salabat Jang would not yield or stood in an undecided mood, it would be better for the French to leave him to his fate or return to the coast or take sides with Nizam Ali and raise him to power. The ceaseless alarms of the Suba were of a nature to disrupt the most steadfast minds.

Contrary to the expectations of Dupleix Gaziuddin marched rapidly onwards. He had been indeed unable to deprive Dupleix of the Carnatic Nababi and Bussy of some particular honours as the dignity of Gamzafar Jang

to which he was entitled in the same conditions as Duploix to the dignity of Zafar Jang. Gaziuddin was not therefore in favour at that time. However he had succeeded to raise a fairly large army. Raja Rao seemed unfriendly towards him, two other Maratha Lords were getting ready to help him to recover his paternal legacy. Ragogy Bonsla was to invade the Deccan from the North-West and Holkar towards Aurangabad. If Bussy had sufficient troops he would have marched at once to the enemy, for he wrote to Duploix on the 13th July, "You are well aware that it is all important to finish the enemy outside the country he is trying to invade", but the help, which Duploix meant to send him, which consisted of 300 Europeans, 50 East Indians and 300 Sepoys, only started on the 20th July (1), but the Suba, from Pondicherry on the 20th war before having his army reinforced by the French troops from Pondicherry. The Franco-Indian army had therefore to fall back before the advancing enemy and withdraw up to the North of the Deccan at the Hyderabad, leaving all the in the mercy of Gaziuddin.

Determination, tenacity and presence of mind which never failed Duploix even for an instant in the presence of the threatened danger to the Deccan, made him think of several possibilities:

1° An annual subsidy might be offered to Gaziuddin provided he allowed Salabat Jang to continue being the Suba of the Deccan,

(1) This detachment under the command of Durocher de la Perigne reached Hyderabad on the 22nd August and was increased on the 25th September by 160 men of whom 80 creos and volunteers from the Islands who had started from Pondicherry for Mazulipatam under command of Diore,

2° If as was probable he refused he might be asked to share the Deccan,

3° If he refused to go in shares he might be asked to confer on Salabat Jang the title of *Naib* or lieutenant,

4° If he pushed aside all these proposals a battle would have to be fought but it might be better to retreat immediately. But there was no safety in a retreat, owing to the risk of being attacked on the way

Dupleix also foresaw that Salabat Jang might lose his life in one way or another or he might be kidnapped by the enemy. If this were to happen Bussy was not to hesitate a single moment, but offer his services to Gaziuddin by explaining him that if the French had successively given support to Muzaffar Jang and to Salabat Jang their aim was merely the preservation of the descendants of Nizam Ul Mulk. Gaziuddin would surely understand that it would be better for him to make an alliance with the French than with Balaji Rao who would subjugate him. If against all probabilities Gaziuddin swept aside this proposal too there was nothing else left to the French but to make alliance with Balaji Rao. Dupleix left to the wisdom and prudence of Bussy the working out of these various suggestions. On the other hand Dupleix thought that the English too engrossed in the affairs of the Carnatic would be unable to stretch a helping hand to Gaziuddin. The situation was not all together desperate and he trusted that Bussy would come out of it with honour for himself and for the nation in spite of the uncertainties and anxieties of that hour.

This assurance was short lived. Just when he talked of dictating the law to the whole of India pressing money demands soon recalled back Dupleix to facts. There were no more funds either at Pondicherry or at Hyderabad to continue the campaign. On the 9th October Dupleix had

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written to Bussy, asking as a personal favour, to obtain for him 3 to 4 lakhs of rupees either directly or through the kind help of Narsadevis and Govinden Das, two Hyderabad bankers, but in the interval Bussy had written on the 24th September expressing his own needs. Dupleix began to fear that this double want of money would paralyse the movements of the army and might even oblige him to withdraw; so rather than expose a large number of Frenchmen to die miserably, he thought it better to accept whichever offer came first even though it might be not very honourable. For the first time Dupleix hesitated to advise Bussy to go forward:

On the 21st October Dupleix wrote to Bussy: "without doubt you have surely considered all this before driving into a country where you yourself foresaw so many things to be dreaded or you were perfectly confident of being able to overcome all these dangers which you now cast before me to make me tremble. I am sure you have sufficient discernment to take whatever precautions may be called for. I have already told you that I am not near by to see and to know early enough what is happening, that you have full power to take whatever steps may be necessary especially when concerning your own safety and the safety of the King's subjects".

After a full examination of the financial question itself, Dupleix concluded that if Bussy were obliged to borrow, he should do so in his own name and not entangle the company whose credit should remain unaffected, because neither he nor Bussy had the authority to endanger it. Bussy's letter of the 24th September had made Dupleix tremble; if he had known sooner the real state of affairs he would not, said he, have hesitated to order Bussy's return; perhaps it was the best thing to be done even then. To withdraw from want of money was no dishonour

and the Suba could find nothing to say against it. Did he not possess enough jewels to retain the French if it pleased him to do so? Could he not mortgage them or at least make all those who could help contribute towards the expenses?

Dupleix added Finally if all these means were to fail and if 8 or 4 lakhs of Rupees might serve to pull you out of your difficulties, I am willing to sacrifice this amount even if I had to sell my last shirt to pay for it. By right, I am the one who ought to bear the expenditure since I am the sole motor of an enterprise on which I should not have ventured. The only request I make of you if you have to come to such step is to draw on me at five or six months sight, so as to give me time to get the money. This is the utmost I can do in the matter Sir and I shall consider myself highly pleased, even if I were never to be repaid to have been able to withdraw you from the danger which you depict to me in such glooming colours which makes me repent over this enterprise from which I expect nothing but sorrow hereafter (A V 7854).

This was the first time Dupleix showed discouragement, but it was also the last. The Trichinopoly disaster had weighted less on him. He felt that if he lost the Deccan, he would lose all the foundation of his authority would crumble. Muhammad Ali could, with impunity proclaim himself as the sole legitimate Nawab, with him the English too would triumph. Bussy wrote vainly that in spite of the hazards of the struggle he had obtained reinforcements and had marched against Gaziuddin. Dupleix blamed him for his temerity. "You have all to fear and nothing to hope for" said he. Friend and foe are equally to be suspected and yet you have begun your march. It is just the case to say *Audaces Fortuna Juvat*. I

wish it were really so, but I will have more than an alarm before I can be reassured on your account”.

Dupleix was in fact neither hopeful nor discouraged; being too far from the actual scene of the operations he reviewed all the possibilities which his apprehensions suggested instead of the exact knowledge of what was taking place; he had glimpses of hope even in the misfortunes of the French. It did not seem impossible to him that by a new impulse of his genius Bussy would once again draw the French out of their scrape; there was one way to this; victorious Gaziuddin might give the country to the South of the Krishna to Salabat Jang; by so doing all difficulties, even those with Muhammad Ali and the English, would come to an end while this part of India would become the most peaceful in the Deccan. The other parts of India would be a prey to such anarchy that it could be expected that after some lapse of time, Gaziuddin being disabused would abandon the whole country to Salabat Jang.

Gaziuddin did not fall to French arms, but in another way which is more common in India. Backed by Holkar and Ragogy and enjoining Balaji Rao's neutrality, he reached Berhampore about 20th September and a few days later he was at Aurengabad. Immediately, Sayyid Lashkar Khan got into touch with him and to gain his confidence, he pretended to be in disfavour at the Court of Salabat Jang. Did he hope to discover some secrets of which he could make profitable use later? In fact, his sympathies were rather for Gaziuddin. Balaji Rao was represented at these conferences on which the fate of the Deccan rested; the negotiation would have turned favourable to Gaziuddin if this prince had not died suddenly. The army deprived of its leader broke up at once and all the advantages went to Salabat Jang who had never before been so close

to his downfall Scheabeddin the son of Gaziuddin was the only one able to rally the broken remains of his father's army, but unfortunately for him he was at Delhi and events occurred without his being able to ward them off

When these events were taking place there appeared a strange personality named Volton a native of Bar-le Duc (France) who had come to India twenty years before as a Surgeon and who had deserted owing to some reasons. He had been at the Moghul Emperor's Court where through some lucky incidents he had been appointed as physician to the Emperor. He was an intriguer and his dealings were not always perfectly clear but he never forgot that he was a Frenchman and more than once he had been useful to Dupleix when the latter was Director at Chandernagore. Years had rolled by and Volton's credit had increased. Thinking he might draw some personal profit in the enterprising policy of Dupleix which was stirring the whole of India, he came more or less willingly from Delhi to Aurengabad in 1751 to see how things were getting on. He witnessed Bussy's early successes and was much concerned to know what repercussions these successes would produce at the Court and what amount of esteem or aversion, of friendship or trust, the French nation had acquired from them. He returned to the Deccan the following year and was at Aurengabad at the time of Gaziuddin's death. He said he had brought proposals from several Great Hindu lords of the North offering to enter into an agreement with Dupleix to derive away the Marathas and to place 150 000 horsemen at his disposal. He showed these letters to Bussy who without putting much belief in them sent them on Dupleix, as well as Volton himself. Dupleix did not greet him with much eagerness, even admitting those proposals were genuine.

they were too handsome to be practicable. Nevertheless Dupleix did not expressly brush Volton aside, but after a while sent him back with a little money to Bussy. The latter, being nearer the North than Dupleix, believed still less in the efficacy of the proposed help; he even doubted that they were genuine, and far from entering into the ideas of Volton, Bussy had him placed under observation and kept him a prisoner for some time in the camp, but as Bussy had no convincing proof of his sincerity or of his fraud, he sent Volton back to Delhi where he ended his days in obscurity; nothing more was heard of him after 1753.

Dupleix thanked God first for the death of Gaziuddin as having been an unhopd for occurrence, then he attributed all honour to Bussy because he at least had not lost all courage and had not thought, even for a moment, of giving up the struggle. He was only sorry that all those who surrounded him at Pondicherry did not share in the same satisfaction. "The true Frenchmen, who are scarce here, will be delighted, but the others will be perplexed", wrote he to Bussy on the 14th November. Then he sought what benefits were to be reaped from the event. The Trichinopoly dishonour had been wiped away, hereafter the minister could not possibly refuse to send out troops to have the King's name and that of the nation respected. In India itself, Dupleix expected Salabat Jang would soon give tokens of his gratitude by granting new concessions, he even mentioned Ganjam as a port which could advantageously replace Mofuz Bandar, whose revenues were insufficient. But could he sincerely depend on Salabat Jang's gratitude? The touchstone would be his behaviour towards Muhammad Ali and the English. The situation was quite clear now. The English had no more reasons to give support

to a rebel. Salabat Jang should inform them that if they continued, he would report the matter to their company in Europe and that he himself would take all necessary measures in India, whatever Saunders might write to justify himself, he would thereby be disbelieved.

By depriving Muhammad Ali of an ally and a supporter, the death of Gaziuddin might also help in settling the problems of the Carnatic. At that moment Dupleix was negotiating with Morari Rao and the Mysore in order to break off their alliance with the English, he even promised Trichinopoly to Mysore. During the last spring when the *Davelay* was helping the enemies, Dupleix had thought of getting Bussy and Balaji Rao to attack him from the West. But since negotiations were going with him, such a manoeuvre could not be thought of, on the other hand it would not be expedient to leave him in complete security. Then Dupleix had the subtle idea of suggesting that Bussy should go to Canara as if to get the ruler of that state to settle the affairs of Nelisse Ram with the French, but in reality to penetrate into Mysore under the excuse that it was a short-cut to Trichinopoly. Once Bussy had a footing in the Mysore State, he would call upon the *Davelay* either to declare himself in favour of the French or to pay one or two *Courous* (arrears) of tribute to Salabat Jang. Dupleix was convinced that this manifestation would suffice to have his proposals accepted and he already thought he saw Muhammad Ali driven out of his estates and wandering aimlessly.

Balaji Rao was to join in this enterprise but unfortunately the peshwa had some serious misunderstandings with Salabat Jang just at that time which might have led to war. We have already read that the Maratha troops were on the borders of the Deccan ready to support the claims of Gaziuddin when he advances forward to invade

the country. His sudden death put a stop to actual hostilities without removing the danger of a conflict: the Marathas stayed in their positions as if waiting for an opportunity to go forward. Salabat Jang was careful not to give them a chance; he understood that the slightest spark would set the whole ablaze and he was not desirous to run the risks of a new war. An incident almost jeopardized the whole situation. At the beginning of November the Suba's advance-guard had been attacked by Balaji Rao's troops and if the French had not rushed to their help, they would have been routed. Bussy was not present at this disturbance; very anxious as to the consequences of these events, Salabat Jang had sent for Bussy; a sort of council was held at which a representative of the peshwa was present. The Suba's durbar was in favour of peace while the Maratha delegate was not opposed to it, but he insisted that Bussy should be the mediator. So Salabat Jang gave Bussy full powers to conclude peace. The whole night was spent in discussing the conditions which were accepted by Salabat Jang and taken by Bussy himself to the Maratha camp with the thrust of having it accepted by Balaji Rao: the Dewan and two other noblemen of the durbar went along with Bussy. Peace had been signed when he returned. Salabat Jang had tears in his eyes when he received Bussy calling him his deliverer and saying that he would never forget his services. The treaty included the restoring of the nine fortresses to the Deccan; in short the peace was as advantageous to the Suba as glorious to Bussy who by his ability and his diplomacy, rather than by the force of arms, had once again re-established and strengthened a shaky situation.

This last event put a most happy finishing touch to the series of political measures or military enterprises wher-e

by Bussy had so to say created, developed and strengthened Salabat Jang's authority. If orders received from Pondicherry were to be taken literally the role of the French was at an end since their only aim, at the beginning, had been to consolidate Salabat Jang's power. Bussy thought that no more favourable opportunity to leave the country with honours of the war would ever be given to him. If he had seconded Dupleix's views and carried out his orders with irreproachable loyalty he had also never failed, when circumstance arose, to tell Dupleix or make him realize that the Deccan problem was an adventure fraught with future danger and that the sooner the French got out of it, the better (1).

As none of the reasons given by Bussy had moved Dupleix, the former thought that there was nothing left for him to do but to resign or ask to be recalled. This is what he did in a first letter dated 28th November. After stating all the hardships he had undergone, previous to the conclusion of peace with Balaji Rao to such an extent that he was more than once tempted to abandon the whole struggle he writes as follows

(1) Godeheu in his "Refutation" published in 1764 refers to 15 of Bussy's letters in which he had placed Salabat Jang's gloomy outlooks before Dupleix and had advised him to find some better means of leaving the country with honour. As most of these letters are missing, we shall sum up, according to Godeheu the arguments or lessons which he had drawn from them. Godeheu writes on the *27th February 1752* that Bussy gave an account to Dupleix of the discussions which worried Salabat Jang and the uncertain condition in which that prince was as regards the temperament of his own subjects; on the *27th March*, he wrote to Dupleix, that a powerful cabal had been formed at Delhi against Salabat Jang on the *10th*, that Balaji Rao was on the point of rising against the Buba while a storm was threatening on all sides; on the *2nd April* that Bagoy's son at the head of 23,000 horsemen was devastating in the vicinity of Hyderabad on the *6th* he reported the insurrection of several tribes on the *17th* that there was not a single chieftain or horseman who was sincerely Salabat Jang's servant, that a Mohomedan (Jaffar Ali Khan) had revolted

"Sir, this is what I thought would be the best I could possibly do in the unfortunate circumstances in which I was placed. Would you think right of me to express my own thoughts concerning what you should do before we enter your province (Mysore)? I cannot hide from you that the large number of Frenchmen, held as prisoners by the English and chiefly by Muhammad Ali and Morari Rao, would produce a very bad impression on the minds of Balaji Rao and the Marathas and considerably decrease the high esteem which they have for our nation. I sincerely wish that you may find some means of getting them released; *Please, Sir, don't lose time and make the least disadvantageous peace possible with the English and Muhammad Ali.* This brings me to wish you come to some

and was causing the same trouble in the North as Muhammad Ali was in the South. *on the 27th*, that if troops were not sent, all would be lost, *on the 30th* that Salabat Jang's Dewan, Ramdas Pendet, had been murdered notwithstanding the French guards some of whom had been killed and others wounded, that the Suba was forsaken by all, that it had been very difficult to protect him, that the Dewan who had been friendly to the French shall have to be replaced by an enemy to the nation, in short that it would be better to look out for some means to get out with honour

"It must not be thought that these violent outbreaks of which Mr de Bussy speaks were only momentary, the situation in the Deccan was almost daily such, Bussy again wrote to Mr Dupleix *on the 5th May and on the 17th June* that he had to be vigilant for his own safety, *on the 15th May* he asked for help and spoke of the extreme weakness of the Suba, *on the 4th June* that if help was not forthcoming Salabat Jang was about to perish, *on the 10th* that the Suba had been shaken by certain proposals made by the English, *on the 17th* that there was a rumour afloat which said that the French had removed some fabulous amount of money from Golconda (an excuse to attack them and make them return), *on the 20th* that the whole of Salabat Jang's army was jealous of the French, *on the 21st July* that everybody was deserting Salabat Jang, that there was 25,000 horsemen about to revolt because they had not been paid for nine months, that if they were to be paid no money would be left, that he would consider as an happiness if Salabat Jang were able to retain even a part of the Deccan " (Refutation, P. 41-43)

agreement with the English. The fact is that Balaji Rao is extremely friendly with them at Bombay, they will not fail to get him round in such a way as to make him agree to offer protection to Muhammad Ali, in spite of the agreement Balaji Rao had made with us. I will not guarantee that he will refrain from declaring himself Muhammad Ali's protector. Such a powerful ally must be treated with great regards. If you would believe me, Sir, you would think to devise some means of restoring calmness and tranquility in these unhappy provinces which badly need them and you would snatch the first opportunity to end a war which can be nothing else but fatal to Europeans as long as they would oppose themselves.

"I shall find myself in great difficulties at the end of this month. The Dewan has just left me saying that there was absolutely no more money, if I cannot get the *sarafs* (bankers) to come to my help, I do not know what I shall do to pay the soldiers. *I say one more, Sir it is high time to come out of this labyrinth.* It is useless hoping that Salabat Jang will ever be able to re-establish his finances, they are too badly managed. I tried in vain to put some order it is a sort of highway robbery the farmers do not pay one half of what they ought to, the utmost Salabat Jang could do is to maintain himself modestly. I cannot see any source of income wherefrom he could amass treasure equal to that of Nizam-ul-Mulk. *Since we have such a fine opportunity to get out of this labyrinth it would be most unwise of us to enter it a second time.*

This letter had hardly reached Pondicherry from where no reply could as yet have returned to Bussy than he wrote again on the 20th December confirming all that he said in the above letter and making it more precisely by his second letter. He said to Dupleix

“The death of Gaziuddin is undoubtedly the most happy event we might have hoped... the peace and the alliance I have just concluded with the Marathas are still more important and advantageous. This news has probably increased your hopes but some of my letters and more especially my last one while revealing to you the actual state of affairs will also make known to you the limitations of those hopes; sudden outbursts, countless unexpected accidents throw much confusion in our correspondence and expose us to much disappointment. When I send you some information regarding an event and the actual state of things, then you decide accordingly and make your plans but when I am informed of these, matters have changed so considerably that what you advise has become impracticable. I am on such a changing and movable scene that I cannot possibly play the same part for any length of time and there would be nothing surprising if I were caught contradicting myself. Besides Sir, in the various steps I think best to take you must not always rely on the exactitude of my opinion and my feelings from the account I myself give of the various motives which induced me to act. However full of details my letters may be, it is not possible for me to state all, being on the spot, knowing the various interests of those partaking in the events, I can see at a glance what should be done in each circumstance and I would need a volume to develop my ideas and give in detail the various reasons which crowd my mind. I will however try, when replying to the various items of your letter (22nd November), to give you an exact idea of the actual state of affairs.

You think that the death of Gaziuddin and his son have steadfastly consolidated Salabat Jang in his place; it is not only erroneous that the son of Gaziuddin has been murdered, but he is well alive and is pulling every

possible wire to obtain from the pacha (Moghal) the firman which had been granted to his father, he will probably not be the only one to make such solicitation for this wonderful government and we must expect to see, sooner or later, some rival appear on the scene Balaji Rao might oppose their actions for a time and support Salabat Jang, but this will not be done wholeheartedly Balaji Rao will not be sorry to have two competitors who would give him an opportunity to become greater by selling at a high price his protection to the one it shall please him to favour, yet I think I can depend on his sincerity

“I stand bail Sir for Salabat Jang's gratitude and that he has given himself entirely to the French, but you were quite right in thinking that he would not be wanting in evil advisers who would make it a point to teach him lessons of ingratitude and do all in their power to break him away from us

Thereupon Bussy depicted the anarchy which prevailed then in the Moghal empire

“You should be aware he said “That the Moghul government is in full anarchy the Subas care very little for the orders of the Pacha when they can act with impunity Salabat Jang himself behaved so for a time. The smaller chieftains follow the examples of the Subas they do not believe themselves bound to obey at the Nawabs any more than these latter are bound to obey the Emperor These people have not got the faintest idea of the admirable subordination which reigns in European States and are far from considering a man a rebel who is able to maintain his seat of which some one else is trying to deprive him Such examples of disobedience are of daily occurrence In defiance of orders from Salabat

Jang, Laskar Khan, after making us march up and down several times to the meeting place indicated by him, has declared that he would not join the army after having been expected there for a whole month....."

Dupleix was plunged in the deepest perplexity by the letter of the 28th November. Bussy's advice though discreet was none the less formal: he distinctly extolled the evacuation of the Deccan. Dupleix could not reconcile himself to this idea and without replying to Bussy's arguments which condemned his policy, he preferred to appeal to Bussy's feelings whom he prayed and implored not to abandon him in that critical situation. Dupleix wrote to Bussy on the 1st January.

"I am grieved to hear that you wish to retire. I am partly of the same opinion as yourself, but I equally presume that you too must be thinking partly as I do and not contemplate abandoning me in the present circumstance or even in any future one. Besides you must consider that you owe a duty to the King and to the State, that all that has taken place till now is your work and that you should not leave it before perfecting it. You should also remember all that you promised regarding Delhi and the embassy you intended leading thereto and which I think necessary for strengthening all that we have acquired.....

"You yourself admit that Salabat Jang's attachment to you calls for your gratitude. Why not continue giving him the means? Some time back, at the moment when you were in great distress, you feared that I would send another man (Latouche) to replace you. I have never had such an idea and you can rest assured that it won't enter my mind now. You are thinking of retiring at the flower of youth (Bussy was 33 years old at that time) and when fortune smiles at you from every side. Why

arrest its course and not continue deserving more recognition from our monarch and our nation? My honour has kept me in India, yet I am of an age to take rest but from the manner in which events are revolving I am afraid I shall only retain hopes without ever attaining the end *Please think well dear Bussy that men who ponder deeply owe their lives to the Motherland* that you are very useful to her that Salabat Jang your work, is not so steadily seated as no longer to need your presence Please bear in mind that he is surrounded by enemies and you alone can turn aside all their evil intentions What regrets you will have to hear that this young prince has been overthrown owing to your absence? (A V E 3754)

In another letter written a week later—8th January—Dupleix takes up the same arguments but he invokes more personal considerations

Please read over all your letters to me he said, they have guided me in all those I wrote to Europe where I sent your letters as well I did all I possibly could to satisfy your desires and if I had not stripped myself as I have done, our affairs here would have been promptly re-established When I recalled you from Golconda I had nothing to fear for our concessions, but wished to comply always with your plans. I did not hesitate to send you all the troops I could spare. I certainly have no cause to regret what I did because of the good use you made of the same and for which I once again thank you You see, my dear Bussy from all that I have written you that I am ever ready to approve what ever you do because I am convinced that no selfish motive prompted your enterprises and that you laboured for the glory of the King and for that of the nation as also for the Company's profit

Dupleix was quite sure that the above mentioned reasons, which he had tempered with kind and affectionate words, would have moved Bussy and make him resolve to stay in the Deccan. And continuing as if the matter had already been settled, he converses with Bussy of the Deccan's affairs and of the best way to settle them. He first spoke, as usual, of the general consideration on the Carnatic, but he made a few alterations this time. To share in Bussy's anxieties, Dupleix was willing to negotiate with Muhammad Ali and to leave Trichinopoly to him, he even thought of remitting one whole year's revenues to Muhammad Ali in order to facilitate the payment of his dues to the English although the latter raised their expenditure to a considerable amount (1). But such an agreement could be considered only in case no understanding was possible with Mysore. Now Dupleix did not seem to be in a hurry to conclude with the Mysoorians, he thought he could get more money from them if they remained under the threat of Bussy and in fact Dupleix was on the look out for financial advantages more than for anything else; at that moment, pushed by necessity he considered Mysore as a milch cow which if allowed to fatten could be milked at the proper moment. By ceding Trichinopoly to Mysore, his contributive sources would be increased without danger to the Suba's authority.

(1) According to Dupleix one of the articles of the treaty between the English and Muhammad Ali was that the latter should pay one thousand rupees per soldier whether he had been killed in the battle, had deserted or had died of illness, and the English fixed this number to over a thousand, and a proportionate number to officers (A V E 3754 letter from Dupleix to Bussy dated 8th January 1753) when calculating the expenses of the war the English had brought into account the men who had died or simply found missing when fighting the common enemy, the loss of each man was estimated to 1000 rupees or 2480 francs.

As regards the Marathas, Dupleix was more and more of opinion that a close friendship should be contracted with Balaji Rao. Dupleix no longer hoped that the peeshwa would come to help the French in restoring order in the Carnatic but he expected that an alliance with him would produce a favourable impression on the Court at Delhi and affirm the French influence in the Deccan. Who would dare attack these combined forces? Dupleix rightly thought less bent on strengthening Salabat Jang's authority than on paving the way for further negotiations which by a slow evolution would end in the dividing of Salabat Jang's dominions. Dupleix was then hostile to such sharing and he wrote "The French were under too great obligation to the Suba and could not, for yet a while, leave him without bringing disgrace on themselves. Salabat Jang appeared to Dupleix such a weak man that no one could be strongly attached to his cause, his brother was more resolute. Could Salabat Jang not vacate the place and become a fakir? How much less trouble for Bussy and how much more security for the French!

Dupleix had his eyes fixed no less attentively on the North than on the South, his views on Bengal and Surat had not changed, he still had the idea of sending Bussy on a solemn embassy to the Moghal Court to have the French influence ratified in the most magnificent pageantry of the whole of India and to bring back if possible the exemption of duty on all French goods imported in the Empire. Bussy was not to return to Pondicherry before he had impressed so the whole country with the French strength and might. Even if he cared to give up the expedition against Mysore and proceed immediately to Delhi, he was free to carry out his own ideas. Was not the security of the Deccan assured? Dupleix even foresaw

the possibility of a reconciliation with Chanavas Khan and on Bussy's advise Dupleix made some overtures to him.

When this letter, which cannot be said to be either pessimistic or disheartening, reached the Deccan, towards the end of January, events had gone ahead and Bussy had changed from his habitual deferential regard for Dupleix to a sort of irritability. He had taken offense to a letter in which, without definitely expressing it, the Governor had hinted that he had not been watchful enough while his trust in Lashkar Khan had been excessive with regard to Muhammad Ali's paravana. His self-love had been pricked thereby and he answered back rather peevishly as if to complain that Dupleix had no longer the same trust in him.

But Bussy's supreme resolution had not been brought about either by the above mentioned letter or by any other. While he had advised Dupleix to get out of the Deccan as from a nest of hornets, he had already made up his mind to execute Dupleix's orders and was about to start for Mysore accompanied by Salabat Jang and Balaji Rao. No doubt, thought Bussy, when Muhammad Ali sees the united armies approaching, he would be led back to a sense of duty; even if the armies did not go up to the Carnatic, they would go far enough into Mysore to force that country to be neutral and to pay contributions which would go to the Suba's, treasury and help to meet the soldier's pay for some time.

The Franco-Indian army had been stationed at Calburga since the 18th December. No sooner were the men informed of the new expedition, than all the leaders and soldiers unanimously protested, they had enough of going to fight in such distant places; the unfortunate ramblings

of Nasir Jang were present in the memories of all. Conversations and mutterings were carried on during six days without being able to persuade the army to march. Abundant murmurs the harbingers of desertion were heard throughout the camp. The Suba's horsemen surrounded tumultuously the Dewan's tent on the 23rd December and warned him that if they were not made to march back to Hyderabad they would compel him and constrain even the Suba himself. Several of the leaders met the following morning around the grave of an ancestor and swore that they would not budge unless they were handed the arrears of pay due to them. Finally one of the leaders was murdered on the 25th and the Dewan too would have shared the same fate had he not been the object of some special protection.

To overcome these rebellious dispositions Salabat Jang had nothing else but his moral authority which did not carry much weight. Even in his own camp every one knew of his weakness and incapacity. For from asserting his will he came to Bussy and declared that he would on no account go beyond the Krishna. Bussy tried his best to make Salabat Jang understand the fact that since he was short of funds to pay his troops, this was an excellent opportunity to obtain money. Mysore was in arrears with its tributes to him whereas it had immense resources. Consequently nothing was more conform to his own interests. Then turning to the question from the French stand-point, Bussy realized that if Salabat Jang withdraw from the Mysore expedition he would get no money and that there was the risk of the wages due to French soldiers being not paid the following month. Such an eventuality would be unpleasant to both. All Bussy's endeavours were in vain. Salabat Jang obstinately held on

to his resolution (1). Bussy did not have enough men to enforce his will on Salabat Jang; he realized that the fate of Trichinopoly and the upholding of the French influence on the Deccan were at stake, but what was he to do? He could not proceed alone, nor could he force Salabat Jang to accompany him. Not wishing to act merely on his own views he asked his brother officers for their advice. Their reply was unanimous: What ever the Suba might do, they were not to abandon him, as such a step would be prejudicial to the honour of the nation and the interests of the Company (B. N. 9158, P. 44-45).

Bussy brought these facts to the knowledge of Duplex with his own appropriate remark (letters of 24 and 25th December). He writes: You will probably be assurprised and vexed as I am myself over the Suba's behaviour, his weakness and his incapacity cause the best of opportunities to fall through; yet from all that I have written to you concerning the Suba, you should not have been astonished, but rather you must have expected such events to happen. I repeat that is not possible to continue upholding such a man much longer; if a new competitor were to appear, undoubtedly everybody would side with him, in the dispositions in which they are at present. I sincerely wish you would take the necessary steps to avoid the terrible distress into which we would be plunged again by such a revolution.

(1) In another account of these events, Fr Monjustin states in a letter written to Duplex on 31st December that if the payments due to the French were not being made good, Bussy would take leave of Salabat Jang. This threat was effective, the next day the Suba sent all the leaders of his army to request Bussy not to abandon him. On the 3rd day the Suba himself came to a more familiar gathering at which Fr Monjustin also was present, fell at Bussy's knees, bathed them with his tears and implored Bussy to stay on as his friend and his protector (B. N. 9159, P. 201-202)

to be overcome? How was this double resistance to be shattered? If need be his tact and cunning might guide his relations with the darbar although he was aware that during the late discussions with Balaji Rao, the counsellors of the Dewan and perhaps the Dewan himself had opposed peace under pretext that it would consolidate the French position and open up the path for the Mahrattas. This sort of opposition was not new to Bussy he had vanquished more than once over such resistance by supple manoeuvres free from all harshness. Probably his talent would lead him safely once again across these pitfalls, but how to get over the money difficulties? The solving of this problem offered greater difficulties.

On the 9th December Dupleix had sent Bussy his detailed accounts he was due L,589 638 rupees actually spent and he expected that in the next three months there would be expenditure amounting to Rs. 125 000 monthly and 4 00 000 rupees in cash. He did not demand that all these amounts be returned to him but could not the half of it at least be paid back? The amount due to the Company for war supplies principally was even running higher, being no less than 10 lacks Rs which was to be paid without delay. Dupleix was anxious to avoid any deficit on the Company's account. Bussy knew that the Suba's treasury was absolutely empty and that money lenders demanded high rates for the loan of their money, consequently in reply he merely proposed to Dupleix who was just then negotiating with Murtiza Ali to transfer to him the title of Nawab of the Carnatic to hand this to him only if he bound himself to early payment of a certain amount of money until the full repayment of the above mentioned advances Dupleix has made to the Suba. During all that time Salabat Jang was not to claim any dues on the revenues of the

Consequently, these conditions were accepted, Bussy held the ~~possessions~~ of investiture quite ready.

A regrettable, yet fortunate incident, permitted Bussy to get out from the blind alley into which he had been led by his own suggestions, the orders or the entreaties of Dupleix and by the sort of rebellion which had taken place on the 24th December. The commander of the French troops did not enjoy perfect health (1); shortly after his departure from Pondicherry in March 1751, he had been ill and on the point of retracing his steps; in August 1752 he had repeated attacks of fever and dysentery, and since November that same year, aided and abetted by worries, his strength gave way and disease held the upper hand. At the beginning of January, his illness suddenly took a bad turn; on the 11th he was exceedingly ill and surgeon Guyonnet was very anxious for his life. The symptoms became still worse on the following days, while fever was continuous. Bussy realized that he could no longer be at the head of the troops, so on the 23rd he handed over charge to Goupil with instructions in writing for which he still had a little strength left. These instructions were clear and precise. Political situation was good, the Suba had no more enemies, nothing to be feared from Delhi where the Moghul was kept busy against Ahmad Abdali, the Afghan;—regular correspondance to be kept up with Balaji Rao and good relations to be maintained with Ragogy Bonsla. If the latter giving in to his racial instincts made incursions into the Suba's territory, his vakil should be sent for, before rushing into any repressive action, and all befitting representations should be made to him;—not to lose sight of the Carnatic whose paravans had practically been granted to Murtiza Ali;—

(1). In several of his letters, Dupleix speaks of eating too much.

to watch carefully the Suba's darbar where there were many partisans of Muhammad Ali and to guide the Suba, whose youth and inexperience rendered unfit to manage his own affairs. The Suba had no new campaign in sight at that moment but when the rainy season was over, he might get it into his head to go to Mysore, he should be followed, for the present the proper thing to be done was to seize the first favorable opportunity to obtain the repayment of all the money which had been advanced by Dupleix Sayyid Lashkar Khan Chanavas Khan and Mir Muhammad Hussain Khan the latter an official representative of the Moghul and the governor of Hyderabad sure of being backed by the French had promised their support to the Suba, these three could be fully relied upon, it was also good to use much discernment when dealing with the chief nobles of the Court.

When Bussy dictated the above instructions, he was at 12 cosses from Oulguir and 70 from Hyderabad. The Suba had consented to his departure provided he would stop for a while at Hyderabad. Accustomed to have dealings with Bussy alone the Suba thought that nothing would work well after Bussy had gone. But after consideration the Suba thought it would be better for Bussy to sejourne first at Oulguir which was at the centre of the country through which the army would have to pass before reaching head quarters (1)

(1) Marion de Mersan, a friend of Bussy and whom Dupleix had made Commissioner of the troops, just to give him a grade, has left a very picturesque description of this country: "Our caravans offer us nothing but a very uniform and tiresome sight: immense plains almost barren, villages burnt and completely destroyed, stone heaps which once upon a time formed large cities of which a few remains are to be seen here and there. This is all I have since I left Hyderabad four months ago (Letter to Dupleix dated 11th January 1753)

On reaching Oulguir Bussy was worse than ever before. He had eleven continuous days of fever on the 29th. Everybody thought he was in a hopeless condition: he had a very acute pain in the side which seemed to indicate liver abscess. His sufferings had so prostrated him that he was unrecognizable. His constitution held out in spite of all. After staying nine days at Oulguir in a most unhealthy place he was carried to Hyderabad which he reached in every exhausted condition; he had "cours de ventre" with a high fever reappearing regularly every afternoon. This was the fourth time he had been in this state ever since he had started on this expedition and he feared he was about to die. After a few days of rest, he regained enough strength to reach the coast safely and towards the middle of that month he left for Muzulipatam intending to go from there to Pondicherry and never return in the Deccan.

BUSSY'S INTERIM.

Let us leave Bussy for a while at Mazulipatam where he was gradually being restored to health, notwithstanding the insalubrity of the country, and return to the Deccan where Goupil had been invested with full command. This officer had formerly been in command of the French troops at Tanjore (January 1750) and at Arcot (October 1751) without having distinguished himself anywhere. He was a prudent man of mild character — too mild perhaps to be able to unravel and disperse the various intrigues which were ceaselessly being formed

at the Suba's Court. His assistant was Mainville another captain who had made a name for himself during the war of 1746 1749 and on returning from France he had joined service in India at the beginning of 1752 These two officers had taken the place of Kerjean and Vincens in May of the preceeding year

Goupil did not enter into as calm a situation as that declared by Bussy in his instructions of the 23rd January If everything was apparently tranquil both within and outside the Suba's darbar the shortage of money still continued The Suba owed six months wages to his own troops, as to the Europeans even on the 28th January they had not as yet been given their full pay which was due by the 15th For the past two months the Sepoys had not received any payment and threatened to rebel Salabat Jang had partly turned aside the difficulty by paying two months wages to the troops the said amount to be recovered in the Hyderabad paragana while Romi Khan had succeeded in obtaining a loan of 1 50 000 Rupees. But all this merely postponed the trouble Current payments were increasing without there being any assurance of having wherewith to acquit them Salabat Jang spoke of reducing the number of his Sepoys to 4 000, to risk such a measure it was necessary to make sure that the country would remain undisturbed, but knowing the Nawab's distress Ragogy Bonsla and the nawab of Nermel were about to plunder the country Probably it would be necessary to march against them

After Bussy's departure the French troops gradually advanced towards Aurengabad camping first on the banks of the Ganga or Godavery and later at Mahour a hill fort a short distance from the river They stationed

there for over a month, suffering from the terrible heat and the land winds carrying minute particles of burning sand which exhausted one and all.

It was then that the idea of having the revenues of the four circars or provinces on the Orissa Coast, ceded to the French to meet the expenses of the troops, was once again taken up. Mention is made in a letter dated 28th January from Goupil to Moracin, the French Commander at Mazulipatam and in another written in February by Romi Khan to Duplex. According to Goupil, if the French were given the revenues of Ellore, Rajamundry, Chicacole and Gangam which amounted to 19 lakhs, 24 might be used for the Sepoys, while the balance of 6 lakhs might serve to repay the money advanced by the Company. While Romi Khan merely tells Duplex that, as the Suba's treasury was empty, Salabat Jang intended getting the money from Chicacole, Rajamundry and Ellore, at the same time Romi Khan suggested that Moracin should be in charge of collecting these revenues.

Moracin did not reject this proposal, but first of all he felt that the tenants would not willingly agree to it and finally he declared that he could give official sanction to it only after consulting Bussy. So that idea could not be carried through immediately, meanwhile financial distress continued. From Goupil's letters of April it is seen that on the 9th of that month the Europeans could be paid only with money borrowed from merchants at 3 % per month, that the Sepoys too were in the same straits, and the Suba had been able to pay only Rs 1,20,000. On the other hand the French troops had been reduced to one third of their effective forces. Bussy had taken 75 men with him, about 100 had either died or had deserted within the past five months, 150 men were

in hospital and the small pox was raging and causing much havoc

Rom Khan is no less precise he writes on the 1st June that the army was in awful want. The salaries of the Europeans and the Sepoys amounted monthly to Rs 270000, the Suba did not know how to face this expenditure and the Dewan was advising the suppression of a part of the troops. They had agreed to pay temporarily Rs 20 00 000 out of which 70 000 would go to the Europeans and 130 000 to the Sepoys leaving a balance of 70 000 due. Rom Khan said that if Goupil was not as patient as he was, every one would desert the army. The French troops were at that time stationed at 40 or 50 *cosses* North East of Hyderabad, they were in such a plight that if they came back South Holkar who was in the vicinity of Aurengabad would seize that city but if they went northwards, they would die of starvation.

But both Goupil and Rom Khan refrained from saying that owing to leniency in command discipline among the soldiers and officers had slackened. The officers spent their time either in making love or in gambling, women had come into the camp where they were publicly entertained. Fr Monjustin, the army chaplain was much afflicted at these bad morals, and threatened to go back to Pondicherry if the scandal was to go on. The officers, of course laughed at his reprimands while several got together to entertain concubines in common within their tents. Under repeated threats from Fr Monjustin Dupleix resolved to act as censor and recalled the most unruly to Pondicherry. The unfortunate women were driven out of the army.

The Indians gradually became accustomed to have less and less respect for the French troops, the halo with which Bussy had surrounded them was being dissipated

by degrees by the bright light of human weaknesses. The departure for Franco of several officers who had received considerable gratuities produced a worse impression on the Suba's ministers than the loose morals had done. They asked themselves if the devotion of the French was nothing more than a matter of money and salary ! Duploix feared that in France too the Company would draw the most rash conclusions about the reputation of the French in India. "What would the Company say of those who returned to Europe within a couple of years with so large wealth ? I already know what will be said on this subject This conduct will do a great deal of harm to those who shall come out hereafter ".

So the Suba was melancholic Deprived of his faithful adviser he could see no one in whom he could trust It is true that in the preceeding month of March he had easily overcome the attempt at resistance offered by Ragogy Bonsla and the Nawab of Nermel. The former had withdrawn on seeing the army approaching and, by the treaty concluded with him, he bound himself to restore the lands he had usurped as also the money he had taken from tenants Nermel had come to terms by paying Rs 150,000. But this happened close on Bussy's departure The French prestige was still unblemished. On seeing the weakness of Bussy's successor, who was more intent on gambling than on attending to the settlement of any business, every man became daring Once rid of the French tutelage or supervision, one by one the ministers began to raise their heads. Lashkar Khan, who had never been faithful to the French, undertook to drive them out of the Deccan even though Salabat Jang were to succumb in the venture. Had he come to some understanding with the Maratha chieftains Januji, Ragogy Bonsla, Holkar, Rekomdaulas who applied to Delhi that the firman of the Deccan be

granted to Gaziuddin's son? This question cannot be answered in an absolute manner

Whatever be of this Lashkar Khan ingeniously pointed out to Goupil that if according to a custom prevalent in India, the troops were used to collect state revenues from the reluctant tenants Goupil would be almost certain to have enough money to pay the men regularly Goupil fell unsuspectingly into this trap, which had been set merely to divide the forces and to throw the unpopularity which the collection of taxes would entail, on the French

Once this first step obtained his next move was to do away with the French control over Salabat Jang by telling the latter that by leaving Hyderabad where he could have completed his recovery Bussy had been wanting in gratitude, that the new ways of the French called for greater reserve that his own security did not necessitate that he be surrounded at all times by the whole of the French troops a small guard of honour would be ample By getting Romi Khan to side with him he told Goupil that the French would have a better hold on the country if they had a part of their troops at Hyderabad and the rest at Aurengabad Goupil hesitated awhile to divide his forces, this was contrary to the instructions of Dupleix and of Bussy To leave the Nawab under the protection of an insufficient guard meant exposing him to treachery but Racomdaulas, the representative of Balaji Rao and other Maratha leaders swore attachment to the Suba and to Dupleix and on the 17th or 18th May Salabat Jang signed the order to Goupil to go to Hyderabad till the end of the rainy season when they would all meet once more at Calbourga

Thereupon Goupil with the greater part of the troops stayed at about 300 kilometres from either Hyderabad and Aurengabad, while a small European detachment

accompanied Salabat Jang to the last place under the command of Lieutenant Jainville. This officer had been particularly instructed to have a very careful watch on Salabat Jang's safety; but if some misfortune were to befall him, Jainville should acknowledge as Suba whoever the nobleman would designate to this dignity. If they wanted to drag him into any new expedition, he was to reply that he did not have enough men for the purpose, besides he could do nothing without orders from Goupil. Each time the Suba went out, he should be preceded by 400 Sepoys and several Europeans under the command of an officer. Goupil had made the necessary arrangements with Romi Khan for the regular monthly payments of one and all, any delay or postponement of payment would bring about serious trouble.

It is not hard to discover all that is defective in the above programme. In the eyes of the Muhammadans, Goupil has lost his rank and quality of general, having dispossessed himself of the command by handing over to Jainville the custody of the Suba, which was Goupil's pre-eminent duty. To leave to a young and inexperienced officer the responsibility of acknowledging all of a sudden a new Suba was, to say the least, most rash; if Goupil was in a position to expect this to happen, why did he not stay close to the Suba? Finally if Jainville had insufficient forces, how could he be expected to make any remonstrances? Consequently the French could only look on as powerless spectators at the events which were about to take place and at the utter ruin of the French authority.

Lashkar Khan had very cunningly played his game to drive the French out of the Deccan. This policy of national independence is quite understandable. But while doing so why did he make an appeal to the English? Was it not exposing his country merely to change masters? Was

Muhammad Ali's example not convincing? A letter which Lashkar Khan wrote to Saunders in the month of April and which the French soldiers had intercepted, fully opened the eyes of Dupleix on this man's true feelings. In that letter he said that he had managed to get rid of their common enemy, his plans were being evolved and, if the English held out a little longer the consequences would be all that they might wish them to be. An appointment had already been made to settle all matters towards the end of the rainy season.

This letter added on to informations which Dupleix had previously received about the collusion which had never ceased to exist between Muhammad Ali and the great nobles at the Suba's darbar make it quite easy to understand how Muhammad Ali had taken advantage to obtain authentic documents to support his pretensions and the amount of prudence and tact which Bussy had to make use of to maintain himself in the midst of such permanent treachery.

This letter from Lashkar Khan to Saunders did not perturb Dupleix very much, but other news received from the Deccan made him shudder. Writing to Bussy on the 5th June Dupleix says *the letters I received from the army make my hair stand erect debauch of every kind is carried there to excess, the nation has fallen into such disrepute that you alone can put a stop to it*. He was as yet unaware that from the 18th May the army had been divided.

There was nothing else to be done but abandon the country or make Bussy return. Dupleix would not consider the former unless the latter could not be brought about. But Bussy had retired in Mazulipatam and had not the slightest desire to return to the Deccan. He would hear

of nothing else but of going back to Pondicherry, when he would be in a fit state of health. A strong magnet attracted him there

At the time when Bussy had lived at Pondicherry, he had become acquainted with a young lady named Chonchon, the daughter of Madame Duplex and whether prompted by love or ambition, Bussy thought of uniting them. The Governor and Madame Duplex had seen no objection to this engagement and it was agreed that they would be married on Bussy's return from the Deccan. The time had now come. But in the mind of Duplex, state business was primary to everything else. After having cheerfully consented to Bussy's return to Pondicherry and after having gone so far as to promise sending a boat to meet Bussy at Pulicat, Duplex changed his mind on hearing of the Deccan troubles. It seemed absolutely indispensable to Duplex that everything else should be put aside and that Bussy should return, at the earliest, to Hyderabad. Duplex even requested Bussy to make this sacrifice for the peace of his mind and perhaps too for his affection.

Although Bussy had wished to live thereafter free from all care and enjoy the great well established wealth he had earned, yet he was not altogether disinterested in the events of the Deccan and he was witnessing with much regret the crumbling of the edifice he had laboured so hard to erect. He had thought proper to vacate the country after a victory, but he was less willing to be made to withdraw when driven by intrigues or on account of the personal mistake of some French officers. He realized that all would be lost if he did not return to the Deccan; so, when replying to the early requests of Duplex, he did not send a definite refusal.

The requests which Dupleix made to Bussy were very nicely worded. He began by offering Bussy more authority by giving him full power to act as he thought best when ever circumstances did not leave him time to ask for his advice or orders. On the 4th May Dupleix confirmed his intentions in a more official note worded as follows —

‘ The circumstances in which Mr de Bussy often stands and which call for a speedy decision — the distance between us which does not allow him time to consult me or await my orders has often embarrassed him and did not permit him to act according to the dictates of his well known prudence and zeal — and admitting the real inconvenience which might result from the distance between us I feel the necessity to grant him all the powers he might need to take the most suitable step which he might think is called for in urgent cases, especially when my orders and my advice cannot reach him in time and that delay might upset the sudden occasions which might occur holding as best now and for ever that everything which he shall deem proper to carry out on such occasions without even imputing any evil result which might proceed therefrom to him — being convinced that he always had in sight the glory of the king and the honour of the nation and of the Company and that his decisions shall always tend to the above ends, his zeal, his firmness, his prudence *being to me perfect guarantees that he will never deviate* from them recommending him to give me early information of the decision he shall have taken according to the urgent circumstances in which he might have been placed and to ask my advice or await my orders only when there shall be no case for prompt decision

While granting these full powers to Bussy Dupleix did not intend to make use of the authority which he held from the king to compel Bussy to return to his post, as he

relied more on Bussy's discernment and his self love. Had he not told Bussy that his presence in the Deccan would produce greater effect in one hour's time than all that every Frenchman in the army might do and whose conduct only resulted in bringing disgrace upon the nation? (Letter 4th May)

Bussy replied on the 11th May that he agreed to return and accordingly he started for the Deccan on the 25th but without any relish or enthusiasm. He could hardly forget that he had advised Dupleix five months previously to evacuate the Deccan; the events which had been taking place since then had not been such as to alter his feelings. Having amassed immense wealth, Bussy was not anxious to risk them and his reputation in what appeared to him hereafter to be merely an adventure. But Dupleix had touched right when he requested Bussy not to abandon, before consolidation, the deed to which his name would be linked for ever; following on Goupil's misdeeds it might mean desertion. Therefore Bussy went back to the army as a soldier to the battle-field through duty and through necessity. But hardly had he wished farewell to Moracin than he wrote him a long letter dated 28th May from Guntur, in which he recalled all the various reasons he had submitted often to Dupleix in favour of abandoning the Deccan; he summoned his objections not so much as reminders but as arguments which would free him or attenuate his responsibility if he met with obstacles which could not be overcome by him. He was convinced that this letter would be communicated to Dupleix :

"I have at last started", said he "and you will realize how sorry I was to make up my mind to go away from Mazulipatam when you will know that the countless civilities you heaped upon me and the pleasure of your company enabled me to spend two months in the most

delightful condition in the most disagreeable part of the world. If you value me rightly you cannot doubt my words and you must be convinced of my sincere friendship. But if I were to tell you that this was the only reason which makes me undertake most repugnantly this journey probably you would not believe me so readily and you will be quite right, that is why I have withheld paying you such an insipid and unbelievable compliment.

I have spoken openly to you and you are too well aware of the real state of things, not to realize all the bitterness of the task entrusted to me. Your zeal for duty the interests of the Company and your attachment to Mr Dupleix are too well known to me to induce me to hide anything from you. I told you and my letters are there to prove what I say that for the past year almost I did not cease telling Mr Dupleix that it was time for us to withdraw the troops we have beside Salabat Jang. The death of Gaziuddin Khan and the treaty with Balaji Rao were excellent occasions for us to withdraw with honour while the trouble at Arcot, for which the Muhammadans would not give us a helping hand was a very plausible excuse. All my representations were of no avail Mr Dupleix seeing the things from afar and believing that to carry out his designs our troops had to remain beside the Suba would not understand that the position was becoming impossible, nothing could get this idea out of his mind. I foresaw the deadly consequences of what he was doing and I told him what I thought but my strongest language had not the slightest effect on him. The weariness of two years campaign the anxieties I underwent on account of the critical circumstances in which I found myself several times having shattered my health. I finally fell a victim to the sorrow I felt on foreseeing the most unhappy conclusions which would infallibly have followed an expedi-

tion from which I can boast of having extricated myself with honour. Although my life had been in danger during my last illness, I admit I was highly pleased to have found a good excuse to leave the army and return to Pondicherry, convinced that if I were given a chance to interview Mr. Dupleix, I would be able to make him take the only proper step. This hope, much more than all medicines, contributed to the recovery of my health in spite of the fatigues of a long journey. My health was far from being satisfactory when I arrived at Mazulipatam as you can testify. I was only waiting for the first favourable opportunity to hasten to Pondicherry, but the manner in which Mr. Dupleix took my desire to retire and his letters, which I showed you, surprised me as much as they grieved me. In his last letter he gives me to understand that I must absolutely return to the army, where he thinks my presence will set matters all right, and that I cannot keep away without sacrificing to my own personal interest those of the Company and the honour of the Nation. You will realize how disheartening is to feel himself in such a fix and I did not hide from you how cruelly my heart was being wounded.

“I hesitate no longer, I will prove to Mr. Dupleix that no personal motives has ever guided my conduct. The step I have taken this day is the glaring evidence of it, since I sacrifice this time my rest, my health and perhaps also my life and what is still more precious to me than all else, a part of my reputation ..”.

Although he had bid farewell to Moracin only on the day previous, nevertheless Bussy asked him for his formal advice on the two following points. “If I fail, after attempting every possible means to pay my troops, is there any thing else that I can do but withdraw ?

Being obliged to withdraw if I am unable to obtain from the Nawab wherewith to pay the expenses of the troops on the way, should I borrow in the name of the Company or should I raise tribute along our route?

'These extreme measures are deplorable and you may be sure I shall do all I can to avoid them but I must foresee every contingency' (1) (B. N 9158, P 88).

No sooner Dupleix heard that Bussy was willing to return to the Daccan than he began by thanking him for his self sacrifice, then he gave him some instructions, Balaji Rao should at all costs be prevented from attacking Mysore which had at last become an ally to the French, and he should be forced to restore to Salabat Jang the nine fortresses which he had been unduly detaining since the last treaty had been signed Romi Khan, whose attitude seemed treacherous, should be carefully watched

(1) Here is a summary of Moradin's reply He fully realized that after all the successes he had and being at the prime of life, Bussy should wish to return to his Motherland to raise the wellbeing of his family ...But it would be advantageous to the Company if the French troops stayed a little longer beside the Suba. Bussy was the only one able to do this by reviving the proposal of having the provinces of Killore and Rajamundry ceded to the French. If he were able to attain this result what a role he was going to play? All the things which happened in the past would be as nothing when compared to what he would be able to achieve in the future. "March on trustfully remember Omsar at the passage of the Rubloon. You are on a better path than Omsar was then

As to the two questions asked by Bussy Moradin replied to the first: "Necessity knows no law" when two actions are not placed before one's eyes there is no possibility to choose, and to the second: it would be better to draw letters of credit on the company or on Masuliptam, instead of borrowing, and not to raise tribute except from the Polygars who were hoarding riches at the expense of travellers, of the villagers and even of the Suba. Every thing taken shall be paid for

I have replied to all that you asked for of me, but remember that this is but an advice and that he who gives it takes no responsibility" (B. N 9158, P 89-90)

finally all the officers who were discontented, troublesome or incapable, not excepting Goupil and Mainville, were to be sent back to Pondicherry, especially Goupil, who understood duty only when he was at a gambling table.

Before leaving Mazulipatam, Bussy had heard that the French troops were being made use of to bring in the revenues from the provinces in order to safeguard their pay. In fact Bussy noticed at Bezawada, beyond the Ghats, about one hundred Sepoys busy at this work while the other French soldiers, both European and Indian, were scattered all over the country for the same purpose. But Bussy was as yet unaware that the troops had been divided. When he did eventually hear of this he could not understand why this had been done and, to add to his perplexities, he received a letter from Romi Khan advising him not to return to Hyderabad where his popularity was lost. Being disabused, Bussy asked himself what he had come to do in this country and seriously considered turning back his steps and calling away all the French troops from the interior of the country. Dupleix, to whom he submitted this proposal, had to resign himself to approve Bussy while regretting that the French were forced to abandon Salabat Jang (1).

Fortunately for the policy of Dupleix but less so for that of the French, Bussy's hesitations were only short-lived. When he had realized the lamentable state of the French, Bussy deemed that his honour more than his duty demanded that he should not leave the country before having restored order everywhere; so he continued his onward march.

(1) "I agree to all you wish to do" wrote Dupleix on the 12th July "I leave you free to take whatever step you consider as best What more do you wish me to do? I only hope that you will not abandon the troops till you have placed them safely somewhere".

THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE FOUR CIRCARS

Bussey reached Hyderabad on the 15th June. He did not meet Goupil who was busy with Mr Muhammad Husain Khan collecting the money with which the troops were to be paid. Everything was in confusion, there was no one in command, complete anarchy prevailed. Bussey started with the most urgent and wrote to Goupil demanding the detailed account of all the money he had collected. He was pleased to find that the contributions were coming in unhindered. This fact brought a certain amount of satisfaction to the General, who proved more lenient in judging the faults committed. He disapproved of the partition of the French troops and blamed Goupil for having been so rash as to fall so readily into the trap set by the enemy and for having jeopardised his up-hill work of two full years. During this time the French were not only the auxiliaries of Salabat Jang but also the mediators of peace between the Moghuls and the Marathas and now they risked being driven out of the country. After scrutinizing the personal accounts of Goupil Mainville and the other officers, Bussey raised another sort of objection. He found that these officers had abused of their authority and had exacted unjustifiable gratuities. By his letter dated 26th July Bussey claimed the restitution by Goupil and Mainville of 40 000 Rs. which they had extorted from Mr Muhammad Husain Khan for their own private use. The two officers pleaded guilty but they represented to Bussey 'If you would be kind enough to place yourself in our stead just for a moment, would you not reproach yourself with having prevented two honest men to make the fortune they had deserved

by their hard work? What consequence such an amount may have in the nawab business and even in the affairs of the nation?''.

Bussy's reply was not that of an uncompromising judge; had he himself not received bountiful liberalities? He replied he would certainly reproach himself during the rest of his days for not having helped them to acquire wealth; but 40,000 Rupees, which might have been considered a contemptible little amount once upon a time, had risen considerably in value just then. Forced to make use of all sorts of means for subsistence, owing to the scarcity of money, further hardships could not be imposed by a greater depletion of the public finances. Besides Dupleix alone could decide what steps were to be taken as he had reserved for himself the appraising of the liberalities.

A few days later an order was issued by Dupleix to the officers in the following terms. Gentlemen. I have been informed that several of you have worried and tired the Nawab and other lords by their irksome demands for gratuities, almost always ill founded. As such a procedure can be nothing else than extremely harmful to the transactions of the Company as also to the glory of the king and the nation, and as it tends to bring disgust even to the very ones who much need our protection, it is absolutely essential to prohibit in the future all endeavours which might have the slightest appearance of a solicitation and to forbid visits to the Lords except after receiving the sanction of the Commander. Moreover you are warned that you are all bound to consider yourselves as being directly in the service of the king and the company . . . that you must deem yourselves very fortunate to draw the high salaries which you receive and that on no account you should think of gratuities except in so far as circumstances may allow and that they shall be

freely granted by those who have the power to do so. The King, the Company and I will it so and whosoever does not submit shall be considered a rebel" (A. Vers 8754-Circular dated 14th July 1753)

An out and out moral and financial cleansing had to be carried out. It is difficult to say whether the former or the latter was the more important. Dupleix ordered a further cut in the salaries of the Sepoys while waiting to do likewise to that of the European soldiers. As for the officers, as they were to show themselves in a decent position their salaries should not be altered. The first batch of soldiers to proceed from Pondicherry would be given an advance of Rupees 20 only while a sergeant and a corporal would receive proportional advances.

Bussy spent the first weeks of his stay at Hyderabad in acquainting himself with the new events. A fact of some importance had occurred within the State. During the second fortnight of July Lashkar Khan had interned the Suba's two brothers at Doulatabad under the pretext that they both and especially Nizam Ali, were not loyal to the Suba and that they might come to some understanding with the Marathas to depose him. As this imprisonment was most unpopular the Minister gave to understand that he had taken that step merely on the request of the French so as to have the French further more hated by the population. As that time Bussy was too far from Aurengabad to act in any way and he seemed taking no interest in the cause of the princes.

When glancing at the foreign policy Bussy discovered very soon, that English intrigues had played a very important role since his departure. He noted that Lashkar Khan and even Mr Muhammad Husain had acted only according to their suggestions. He found also that Balaji

Rao and Ragogy Bonsla were preparing to attack the Deccan once again notwithstanding the treaty signed by them and to which he himself had acted as mediator. The situation was very critical. Bussy could not think of concentrating his troops by recalling Mainville ; that would mean endangering the life of the Souba. He could not himself rejoin him because the payment of the army had first to be assured. But Bussy was not perturbed at all and very calmly resolved to bring to safe haven the barge of which he had retaken the command although against his will. Before setting out to open sea, he tacked about among the reefs and only when he set out in full sail was it realized that his genius had never been so sure, so prudent, so able nor so resolute. He had not made any false manœuvres and finally brought back to Aurengabad, under the French flag, the unsteady barge which carried the destinies of the French.

On the 2nd July he wrote as follows to Moracin : "Since I have gone so far as to return and retake the command of our troops, I will act so as my return don't tend to leave the Deccan shamefully. The greatest and so to say the only obstacle in my way is to find the necessary funds to upkeep the army without being obliged to have monthly vain recourse, as suppliants, to the very ones we intend overcoming...".

Such words were expected for the past six months and our troops were paid in the meantime only through some stroke of luck. It was high time this anxiety came to an end Bussy act himself exclusively to attain this end. On the 10th July he sent a lengthy memorandum to Dupleix under the title *Memorandum of the political relations between the Muhammadans and the French in the Deccan and their reciprocal interests.*

This document is an exceedingly important one as it shows a new direction in Bussy's politics and it indicates the practical means to realize this aim. Bussy no longer spoke of abandoning the Deccan to its fate, whatever that might be but he was resolved to stay on and maintain himself. Let us analyse this document.

Bussy began by calling attention to the fact that the French nation had lost a great deal of its prestige during his absence. His return had outwitted all the intrigues and cabals, but some time would be necessary to regain his ascendancy. He would without difficulty reach that stage if he had sufficient forces. He further said. I can without flattering myself promise to settle the affairs of the Deccan according to my own will and regulate the interests of the Suba and those of individuals according to our own.

The French should not be blinded by illusions: attempts were undoubtedly being made to get rid of them. Having partitioned the army and although fearing the departure of the French, Lashkar Khan was convinced himself that he had already succeeded to realize his desire as for the Suba. "naturally pusillanimous and deprived of any genius or any experience" he endured his influence. However the minister refrained from openly showing his real game owing to the presence of the French. As he was fully aware that the French were resourceful he did not dare use either force or treachery against them, but he thought it more skilful to oblige them to withdraw of their own selves by keeping back the payment of the troops and by crushing them through starvation. It was indeed possible, Salabat Jang's treasury was quite empty but the country was far from being unproductive while its revenues were more than enough to cover the needs of the French. Lashkar Khan was well aware of this.

Ought it to be taken for granted that the Suba's power was so firmly established that the help of the French was no longer needed? Assuredly not. The Marathas and Balaji Rao were as threatening as ever. The mere withdrawal of the French would suffice to cause the Suba's empire to crumble. This fall might be a matter of indifference to the French; but if they were to go away from the Deccan, other Europeans would take their place and maintain Salabat Jang's authority. The letter exchanged between Lashkar Khan and the Governor at Madras left no room for doubt on this point: the English would defend the Deccan against the Marathas just as the French had been doing, there would be no change except that Lashkar Khan would be upheld by the enemies of the French and maintained as minister and regent in spite of Salabat Jang's own will.

What shall the French gain thereby? Absolutely nothing. They would lose everything at the same time, the Deccan, the Carnatic, Mazulipatam and Condavir. Their commerce would be annihilated. The Suba might witness the downfall of the French with regret but he could not prevent it. His will, domineered over by that of his minister, would be ineffectual, he might lament and even burst out but without any effect to the French because he had neither authority nor firmness.

All this risk might be quickly avoided by knocking off a single head only. There were but two ways to attain this extremity: either treachery or violence. The former was unsuitable to the French, while the latter offered almost unsurmountable difficulties. Should the French give up intrigues and willingly withdraw from the Deccan, the country would not obtain any gain as it would merely change masters. Was Lashkar Khan led by real interest of the country? Bussy said: "Such is

the spirit of the Moghul nation that every one thinks of his actual and own advantage and sacrifices fidelity, gratitude and everything else to that idea

What attitude should the French take in the present juncture For Bussy there was no place to any discussion He cannot suppose Dupleix will recall the troops The honour of the nation and the interests of the Company were too dear to Dupleix for him to stop midway "We must keep the Deccan, you feel the necessity of doing so

If at a time I showed opposite views my letter have given you the reason why I thought so The point is to be able to maintain an army and provide for its subsistence despite money scarcity The difficulty did not rest in having to stay beside the Suba but in having to feed the army Bussy hoped to be able to overcome the difficulty through negotiations which would take four or five months to complete but during that length of time he must be provided with all the money he might need even if it was necessary to have recourse momentarily to the funds of the Company The Company would not only recover its advance on the completion of the actual negotiations but it had a real advantage at the present moment not to abstain indemnifying him

Bussy went on giving further details as to the means through which he hoped to succeed If the payment of the army could be secured through gentle insinuation undoubtedly it would be the best method to adopt in preference to all others But it must be confessed that, at times, one can hardly keep within the limits of meekness and no one can sometimes abstain from vivacity when dealing with an artful and cunning people

Unfortunately the Suba, with whom it would be easy to come to some understanding was far away When his

minister retired to Aurengabad, he had left with the major portion of the French troops a Muhammedan lord in charge of the recovery of tribute with the help of the French. Negotiations should first be carried on with this man before proceeding further. This lord, by name Mr. Muhammad Husain Khan, the superintendent of Hyderabad, hesitated to return to this city in order to avoid partaking in the negotiations, which he foresaw would not be to his advantage Bussy however was quite certain of being in a position to compel him to come there and make all arrangements to suit the French. To this end, Bussy intended to propose that Mr. Muhammad Husain Khan should get money lenders to guarantee the monthly payment of the French troops or assign to the French one more province, whose rents they themselves would collect.

In case Mr. Muhammad Husain Khan accepted these proposals, 100 Europeans and 1,000 Sepoys would at once be despatched to occupy Ellore, Rajamundry and Chicacole, which were suitable to the French, while Moracin would be put in charge of the government of these provinces But in case he refused, Bussy would take a still more energetic step: He would seize the government of Hyderabad and change at his will all writers and officers of justice. "I will meet no obstacle in doing this" said he. I hold the persons necessary for carrying out this plan .. If all this seems difficult to you, it is not so, to me, on the spot, I know thoroughly the strong and the weak points of the Muhammadan nation so that I am in a position to give you my word of honour that I am prepared to execute all this, provided I get some ready cash to help me . . You must get convinced that the Nawab has, so to say, no means of existence

This somewhat harsh determination might have some inconveniences but if it is an evil it is a necessary one.

The Suba being not, to say so, cared for what the Muhammedan lords would do or what were they able to do? They dreaded the French and they could always be kept in check by an alliance with Balaji Rao and the Marathas. But this should be reserved as a final resource. The Marathas had never ceased to grow in authority and in territory ever since the day on which Nizam ul Mulk had invited them to invade his own State in order to have an excuse for not answering a summons to Delhi sent to him by the Emperor. Quite recently Balaji Rao had captured the provinces of Khandesh and Guzerat, and if he were to make up his mind to go further the Moghul could not resist him as he too is in want of money. Without the French and their presence the Deccan would have been conquered long before. Consequently an alliance with the Marathas would be preferable to one with the Moors. Yet Bussy did not propose the French breaking off relations with the latter as it would mean destroying their own deed. Bussy merely meant to show that even if a rupture with the Muhammedans were to occur the French interests would not be desperate. If the Muhammedans realized or even suspected that there was a close understanding between the French and the Marathas, it would be quite enough to instil terror into them and make them willing to accede to whatsoever the French wanted.

There was one more thing to be considered. An alliance with Balaji Rao was absolutely indispensable to carry out the French plans regarding Surat. The latter owned all the territory in the vicinity of that town. The French must be satisfied to own the fortress and the harbour and to possess suzerain rights on them and a few neighbour-

ing countries. Let it not be said that an alliance with the Marathas and Moors would be of no consequence. Were the very Muhammedans, with whom the French were co-operating, not usurpers?

Such were the thoughts which had been inspired to Bussy by his long experience, his knowledge of the various political interests and by the different forms of government existing in the country. In concluding Bussy once again asked of Dupleix to advance 4 or 5 lakhs of rupees to him or else to allow him to dispose of the revenues from the Condavir province, while he would negotiate and obtain from the Deccan itself the necessary amount for the regular and continued upkeep of the French troops.

On reading this report in its original text, one is less astonished by Bussy's daring suggestion than by the absolute assurance with which he expresses himself. Nothing seemed impossible to him; yet the partition of the troops placed the French in a precarious situation. They had not made yet any treaty with the Marathas, while at Aurangabad, Hyderabad and throughout the Deccan, all the authorities, except the Suba, were hostile to them. They could rely on no one except themselves.

Bussy's serene confidence seemed like a challenge to reason, yet events were to prove that he had judged rightly for they went even beyond his expectations. He retained for France, during five more years, the land he had asked to evacuate six months previously. The cold obstinacy of Dupleix had vanquished his most sound arguments in favour of evacuation. After all, Bussy was not the arbitrator of the general politics of the whole of India. And since he was ordered to go onwards notwithstanding all his remarks, he had nothing else to do but to submit, that was his duty as a soldier. But it must be said that from

the day on which he accepted this new role he had acted as conscientiously and implicitly as the most convinced man Was it not an irresistible satisfaction to overcome difficulties which seemed the most unsurmountable?

Dupleix perused this memorandum with the highest interest No document had ever better fitted in with his thoughts just as no other ever co-operated better with his plans He sent it on to the minister thus leaving all the honour to Bussy

Writing to the latter on the 1st August, Dupleix says
You daily show talents to which you had not given wing till now I am all the more pleased that it is so for it proves the nicety of my discernment regarding you Hence all the great deeds done by you touch me to the quick as if they were done by myself Continue onwards, my dear Bussy to where I see you and please be justly convinced that you cannot abandon this task till you have well asserted it'

Foreseeing that Bussy might be forced to leave the army some day or other either on account of weariness or ill health or any other motive Dupleix left Bussy free to seek out and train as he thought best a successor, as another token of trust Dupleix allowed Bussy to open every letter which might be addressed to him from the Deccan and to make use of his private seal while replying to them He promised also not to send any letter to the Minister or the Suba before Bussy had taken knowledge of its contents

Dupleix was in full agreement with Bussy concerning the various propositions submitted to him even those concerning Surat, he merely made a few unimportant remarks

This report which stands as an evidence of the complete full, absolute and unreserved understanding between

Dupleix and Bussy, was followed a few days later (29th July) by a second memo in which Bussy tried to show the practical way for the French to put an end once and for all to their wars in India:

To judge correctly, he explained, one must begin by getting rid of European ideas in which monarchy is the regular government well fitted out in all its parts and in which every member works for the best of the common interest. Such ideas are unknown in India where they are taken to be most admirable in theory but chimerical in practice. The government of the Moors is monstrous in all its parts, there being neither order, subordination, zeal for public good nor the spirit of nationality in it. Everything is sacrificed to private interest: honour the welfare of the nation, the monarchy, the monarch himself and even the religion. In spite of the very great services rendered by the French, the Muhammedans seek only for means to drive them away in order to get back possession of the territories which they gave to the French. Bussy's aim was to place all French territory beyond the reach of any revolution which might occur in such an unsteady government.

Bussy did not wish to start off with some brilliant action, he thought it more befitting to continue upholding the Suba and the Muhammedans while dominating them. This mode of action had its own difficulties. The Suba's power waned to its ruin; the utmost that could be done was to delay an imminent revolution. But the greatest obstacle laid in the money scarcity to which there was no other remedy than to seize certain provinces, whose revenue would be sufficient for the upkeep of the army. A double advantage would be secured by this procedure; that of being assured of a fixed salary, however might be the bad state of the Suba's treasury, and that of being

independent of the Muhammedan officers from whom the French were obliged to beg so to say, to obtain their pay. With this idea in his mind Bussy had set his eyes on the four Circars over which the French commander at Mazulipatam could easily watch the tenant and make sure that he sent the amount of money necessary for the army every month.

The whole negotiation would be to obtain the changing of the tenant and placing in his stead another chosen by Bussy who will take charge of the provinces on behalf of the French. Circumstances were favourable just then, the various governors on the coast were jealous of one another and were at loggerheads this disunion required merely to be entertained. These misunderstandings were necessary to support Bussy's demand of the provinces and to give to the whole plan the semblance of zeal for the interest of the Suba.

Bussy next entered into details of which we shall read further when dealing separately of the affairs of the coast itself which had been left till that time independent of the inland affairs. Afterwards Bussy continued saying he had laid open his plan to Mr Muhammad Husain Khan who appeared to approve of them but he felt sure the Souba and his ministers would be unwilling to accept them since they were planning to take back the territories already assigned to the French. Bussy was not alarmed at this prospect if Dupleix authorized him merely to borrow some money he would start at once for Aurengabad meet the Suba and complete the transaction. In case he found that the Suba's power was too considerably shaken rather than he dragged with him in his downfall Bussy would enter on an alliance with Balaji Rao provided the latter agreed either by secret intrigues or by threatening to break off relations.

to have all the nobles at the Suba's Court and especially the prime minister, dismissed and then have Bussy in full authority, which later on could be shared by both in common. This was the only means left to continue giving support to Salabat Jang although he no longer deserved the same; but Bussy could not destroy the work of his own hands unless all other means had been tried in vain.

In case the secret intrigues did not succeed, Bussy in agreement with Balaji Rao would turn his forces against the Suba, avoiding however real open warfare. While Balaji Rao would attack him on the Aurengabad's side, Bussy would threaten to seize Golconda till he was in a position to start an expedition against the Circars. He would install a *Naeib* or lieutenant and would join these provinces to Mazulipatam under the command of Moracin. This expedition would cost nothing more than the trouble of its being undertaken. At his approach all things would yield. Salabat Jang would undoubtedly complain, Bussy had his answer quite ready; he would say that he occupied the provinces merely to keep them in safe custody for the Suba himself and to have the necessary funds to pay for the troops which were there to defend him. Dupleix would be free to write to Salabat Jang that he could not explain to himself why Bussy had done this and that he disapproved of his action, the farce would all the better have been enacted.

While Dupleix would write thus, Bussy would be consolidating all that he had acquired and when he shall have fixed up everything, he would return to the Deccan with his troops as if nothing out of the way had occurred and he would offer his services once again to Salabat Jang. While doing so he would also write frequently and openly to Balaji Rao to impress the Nawab. If the latter asked Bussy to call on him, he would ask for the dismissal

of the ministers who were against the French. If the ministers did not act frankly Bussy would write to Balaji Rao to march on to Aurengabad while himself would advance from his side.

Bussy would take this opportunity to propose an expedition against Surat to the peshwa. He would first try to do this jointly with the Suba and the Marathas in order that the whole expedition be looked up as a lawful conquest in case it turned out successfully and the French could not be called usurpers. To be sure of success Dupleix must send 500 men. Bussy would then proceed to join the Suba at Aurengabad but he would not enter the City. He would say that, as the Deccan was peaceful he was going away and that he was on his way to Surat to make arrangements for ships to convey his troops back to Pondicherry; and to make the news more creditable he would have some steps, to embark the troops, made at Surat. Then he would cross Balaji Rao's territory and carry off the city of Surat which was being guarded by some Abyssinians and a few European deserters. Holding Surat on the West coast and Mazulipatam on the East the entire Indian peninsula would be blockaded by the French.

Bussy himself admitted that on reading these proposals every one would be astonished to note he was deciding at his will and pleasure such important affairs and acting as a sovereign. One would think he was about to jeopardize the nation by his most fantastic schemes, but India cannot be compared to any European nation, its government was totally different to that of the various western monarchical States. It is true that if the Nawab was in earnest to assure the pay of the troops, all those schemes should be delayed, but merely postponed as the Deccan could not be evacuated by the French before the said schemes were all carried out in every detail.

Balaji Rao was making great preparations for war under pretext that he was joining to help the Moghal against his vizir. The reality was that Balaji Rao was getting ready to invade the Deccan where the Subahad neither credit nor cash and could in no way resist him. Nothing could hinder the course of an already far advanced revolution. If the Suba were attacked by a considerable force the Muhammedan lords would certainly not stand by him. Bussy concluded most philosophically: "Let us allow the Maratha domination to replace the Moghal government in the Deccan; but as we cannot stand merely as idle spectators of such a revolution, we must take part in it and draw some profit: Such was in Bussy's opinion the only way to put an end to all wars (B N 9158, P. 37-43)

Dupleix did not dissemble his joy on receipt of the new memorandum. All his anxieties about the Deccan vanished at once. He replied to Bussy on the 31st August: "I am in extasy at seeing the amount of ressource you find within yourself. You are not only a daring military man but at the same time you are a most perfect minister. The depth of your ideas astonishes me. What do you not deserve, my dear Bussy, with such wonderful talents and how I congratulate myself for having insisted on your return to the Deccan ... In the middle of a labyrinth you will obtain such an amount of fame as you had never before attained Since long I have not ceased to say that where you are I have no cause to any anxiety. How many anxious moments would I have been spared did I but have another Bussy on this side (i-e in the Carnatic)!"

As it has been for the first memorandum, Dupleix gave an unreserved approval to all the proposals exposed again by Bussy. Dupleix however had some regrets about

having probably to sacrifice Salabat Jang, but what hope was there of seeing this weak and ill-advised prince reacting in some way?

‘You are quite right in saying that with such cunning people one is forced to be still more cunning than they are themselves. You will find always the Marathas more faithful and I see apparently that we would be forced to treat with them. Then it would be very difficult to hold a just medium between these two powers. The Maratha power is taking such an ascendancy that the other will be forced to fall. Already the Moghals are just able to hold themselves owing to our flag. I admit with you that everything must be done to save the remains of the Moghal Empire but we must not be its dupe.

A third memorandum soon followed (6 September) under the strange heading

Discourse between two Muhammedan lords relating to the present state of the French in the Deccan and to their military and political qualities as compared to those of the English? With remarks on the said discourse.

The two Muhammedan lords were none other than Mr Muhammad Husain and Coja Abdur Rahman, son of Calender Khan the late governor of Mazulipatam. In this real or imaginary conversation, Bussy makes Mr Muhammad Husain stand up for and speak in favour of the English and their politics so as to afford an easy opportunity to Abdur Rahman to triumph over the arguments of the former and to prove that the qualities of the French were immeasurably superior to those of their rivals and that the Deccan had more to gain by adhering to the French. Bussy deduced, and there were his own remarks—that it would be a dishonour and a shame for the French to withdraw their troops. It would be said

that the French had come to the country merely to satisfy their lust for gold and that they had gone because the treasury had been emptied.

Leaving the country is nothing. The French may be perhaps forced to do so if they are not able to secure the money necessary to pay their men; but did not the English wait for their departure to take their place? Of what use would the French possessions on the coast be to them, in such a case? It would mean their ruin and the loss of their trade. The English would benefit, for a while of all the advantages which the French shall have lost. They would spare neither pains nor money to strengthen their success and render their position inexpugnable

So reverting to the method he had traced out in his instructive memorandum, Bussy once again expressed the necessity to maintain a detachment of French troops beside the Suba "This detachment would be like a moving factor in which the Governor general of India would make whatever alterations he thought necessary and proper. It would not be a burdensome and fruitless appointment either to the officers or to the men, their handsome salaries duly paid and partially put aside would soon create for them a well deserved and well earned fortune, and the money sent in the Colonies would make them richer and flourishing in their commerce".

And then, Bussy looking at the plans from his own standpoint said: "There is no one amongst the officers in the service of the company who could not occupy with dignity the office I am holding, if in the least he would take a little trouble to be acquainted with the genius and the customs of the country He would then be able to conform himself to them in the circumstances where it is quite convenient to lay aside for a while, all European ideas and behave as an Asiatic without

however being hampered by his vices and defects. In the case the Company is pleased to retain my services I shall not refuse to spend a short while to make all these arrangements quite stable. Once the track laid out it would be quite easy to follow it. In spite of the discomforts of a broken-down health which has altered my temper considerably I am prepared to sacrifice my rest and my youth to the enlargement of my nation, and to the advantages of its commerce at a period of my life when I could enjoy happy days in the midst of my family and in my own motherland. I dare trust my services will not be overlooked and that those who, by the rank they occupy have the duty of making them known, far from dissembling would represent them under their real colour so that the Company placing my services before His Majesty's eyes I might feel the effects of his royal generosity (A. COL. Inde 2nd series, T 7 pages. 198 to 205)

It is medless to say that this report as also the two previous ones were meant not so much for Dupleix but for the Company and the minister whose good will had to be conciliated. Consequently all three were sent to Paris about October or November and if they did not help to subserve the case of Dupleix already forfeited then, it may be that they contributed to the determination of maintaining Bussy in his office and not sacrificing the French settlements in the Deccan to the demands or even to the mere desire of the English.

Bussy's memorandums and their approval by Dupleix contained in shoots the very principle of a new policy by an alliance with Balaji Rao against Salabat Jang, the French implicitly abandoned the principle of legitimacy to which Dupleix had been adhering till then and they entered a revolutionary path. It is regretful to note that Bussy's habitual success which overcame without any

difficulty both the Suba's indolence and the minister's resistance, did not break away the French from Salabat Jang but on the contrary bound them all the more closely to his cause. As rightly as we may judge from the events that soon followed an understanding with the Maratha would certainly have been more advantageous to the French. There might have been indeed some danger in being allied to a powerful prince, who might afterwards try to subdue the French themselves, but was there no peril to join to a weak power, fatally the prey of its neighbours? For the present, an alliance with the Marathas would have helped, the French to overcome Muhammad Ali; for the future it would have served as a sure pledge against the ambition of the English. The situation in India would have been quite different if Dupleix had followed completely the inspiration of Bussy, but while admitting the advantages from an alliance with Balaji Rao Dupleix did not know how to take the decisive step held back by a certain legitimate point of honour as also perhaps by the uncertainty of the future, Dupleix did not dare to sacrifice Salabat Jang at the auspicious moment, when that prince and his government openly conspired against the French and Bussy, left without precise orders, abstained to risk an initiative, which at times is the light of genius. At the very moment when Bussy could undertake what he would, Dupleix received from France the most magnificent presents for the Suba which he was about to send to Hyderabad; this was not a sure sign that he really meant to break relations with Salabat Jang.

In continuation of his letters and to give a solid basis to his policy, Bussy was trying more earnestly than ever to complete the transaction with Muhammad Husain regarding the payment of the troops. He succeeded at last and about mid-August he obtained that, from the 1st

September next, some of the tenants should supply the necessary amount each month. But this agreement in no way settled the debts which amounted to 52 lakhs and could be advantageous except in the case some lands were mortgaged to the French, such a guarantee should be given only by the Suba or his prime minister and they were far from being disposed to do it. No sooner had the agreement with Muhammad Husain been concluded than Lashkar Khan appointed a new governor to Hyderabad so that the terms of the agreement with Muhammad Husain might fall through. The intention was quite visible, however Bussy seemed not to understand it and sent his congratulations to the new governor but at the same time and as a test Bussy asked him a lakh of rupees for the garison at Aurangabad. Things happened as Bussy had expected them in view of abstaining to carry out the terms of the agreement. Muhammad Husain's successor did not join duty saying he was acting according to the orders of the Suba. The settlement of the difficulties could consequently be done only at Aurengabad. Bussy resolved to go there as soon as he received reinforcements from Pondicherry (1)

(1) *There exists a statement of the Sepoys Bussy found at Hyderabad when he returned from Masulipatam. There were 5700 Sepoys costing 141,508 Rs. a month divided into eight corps each having as its commander the following*

Abdul Rhaman	with 1145	men	costing	34031	Ra.
Muhammad Khan	— 919	—	—	27765	—
Aboubaker	— 454	—	—	14090	—
Koker Khan	— 551	—	—	9360	—
Lar Khan	— 548	—	—	2500	—
Romani Khan	— 540	—	—	8901	—
Aboubaker	— 100	—	—	1510	—
Ibrahim Khan	— 1434	—	—	36361	—

These reinforcements arrived in small batches during the course of September. Dupleix hoped to send 500 men but he was able to give only 350 of whom 150 were despatched from Mazulipatam. One of the detachments was under the command of the Marquis of Conflans, lately arrived from France (2).

As a purely documentary statements we give the details of Abdul Rahman's detachment.

1	Captain	336 Rs.
2	Captains	300 Rs. each...	...	600
1	Captain	277
8	Captains,	250 Rs. each	..	2000
1	Captain	200
47	Officers	5440
80	Sergeants	4434 Rs. 8
91	Corporals	2586
838	Sepoys	14414
76	Cavalry men	3788 Rs. 8

(2) The Marquis of Conflans had come to Pondicherry on board the "Rouille" on the 10th August as a "*capitaine reformé*" He was previously of the regiment of Rouergue and had some difficulties with the "*Grand Prieur*" Dupleix announced his despatch to the Deccan thus "He is the man who had some trouble with the Chevalier of Orleans and that certain regretful events have led here on the advise of the ministers themselves, who assured him that I would help him to refit his fortunes His manner of behaving here encourages me and I can do nothing better than sending him on to you His contract with the Company and with the ministers is that he shall always be on the staff and not under orders in places where he might be and not called upon to mount guard as a simple officer It is quite certain that having been a Colonel and exempted of service in the body guard of the king of Spain, it would be hard to him to be deprived of such privileges here So, my dear Bussy, please hand over to him on his arrival, the charge of Major of your army. This post is advantageous to those who occupys it According to the remarks I have made till now there are more resources in those of high birth than in those with whom India is unfortunately peopled (Letter to Bussy dated 31st August 1753—A. V. 3754 P 113)

The salaries were not uniform in Aboubaker's corps the sergeants corporals and Sepoys were paid 62 81 and 20 Rs. respectively while in another corps they were paid 42, 21 and 12 Rs. (B. N 9158 P 52—53).

The exact number of Europeans is not known, they must have been somewhere near 400; at any rate their pay amounted to 72700 Rs. per month

Bussy feeling at last strong enough decided to march on to Aurengabad Needless to say that neither Goupil nor Mainville took part in this expedition After settling all the military accounts with them these two were sent back to Pondicherry which they reached about the end of September Dupleix asked for no explanations from them and he did not even speak with them, leaving them at first unaware of his intentions about them We have already seen that Dupleix was not too stern on them and that a few days later Mainville was called upon to take command of the French troops at Trichinopoly

Till the beginning of September Bussy feared that the Marathas knowing the disturbed state of the Deccan would have liked to take advantage of the disorder which reigned on all sides to invade the country once again.

Bussy had some confidential information that Balaji Rao and Ragogy were ready to march a force previously arranged with the help of Lashkar Khan was to justify their intervention Bussy with his habitual boldness warded off the blow by pretending to march against the enemy Balaji Rao on seeing the French about to pounce on him sent his vakil in great haste to request Bussy's friendship and to say that he was quite ready to satisfy the treaty which had been signed at the end of 1722.

Things were done accordingly: Ragogy followed Balaji Rao's example and peace was once again assured in the Deccan.

The ground being cleared, nothing more hindered Bussy's march to Aurengabad. He did as if he had been invited by the Suba to call at him; it was therefore a simple promenade and not a military expedition. The last preparations being completed by the end of September, Bussy gave a splendid military fete, the report of which he hoped would soon reach Aurengabad and on the 28th he wrote to Salabat Jang to inform him of his departure two or three days later; but how hard was his letter! He began saying: "If you are the Suba of the Deccan presently, you ought it to me". Then he crudely reminded him of all the services he had rendered to him at the time of his accession to the throne and especially at the time of the death of Gaziuddin. Then Salabat Jang wanted to make peace at any price; Bussy had saved the situation. If in spite of some injustices Bussy came to him once again it was for two reasons: first of all for the glory of his king and the honour of the French nation and secondly for the interests of Salabat Jang, towards whom the French were still prepared to sacrifice themselves:

"Beside my usual straight forwardness well known to you, I am entitled to write to you as I am doing, because everybody in the Deccan is aware that I call you my son and that you consider me as a father. Whence is it that you no longer hold the same language? Who could have changed your mind? Despite the change in your feelings and words, I shall be near you in a couple of days. It is nothing but proper that you should expect my arrival in order that we might together arrange a campaign which may honour and bring you some profit, whereas you are

aware that your last campaign was neither honourable nor profitable to you. You followed the advice of your enemies rather than mine. Your behaviour is so irregular that I believe you are anxious to ruin your country. You have just knocked off Mr Muhammad of whom you told me all sorts of good. Probably this too is the work of my enemies who are also yours as well and who being jealous of seeing the perfect understanding between Mr Muhammad and myself and of the settlement we had reached for the regular payment of our troops, have set you up to dismiss him. I warn you that if you continue blindly trusting those people you will lose yourself and you will infallibly lose the Deccan. I shall be beside you in a few days I hope you will be cured from your blindness which may lead you to your downfall (B N 9158 P 48-49)

The journey had taken over a month. Just as Bussy was about to start he discovered that steps had been taken so that he should find neither conveyance nor the things needed for the journey. Notwithstanding these difficulties he left the city and pitched his tents on the banks of the river running near the town. As Bussy was sure the tenants would refuse to pay their dues for the upkeep of the troops, he left Dugré with a detachment of Europeans and Sepoys at Hyderabad. Then he went forward. He made Muhammad Husain the ex governor of Hyderabad several Moghal lords and the Dewan himself accompany him on the journey. After a day's march from the city he was rejoined by the governor of Beder. Conflans too joined him. Great excitement prevailed at Aurengabad where there were as many lords attached to Bussy as to Lashkar Khan. When almost three quarters of the way had been crossed Muhammed Hussain who wanted to be the peacemaker between Bussy and Lashkar Khan and who only

obtained vague replies from Bussy, threatened to desert him if he did not accede to a reconciliation Bussy declared he was quite willing to make all the promises of friendship they thought necessary. When they had come to a day's march from Aulengabad, Bussy sent a Muhammedan lord who was sincerely attached to him to reassure the Regent of his kind intentions and to propose, as the basis of an agreement, the ceding of the four provinces of Chicacole, Ellore, Rajamundry and Moustafanagar. On hearing that his proposal would probably be granted, Bussy got ready to enter the city; he had 8000 infantry and cavalry men with him. The army was in battle array with Bussy and the Marquis of Conflans at the centre. The march was slow according to asiatic ceremonial. Soon 22 elephants were seen coming forwards to meet them bearing the minister Regent and all the lords of the Deccan; Bussy so arranged that the lords had to be the first to get their elephants on their knees in order "to do honour to the French flag and to recognize its superiority" and then alone he made his own elephant kneel. Bussy, the Regent and the most prominent lords embraced one another. When this was over each one set on his elephant and proceeded to the Suba's tent. A renewal of the embracings and manifestations of friendship took place. The salutes being completed, the march was resumed and at last the palace of Salabat Jang was reached, after a day's very tiresome journey under the burning sun. "I was never so tired of all the pomp, the discomforts of which I had to bear" said Bussy.

Thereafter the real negotiations were started. They soon resulted as desired by Bussy, i.e. the four Circars were ceded to the French.

This meant the realisation of all the French desires and the solemn recognition of their authority. Rarely

had such great results been achieved by such simple and natural means. Bussy had succeeded in becoming the master of the Deccan without ever having fired a single shot, a simple military display sustained by some useful intrigues and a few wise personal contrivances had sufficed

Before going further it would be well to cast a glance on the events which took place round about Mazulipatam since 1751 and which had till then some occasional relations with the inland affairs. The ceding of the four Circars called for attention to them in a most opportune hour

A RETROSPECTIVE GLANCE ON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS AT MAZULIPATAM AND ON THE ORISSA COAST

In 1750 the French possessed on the coast of Orissa only the factory at Yanam and the lodge at Mazulipatam merely for commercial purposes. The English owned more or less flourishing factories at Mazulipatam at Narzapour or Madapolam, Ingeram and Vizagapatam. The Dutchs were trading at Jaggernat and Bimlipatam.

After the French had defeated Anaverdi Khan at Ambour Muzaffar Jang, among other tokens of his gratitude had granted to the French the full and entire property of the town of Mazulipatam and that of the island of Divy together with about 80 leagues of territory in the vicinity whose gross annual revenue amounted to 800 000 Rs.

The island of Divy which is mentioned for the first time in the history of the French in India is situated at

the mouth of the river Krishna a few miles south of Mazulipatam. It was separated from the main land by a very narrow strip of the sea which is almost dry from January to the end of May. The English had some designs on this island. In 1716 or 1717 the governor of Madras had sent two government servants with 70 soldiers and 150 East Indians to take possession of the island by virtue of a paravana which had been granted in ancient times by a former king of Golconda. The ruler of the Deccan at that time was Maubauiz Khan, the predecessor of Nizam-ul-Mulk. He held that the paravana was a false document and he interdicted the English from realizing their designs. They later stayed eight or nine months at Mazulipatam but were unable to obtain the cancellation of the Suba's orders. For quietness sake they left at last Mazulipatam and were never heard of again.

But the English had never given up the idea of possessing the island of Divy. As for the French, busy with other cares they did not take immediate possession of the island, the English thought they might once again ask for it from Nasir Jang who refused to grant their request. But they were fortunate enough to get that prince to drive the French out of Mazulipatam and Yanam in May 1750. Dupleix however made the French to occupy Mazulipatam in July the following year. Guillard a member of the Council of Pondicherry took charge of the place with some Sepoys. Divy was occupied only on the 16th February next. The territory of Nizam-patanam and the lands of Guntur, Acclamanar and Narzapur were ceded to the French shortly after.

The French were hardly in possession of those countries which were already of such a large extent that, by his letter dated 26th March 1751, Dupleix suggested to Friell,

the French agent at Mazulipatam, the idea to increase them still more not by a virtual acquisition of further territory but by a mere tenancy of the lands of Rajamundry Ellore and Moustafanagar so as to carry if not our domination, at least our influence up to the Godavery and even beyond These lands were at that time owned by Neamet Ulla Khan who had striven to expel the French from Mazulipatam and Yanam the year before, it would be both just and precautionary to get rid of him Dupleix advised Friell to seek the help of Calendar Khan, the *faussedar* of Mazulipatam and the friend of the French in carrying out these plans This scheme did not actually materialize but it contained the starting idea which was to be taken up on other basis at Hyderabad less than two years later when Bussy was about to start for Aurengabad and which came to an end in 1753 by the ceding of the four Circars. As these provinces were soon to be under French rule we shall give here a short description of them

Moustafanagar was the most southern of all the four Circars, extending in the south up to the Krishna and in the North up to Bezoara or Bezwada and even up to the fortress of Chintepelly

Bezwada might be considered as the capital It was an ancient city lying at the foot of steep hills There was between them and the Krishna a very narrow gap which could easily be held by a small body of men Bezwada was at about 15 leagues from Mazulipatam, from Bezwada to Ellore in the North East direction the distance was about from 15 to 18 leagues from the later place to Rajamundry So each of these provinces had a diameter of about 15 to 18 leagues All this territory is bounded on the west by the chain of Ghats which offered in certain places openings hard to cross but extremely easy to

be defended. The country sloped rapidly away into plains slightly higher than the rivers which watered them. The Godavery, on the left bank of which Rajamundry is situated, enters the sea by seven arms which begin to break up at Yanam, forming numerous islets separated from the mainland at times by only a few meters distance; the most important of these islets were and still are Isquitipa, which is a dependency of Yanam, Coringuy and Banderroulanka. The province of Chicacole extended, beyond the Godavery, along the coast. It was longer, narrower than the previous ones; there was the English factory of Vizagapatam and the small harbour Mafousbender at the mouth of a stream leading to Chicacole, distant from one league and half in the inland. All the territory between Rajamundry and Chicacole contained prosperous manufactures of cotton clothes suitable for exportation to Europe; this circumstance gave a great importance to the English factory at Ingeramand to the French factory at Yanam, which were near each other

Owing to the occupation by the French of the provinces of Mazulipatam and Nizampatnam at a time corresponding more or less with Salabat Jang's accession and to the march of Bussy to Hyderabad, and from thence on to Aurengabad, Dupleix had the opportunity of revictualing the Deccan's troops as well as by land and by sea. The French were still the masters of Arcot and consequently of all the territory round about Madras and its dependencies.

In 1752, life in these establishments was normal and free from external threat of internal disturbance. In November the French obtained, not the full property, but the rent of the Condavir province as an award of the fresh services rendered to Salabat Jang when he was attacked

the provinces of Ellore and Rajamundry for him, but he was made to understand that such a transaction could not be realized just then. The position of the French in the Deccan was in a bad state, and Bussy himself advised to have some regards to Jaffer Ali, at the risk of substituting Calender Khan to him when it would be possible to do so without too much difficulty.

By this time 1753, which was a more eventful year, had dawned.

Dupleix was very much interested in the affairs of Mazulipatam which were daily becoming more and more dependent from those of the Deccan. The granting of the tenancy of Condavir was not entirely satisfactory to Dupleix. He desired the full property of the province, so he never ceased importuning Bussy to obtain it. But Bussy preferred to acquire the four Circars.

Meantime Moracin was endeavouring to govern his province with much zeal and it seems sincere disinterestedness. According to him, the income was ample to pay the current expenditure and leave a surplus for commercial purposes. Howver such a result could be attained only if there were sufficient troops to hold the country otherwise it won't be possible to cash the revenues and what could be done without money? Jafar Ali and Moutron Khan were owing the Suba respectively 50 lakhs and from 15 or 20 lakhs which they did not seem willing to pay back. Salabat Jang had no other means to get this money from them but by appealing to the kind services of the French. "What disorder" said Moracin "rather, what weakness!" To get them to pay what they ought Moracin wanted that Chek Ibrahim and his Sepoys be detached from the Deccan army and sent on to him.

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Notwithstanding all the difficulties almost the whole income was cashed when Goupil proposed towards the end of February that Moracin should ask for the four Circars in order to guarantee the money for the troops. Goupil was of opinion that it would not be necessary to call any part of the Deccan army for this, but that it could be effected merely by the detachment which Bussy was bringing back to the coast. Although the idea was not a new one since it had already been considered by Dupleix in other terms it took Moracin more or less by surprise. As Bussy was about to arrive Moracin thought he was not justified to express an opinion in Bussy's absence. He foresaw however some difficulties to the execution of this proposal due to the personality of the actual tenants. What would they say if they were not maintained as general contractors? What would their rivals do if they were maintained? In fact it was the question of Jaffar Ali and Calender Khan which stood out prominently. This time it was absolutely necessary to make up one's mind to the one or to the other. But whatever should be the decision war would be inevitable between these two rivals. The matter was becoming still more complicated by the nascent greed of one Viziam Raja the Subtenant of Chicacole who longed for independence and for collecting the full revenues of that province on his own behalf. This Viziam Raja dependent from Jaffar Ali could be a cause of serious trouble to him. Moracin was not anxious to give rise to all these hankerings as he did not have wherewith to satisfy the one or oppose the other. Dupleix who was far away from the site of the competition, did not hesitate to decide in favour of Calender Khan. This man would at least prevent the English from being the masters of the cloth export trade while 100 Europeans and 4 to 500 Sepoys would suffice to

get rid of Jafar Khan very easily. When Bussy arrived at Mazulipatam he was rather inclined to side with the views of Moracin, besides what could he do from the coast? Matters had to be settled at the Suba's Court. While Bussy at that time was most unwilling to return to the Deccan. The whole matter was left in suspense in the same way as a conversation which drops for want of subject and Goupil was not authorised to proceed with it. There was already some evidence to doubt his abilities, though not exactly his good will, and it became more apparent daily that the matter had been made too public and had caused excitement in the minds of the people, both at the court and on the coast, and that it was met by a dangerous opposition in both sides. It was not even quite sure whether the idea had not been suggested to Goupil by the enemies of the French in order to discredit the latter in the eyes of the Hindus.

Bussy stayed two months at Muzulipatam where he was heartily welcomed. Moracin was a man of initiative and understanding and knew to rise up to general ideas. Trusting each one in the other, these two men were soon thick friends and spoke openly to their heart's content of their plans, but especially of the plans of Dupleix on whom their own future rested. Bussy did not hid from Moracin his fears for the Deccan and his desire not to return there. But it would not have been right of Moracin to entertain these ideas in Bussy; his double title of government servant, and that of a relation of Dupleix, withheld him, but what cannot time achieve even against the most stubborn resistance? Weariness itself gets tired and Bussy was daily being encouraged by Moracin and also by his friend Marion du Marsan, both of whom

were inspired by Duplex (1) to return to the Deccan to complete the deed he had so well started

At last he made up his mind to return to the Deccan and we have seen from his letter to Moracin from Guntur that he was going back with a discouraged heart and a sorrowful soul. Fortunately things turned out better than he had expected them to he reached Hyderabad easily, there he found that his prestige was as great as it had been before he left.

The question relating to the Circars seemed easier to solve and as soon as he was able to meet Muhammad Hussain, who had returned from the army this matter was one of the first he took up. Taking into account the rivalries which prevailed in the Coast he wrote to Moracin on the 2nd July and submitted him his own view on this matter

Jafar Ali was being attacked by Viziam Raja and the provinces held by the former were about to be lost for

(1) On the 5th May Duplex wrote to Moracin "The military ranks to which he aspires could be obtained here rather than by his return to his motherland so soon. There involved in infinite number of applicants he might be told that the great wealth he had amassed in such a while as well as the titles he might have obtained here formed a fitting reward. After the tragedy in which Muzaffar Jang lost his life and when Bussy acted with such glory I asked for him the grade of Lieutenant-colonel and after the so serious defeat of Nana (Balaji Rao) I have proposed him for the rank of colonel. One or other of these ranks will surely be granted to him the more so as I have written that all we hold in the Deccan ever since he left Pondicherry was entirely due to his firmness, prudence and zeal. I leave to himself the honour of all our success. All this should encourage him in all his actings. Let him read attentively my preceding letters. I think it is not possible to press him any more than I have done on the necessity of returning and staying beside the Nawab at least till I can find some one capable of seconding or succeeding him. I have always given him free hands each time the matter asked a prompt decision. I continue to give him full power in such cases. What more could he want?" (A. V. 3750).

the Muhammedans. If the French wanted to have those territories ceded to them, they had no interest to guarantee their value. At Hyderabad, they would not care to possess provinces which would escape to them. Instead of helping Jafar Ali, the French should support his adversary by sending him munitions and inciting his Sepoys to desert Jafar Ali and joining Viziam Raja, needless to say that all this should be done with discretion.

In view of avoiding any suspicion, the French should loudly claim from Jafar Ali the deserters. Viziam Raja would not be so silly as not to understand the double-dealings of the French. The latter should avoid having any agreement with Jafar Ali, if being harassed by his rival, he were to ask for their help. Bussy would take advantage of the moment, when those provinces were on the point to break off from the empire, to make the Suba understand the only way to keep them under his authority was to cede them to the French for the upkeep of their army. He would retake them as soon as he no longer needed the services of the French troops. If Salabat Jang was agreeable to this arrangement the provinces could be maintained under the authority of Jafar Ali, provided he accepts to act as the *Naeb* or lieutenant of the French and to pay monthly 2 lakhs of rupees to them. If the Suba refused, far from showing him any discontent, the French would inform him that they intend taking the direct control of those provinces to prevent Viziam Raja to rise against him. They would represent still better, that the income from those provinces would be utilized to maintain an army which would stay beside him and continually watch on his safety. Calender Khan who had arrived from Mazulipatam, together with Bussy fully endorsed these combinations. Probably he held the promise of being sooner or later the beneficiary

of the said arrangement but unfortunately for him and perhaps for the French too, he died one month later

I expect praise from the Nawab and the Muhammedans for having saved these provinces and made them be obliged to the French for having opposed the raja's invasion. You must intrigue so well as to lead Jafar Ali almost at the edge of his downfall. Fan the flames of discord, as much as you can, between Jafar Ali and Ram Raja (Viziam Raja). It is to our interest that these two men should not agree. To all this I will say as did Hannon

“With which of these deceitful folk should I side? Events alone can decide

Muhammad Husain seemed to agree with Bussy's views but he refused to take any engagement on behalf of the Suba and of his ministers he knew at that time that far from being inclined to grant further territorial concessions to the French, the Suba's Court was planning to get back the former ones, especially the Carnatic and the Condavir

It was about the same time that Bussy thought to enter into an alliance with Balaji Rao against Salabat Jang. He was however not pushed to this extremity and we have seen how he went to Aurengabad and settled there the question of the four Circars.

Jafar Ali was among the chiefs of the Deccan who had to contribute a monthly sum of Rs. 60 000 for the upkeep of the French army. Moracin offered to make a strong pact with him and as a proof of his good intentions he offered to be the mediator of peace between him and Viziam Raja. It is true the latter negotiated peace through the French with Jafar Ali he sent Balbaderajou a relative of his to inform the French at Mazulipatam that he was not a friend of the English although they had offered

him 130 men in view of upsetting the designs of the French, but it would be hard to conclude peace with Jafar Ali. Peace was possible only if each of them was made independent of the other, in other words, in order to avoid further disagreeableness with Jafar Ali, Viziam Raja proposed to pay directly his contribution either to the Suba or the French. As a proof of his peaceful intentions, he promised to withhold all hostilities till Moracin gave him a definite reply and to counter-order the Marathas, whose help he had solicited Moracin would do nothing without Bussy's advice, to whom he told plainly that Jafar Ali, was giving a great deal of trouble to pay the 50,000 Rs. he had been assessed with and that the French interests called for the support of Viziam Raja (September 1753).

Jafar Ali in fact did not pay the French ; he merely gave assignments to be paid by the Zemindars of his dependencies, knowing full well that the latter would not discharge the obligation. He could easily have paid 3 to 4 lakhs himself. Moracin however accepted the assignments with a view to enforcing payment if necessary by the aid of the Sepoys at the harvest season. In the meantime Jafar Ali, had some small success over Viziam Raja; this was enough to reconcile Moracin with him, he congratulated Jafar Ali on his success and proposed to impose a peaceful settlement on Viziam Raja (October 1753). On the news, which were moreover false, of the death of Jafar Ali, or that of his father, who was said to have been killed, Moracin, whose policy had remained unchanged under the appearance of mobility, suggested to Bussy the idea of coming to an understanding with Viziam Raja for Chicacole and Rajamundry, while Ellore and Moustafanagar would be granted either to Mirza Ismael Beck or to the son of Calender Khan Ismael Beck was the confident of Moracin and a worthy man.

Things were at this stage, when Moracin learnt by a letter from Aurengabad dated 28th November the assignment of the four Circars to the French. The life of the French possessions on the coast was about to become part of that of the inland.

We shall not close this account special to them without giving the figures of their income of 1753. They were considerably greater than those of the preceeding year since they amounted to 994,896 Rs. as against 379,251. It is true they have being increased of the revenues from Condavir. We give below the produce of each province

Mazulipatam	204,187
Condavir	488,000
Narzapur	71,984
Nizampatnam	86,700
Isle of Divy	39,263
Devracotta s paragana	104,762

Deducting the income from Condavir the revenues from the other provinces classified themselves as follows. revenues and land rents 327,275 salt 120,882, customs 44,085, and miscellaneous 14,654. Bussy had ardently wished that the income from Condavir be devoted to the payment of the troops and at the time when he started the negotiations for the Circars (in August) he expressly asked Dupleix for 5 lakhs from the revenue of Condavir so as not to be obliged to beg said he from those with whom he had to deal. Dupleix had not agreed to this demand however it had been painful to him he had preferred to advance 200,000 Rs. of his own personal money. The revenues from Condavir belong to the company and he would not dispose of them as well as of those from other provinces, unless at an extreme resort (Letters of

6th August and 22nd September 1753). Being out of money he soon after ordered Moracin (9th October) to borrow 40,000 Rs. in the name of the Company.

The administration of Mazulipatam and Nizampatnam by Moracin had been happy and prosperous. Except for a tiny incident at Ongole, the rest of the country had enjoyed tranquility ever since the French had taken possession of same; the ryots toiled at their lands and the weavers at their looms in security; revenues increased regularly through a more careful watch over the tenants, while commerce flourished, but not exactly to the extent wished by Duplex and the Company; some practice which prevailed could not easily be eradicated. But let it be said that although the occupation of the country by the French, the English and the Dutch were left free to continue their trade, but this freedom was more theoretical than real; in fact they had been obliged to evacuate Nairapur and transfer their business to Bandermoulanka at the mouth of the Godavary. The French were in reality the sole masters of the whole country.

THE TAKING POSSESSION OF THE FOUR CIRCARS.

Let us return to Aurengabad.

The ceding of the four circars was the crowning of the almost uninterrupted successes of three whole years. The French nation had been raised to the highest pinnacle of glory and (a fact which had its value) their troops were at last going to be paid out of regular and permanent sources. rather there was every hope that it should be so

Bussy did not draw any vain glory to himself from this achievement, but his views on the Deccan were modified. The ease with which he triumphed over led him to believe that after all Dupleix was not mistaken in wanting to stay for ever in the Deccan. Bussy no longer spoke of abandoning the country. Better still on hearing rumours from France that the troops were about to be recalled as a proof of the peaceful intentions of the French, Bussy took upon himself to write and claim that they should be maintained. In a letter written on the 16th December, to Roth who was about to return to France (1), Bussy said that the departure of the French would be followed by the arrival of the English who would build their greatness on the ruins of the French the Deccan was absolutely unable of defending itself against any foreign attack.

“While” wrote he “all other nations are trying to supplant us because they are convinced that we are doing solid work are we the only ones not to feel the advantages of our situation? Is it possible that the Company obstinately blind or so erroneously prepossessed against its own real interest as to refuse the treasures which nature bestows on it, as one may say in spite of itself and that seeking an imaginary interest in peace it should willingly give up the fruit of so much labour? Was it necessary to yield all we have to our rivals in order to obtain peace at Arcot and thereby become their slaves while receiving a master from their hands? This peace I say which the Company hopes will bring a flourishing and regular trade shall produce quite a different result. A Suba placed by

(1) Roth was an ancient merchant of the company who was stayed for a long time in China and was completing a voyage of inquiries in India. Besides Pondicherry he visited Marulipatam and Bengal. On his return to France (autumn 1754) he was called to the Presidentship of the company.

them shall restrict us within such narrow boundaries that the trade shall be kept from extending if it is not suppressed altogether”.

These resolutions, so contrary to the interests of the Company were, according to Bussy, the outcome of letters sent from India to France by some servants of the Company who were either bitter, jealous or discontented; Bussy was dipped in the most deadly anguish; he could not understand how servitude could be preferred to wealth, authority and independence. The company's commerce would either fall to ruins or extend and be placed on solid basis according to the determination which the company would take. Bussy expected his discourse to be repeated in France, and that Roth whose mission had till then been favourable to Dupleix would be the best defender to both Dupleix and himself.

Another letter written by Bussy two days later (18th December) to his friend Marion du Mersan, who was on his way to France just then will enlighten us further on Bussy's ideas and intentions at this period of his career during which everything seemed to smile to him.

He began by relating all the events which occurred from his arrival at Hyderabad up to his entry into Aurangabad. Needless to resume here that part. In the second, Bussy lays down some general political considerations and wrote rather with a scepticism which throws a new light on his temperament.

“Military glory” said he, “must interest only slightly those who are in the service of the company, unless it carries along with itself some solid advantages to the company's trade. The interest of the company, inseparable from those of the state, are so well bound together in this matter with the honour of the nation in general

that one must be in same time a militaryman statesman and a tradesman I am far from possessing all these qualities. I only wish to convince the company of my zeal for its interests which I daresay have been the chief aim of all my enterprises

Everything is quite just now The French are the protectors friends arbitrators and mediators at one and the same time I am highly pleased to note that my ceaseless toil for the last four years during which the most singular events occurred, and all my deads crowned by the most beneficial results, have secured to the company some wealthy settlements and have guaranteed the throne of his fathers to Salabat Jang

After having expressed as he had already done to Roth his fears that owing to some reports sent from India the company recalled his troops, thus leaving the path open to the English (1) and having justified the best he could the politics of Duplex in the Carnatic (2), Bussy concluded by these sad yet humoristic words

So far as I am concerned if I were to think only of my own inclinations and natural earnings which carries me to my country and my family I would most gladly welcome the orders of the company recalling the troops to its settlements Although I have been honoured with all the titles and marks of esteem which the emperor

(1) Bussy tells us that not only the English, but also the Portuguese were trying to supplant the French in the Deccan He said he had, in hand an agreement between the Viceroy at Goa and Salabat Jang's ministers.

(2) Bussy remained convinced that peace should be brought about in the Carnatic, but agreeing imperceptibly to the views of Duplex he was of opinion that such a result could not be attained by sacrificing all to the adversaries. They had the superiority of arms on several occasions and if negotiations were carried on with them now they would leave to the French only that part of commerce of which they had no need this was carefully kept unrelated in France.

could grant even to the highest of his empire, such as generalissimo of the Deccan, arbitrator between Muhammedans and Marathas and even that of Maymarath(1), all these appeal but slightly to me. How much I would prefer to take a walk in the garden of the "Palais Royal" or in that of the "Tulleries" to set at supper with two or three friends such as you, to the vain pomp of asiatic greatness of which I am wearied and to the pompous and fastidious personality I have to play here and of which you and I had some time laughed in our private interview. The honour of the nation and the interests of the company have till now kept me from enjoying such a blissful delight of which I can taste only in spirit. If I had worked less ardently for the advantages of the company I would support their loss less keenly. I shall look on with the sorrow of a citizen who witnesses

(1) "The mark of Maymarath or Maimaratta or yet Mamurat was a stick bearing on its top the head of a fish, under the head was a small ball maintained by an hand, the all covered with a golden sheet, the small ball meant the right of commanding on land, the hand was the one of the Moghal who, unable to put his own hand in the one of the lord to whom he bestowed this rank, was sending him a golden hand to assure him of his protection. Only four or five Nawabs were entitled to have the standard of Mamurat carried before them when they went out. Muzaffar Jang who being the Nawab of Golconda and Aurengabad, had the right to confer this great title and he was pleased to grant it to the general of the French. When Mr Duplex went out he was preceded by six Europeans guards and their captain all on horseback, then followed twelve lancers and 24 pions each bearing a golden flag on a white ground, behind these were twelve elephants richly adorned one of them bearing a large French flag, while another carried the standard of Mamurat on a golden flag with a white ground which only the Muhammedan vice-roys of the Moghal empire are entitled to have carried before them, while a third elephant carried two huge copper kettle drums on which the march was being sounded, the sound of these drums was in harmony with that of a large number of trumpets, fifes and other musical instruments used in India, the other elephants bore other ensigns relating to the high dignities conferred on Mr Duplex by Muzaffar Jang" (Reputation by Godeheu P 87-88)

his motherland blind to her own interests abandoning to others the treasures which she rejects only because she does not know them (A O O 284 P 138-151)

In the meanwhile Bussy continued to behave as if all things were to happen for the best. How did he manage to get several lords of the court to present him, a few days after his arrival at Aurengabad, with a sort of agreement the chief aim of which was to establish the French firmly in the Deccan and to place full authority in his own hands? It was surely due to his well known prudence and ability. Whatever be of this five high dignitaries, among whom was Chanavas Khan, presented to Bussy an agreement in eight articles by virtue of which

The signatories (we were about to say the conspirators) took the solemn oath to help and defend mutually while Bussy bound himself not to allow any one of them to be crushed if he were wronged,

They bound themselves to an inviolable law of equity and justice specially towards the populace whose interests were always to be respected and cared for,

They should communicate to one another their views and projects, nothing should be kept hidden when it was a matter regarding the common cause,

The opinion of the majority would carry in all discussion and no one should consider it an offense that his own view did not prevail,

Their projects and designs were to be kept most secret, nothing about them was to be spoken even to their dearest friends,

Whatever promises or offers were made by the opposite party to try and break away from the convention any

one of the confederates should be faithfully exposed so that necessary provisions be made to the satisfaction of the one interested ;

At last Bussy shall enjoy of the same honours as those rendered to the Suba; on his side he should have for the confederated the regards due to the state and rank of each one (B. N. 9158, P. 74-75).

In accordance with the above plan they were to work to overthrow Lashkar Khan, and give back liberty to Salabat Jang's brothers. Circumstances would decide the rest without ever losing sight of the interests, the credit and the maintenance of the French authority.

The overthrow of Lashkar Khan was brought about in a most natural way. Having found that all his underhand dealings had been brought to light, he offered of his own self to resign his post. Bussy hastened to have this offer refused pretexting that he did not wish interfering with any matter concerning the administration of the Deccan, but he secretly made the confederates act so as to render his position untenable and in a few days Lashkar Khan again sent in his resignation which was accepted this time. As a sort of compensation Lashkar Khan was appointed governor of Berar; but as this post was already occupied by Ragogy Bonsla, who held that he was independent, it was the best mean to stir up between these two men an antagonism favourable to the interests of the French. If Lashkar Khan did not agree with Ragogy, as it would probably happen, the former would have to raise 7 to 8,000 men to have his rights recognized: the expenditure would ruin him. Chanavas Khan, who had been an enemy till the day before, succeeded Lashker Khan as prime minister.

Dupleix would have wished that more rigorous steps were taken and he advised Bussy to have Lashkar Khan

arrested and sent under strong escort to Mazulipatam and from there to Pondicherry Bussy refused to enter into this line of action saying that in spite of his downfall Lashkar Khan still had some prestige and that such stern measures might provoke some disturbance which they may not be able to overcome and perhaps also a less friendly intervention by Balaji Rao. They were out on politics and not to teach morals.

The setting free of the Suba's brothers was just as easy. We must remember that Lashkar Khan obtained from the Suba the internment of his brothers under the pretext that he was setting him free of dangerous rivals when in reality Lashkar was attempting to impose his own authority. When Bussy returned to Aurengabad and notwithstanding the demonstration of friendship so prodigally given to him by Salabat Jang he refrained from showing any interests in the Suba's brothers. He seemed quite unconcerned with their fate till the day when the changing of the prime minister gave him the opportunity of interfering without any prejudice to himself. Not wanting to incur any risk, he began by having the Governor at Doulatabad pumped and this man after a great deal of reticence asked 50 000 Rs. in cash and a jaguir of 2 lakhs. But it so happened that at about the same moment, Balaji Rao also was attempting to have the princes handed to him so as to have an opportunity of interfering in the affairs of the Deccan and he offered 3 lakhs of rupes for this purpose in cash and an equal sum in jaguirs. The governor was hesitating between these two offers. Bussy having heard of the whole plot thought it necessary to remove the means of bringing about a revolution by Balaji Rao so he informed Salabat Jang

about all that was happening. The Suba realized the danger and consented to the recall of his brothers, provided they stayed under the guard of the French. To safeguard the appearances it was agreed that Bussy should send a report asking for their liberation and that both Chanavas Khan and Lashkar Khan should also sign that report. The things were done accordingly and Calender Khan's son started immediately for Dowlatabad with French dragoons, 200 soldiers and 2,000 Sepoys. The *quelidar* began to refuse the orders from Salabat Jang, but he gave in when he became aware that such was also Bussy's will. Nizam Ali also behaved as the *quelidar* had done; he declared that he did not have any brother at Aurengabad.

The concourse of the people was so great on the return of the princes that one could hardly move. The princes entered the town in the midst of hearty acclamations, great and small, one and all called blessings on the French. No end of praise was lavished on the French nation and more especially on the commander who was unanimously called the restorer and the saviour of the Deccan.

This event took place in the early days of January 1754. The French derived great benefits from it. Among the people there was no more any reproach to the French about the captivity of the princes and there was no more cause to any rigour. As for Bussy he thought that the French could, if need be, back on one or other of the princes, in case "the weak and feeble minded Salabat Jang, capable of all sorts of blunders and silly acts, should forget the services of the French, or if any revolution threatened to change the face of the country?" If such a day ever dawned it would be just as easy to raise a new sovereign as to throw him headlong.

Once these matters settled, Bussy being now the real minister of the Deccan, set about strengthening his position by maintaining the best possible relations with Balaji Rao. He had realized that in spite of old Tarabai's hostilities, the power was undoubtedly in the hands of the peshwa and that if he had some envious, of whom some plotted to knock him down, yet at the slightest command all his rivals would gather under his standard and immediately send him their troops. There was no possibility of dissociating such a well united force.

Bussy had learned the language of the Moors in view of acquainting himself with their temperament and principally being able to converse with Salabat Jang without the aid of an interpreter. Therefore he found less and less trouble to undo the intricacies of the Indian policy and wield such influence on the prince's mind that no one could easily oppose. His genius never failed him. In December Salabat Jang needed money and did not know from where he could obtain it. His ministers were equally powerless. Bussy conceived the idea of auctioning, so to say, several governments either by renewing the powers of those who were there already on the payment of a certain sum of money or by having new persons appointed under similar conditions. This somewhat Asiatic procedure brought in at once 19 lakhs of Rupees as a joyous advent from the newly appointed and at the same time it allowed calling to the power those who were devoted to the French cause. So there had been a double advantage. Thus the Hyderabad government was given over for 5 years to Safchikan Khan for an annual rent of 40 lakhs of rupees of which 12 were paid in cash. The governments of Adony and Raichur were likewise handed over to Neamoutulla Khan for an initial outlay of 5 lakhs. While Abdoulali Khan, a brother of Muzafar Jang's widow,

received the fortress of Mahour on his offering a gift of 2 lakhs. As Murtiza Ali hesitated to accept the government of Arcot, Bussy wanted it to be reserved to the very youngest son of Muzafar Jang and in the meantime he made him to obtain a jaguir of 2 lakhs of revenues. He made also five important fortresses given to the relative of Neamoutulla Khan and Calendar Khan. The *quelidar* of Beder was a creature of the French. In this manner Bussy became in fact the master of the administration of the whole of the Deccan. Even in the court of the Suba he had everything changed right up to the most menial servant.

When he had strengthened his position at Aurengabad, Bussy thought of going in person to take possession of the four Circars, since they had been attributed to himself personally. He have lived too long in expedience and now the possession of the four Circars assured to him a regular revenues ; but he had to cash them and he could not get them if he was not on the spot. In the meanwhile his position was precarious. If he had been able to obtain 19 lakhs for the Suba he had obtained nothing for himself. The French had indeed safeguarded the future by the assurance they had actually of incomes from certain provinces, but by the same fact the assignments they have obtained on some tenants on the preceeding September were now cancelled. In this connexion being unable to claim anything further from the Suba, they were penniless unless they went in search of their incomes wherever they lay

Various circumstances delayed Bussy's departure. One of the terms of the document stated that the Circars were granted to Bussy personally and not to the Company. Both Dupleix and Moracin objected to this as if Bussy was preparing to become an autonomous or independent

This manner of reasoning was meant for Moracin who had been appointed to govern the provinces in Bussy's name whenever the latter had to be away at the Suba's Court. It was to fear that a certain amount of self love coming into play Moracin may try either to be the absolute master or exert too independent authority. Though Bussy consented to be subordinate to Dupleix, he was willing to take orders from no one else. Hence it was in order to avoid all conflicts in rank that Bussy expressly requested Dupleix to pass a decree appointing him governor or commander general of the new French provinces. He certainly did not mean to carry on the work without Moracin's help nor did he intend imposing a humiliating subjection to Moracin. He fully agreed that Moracin should hold his place and exercise his authority with the utmost freedom while he (Bussy) himself was either at Aurangabad or should have to go to Pondicherry but even in these occasions Bussy was of opinion that if his politics were to be successful, every body should acknowledge him as the master of the whole situation.

Another still more discreet consideration entered into the whole affair. Bussy had not given up the idea of marrying Chonchon. One of his letters informs us that if the marriage was to take place and if he were given the rank he was asking for he would leave India simultaneously with Dupleix. The family tie which would then unite them would still further serve to promote his prestige and his influence over the Suba.

Dupleix deemed it quite right that Bussy should prefer provinces to money on his return to Aurengabad. It was certainly a great glory for him (Bussy) and a great advantage to the state. Dupleix added with some apprehension, "I will do all in my power to convince the company, but success will not be forthcoming with loss

difficulty than that which we encountered for all that we have already obtained." He had his own doubts as to whether the company would be touched by the acquisition of the new concessions.

Although this success made Duplex happy, yet in the eyes of the public he appeared to consider it of very little consequence; he did not even have a single gun fired to honour the event. Duplex was of the same opinion as Bussy, that "it would be well not to excite the jealousy of the English at a time when he was to negotiate at Sadras with them for the re-establishment of peace between the two nations".

Writing to Bussy on the 16th January 1754, Duplex said: "I made them believe that the French nation was only indirectly concerned in this affair; that the provinces were still under the domination of the Nawab of the Deccan, while the income derived from them was meant solely for the upkeep of the army; that you would have the administration of those provinces without any connection with the French nation, that you were in this case an officer of the Mogul, your business being to collect their income; that the Muhammajans would always be the rulers, as your *Naiibs* consequently, I have instructed Mr. Moracin to follow, as far as he could, the orders you would send him for the administration of those provinces".

While congratulating himself on the acquisition of the Circars, Duplex could not understand why Bussy had them granted in his name. By his letter of the 28th February, Duplex formally disapproved him for having imposed such a clause. In consequence to certain letters written by Bussy and from some of his private conversations in which he had stated that he intended going in person to take possession of the Circars, after leaving a French detachment of about 100 or 150 European and

about 1,000 Sepoys to guard Salabat Jang Dupleix disapproved of this idea still more emphatically and stated that it would be a renewal of the doings of the previous year which had endangered the whole position of the French in the Deccan when Bussy had gone away to the coast. Since Mr Moracin was there near hand, he could take possession of the new provinces and administer them without Bussy having to go there himself Mr Moracin would carry out the instructions which shall be sent to him from the Deccan

When faced directly with this opposition, Bussy replied very vehemently, he not only upheld his own deed, but he still further put forth his right to be the only one to shape the politics of the Deccan as he thought fit. Had not full powers been granted to him by Dupleix himself! He meant to use these powers. It seems to us that we had better let Bussy speak for himself on this very important matter as also on certain others, his own statement would have better value than any commentary we could make (letter of the 11-22 April)

When preparing for the cession of Circars "I have based myself on the practical knowledge which, I may say I alone possess as I am the only one to have made a regular study of the matter and to have devoted four full years of constant attention to it. Any amount of conjecture could never prevail over facts

Bussy then proceeded to justify his policy Salabat Jang who happened to be the Suba at that moment, might cease being so the very next day "So we ought not to cling merely to his person but to whomsoever happened to be the lord of the country even if the latter held his rank merely through the strange fancy of luck. The real way to lose all would be to follow the erroneous doctrine of clinging steadfastly to the person of Salabat Jang

Once this undisputable principle admitted and acknowledged it would be a vain dream to uphold Salabat Jang notwithstanding all, and somewhat a folly to be the only ones to oppose the torrent of revolution. Now this revolution was on preparation, the only thing uncertain about it was the time when it would burst forth. The emperor's firman would not restrain it. The emperor could appoint some one else as the Suba notwithstanding his previous firmans. The day this revolution did occur, the French, unless they wished to be dupes, should be ready to follow the same course as every other jagirdar of the Deccan did.

It probably might take one year before the revolution burst forth. Was it necessary that during this time the French should remain beside the Suba, in the Deccan throughout the whole of the rainy season? That was good when they were mercenaries, but now they were no longer the simple guards of the Suba, since they had become jagirdars, they could not be dismissed. They would make themselves more longed for and dreaded remaining in their own territory than by staying on at Aurengabad. Once winter was over and they did return to the latter city, they would no longer be what they had been the preceeding year during which they, being paid as mercenaries, might be told not to come back.

The conditions under which the Circars had been ceded to the French were the same as those imposed on all the other jagirdars or monsabdars; viz: to keep up a body of troops beside the Suba whoever he might be and follow him whenever he went to war. Only if the troops were not sent to him, could Salabat Jang molest the French. "I would have to write several volumes" said Bussy "to make known to you, the innumerable manners and customs of which you are ignorant and according to which,

/and whatever it may be said, we must shape ourselves. The interests of the Mogul emperor and those of his viceroy in the Deccan, to which you refer, are very hard some terms for Europe, but between you and me Sir it is not hard to reduce them to their real value" According to the theory of supporting Salabat Jang towards and against all when another Suba may be appointed by the Mogul emperor and abiding by his side with all our troops we run the risk of getting ourselves "into a deadlock at Aurengabad

Then Bussy becomes slightly aggressive, he criticized the policy carried on in the Carnatic and concluded by saying that if Dupleix did not alter his point of view the want of money would force the army of the Deccan to go to the coast in search of same. Let us allow Bussy to speak for himself

"For the past four years during which I have been solely responsible for my acts I have always taken the most befitting steps. But if to day my doings must depend on your orders, which I will ever most dutifully execute but which distance renders you unable of judging properly I assure you Sir that we shall be doing bad business.

"Chanavas Khan has informed me that he did not intend to take any part in the affairs of the Carnatic hereafter I may say the same so far as I am concerned Consequently Sir you may act as you please, I casually mention that your plan to restore Trichinopoly to the Mysoreans will achieve to make us odious and the Nawab will not derive the gain you imagine he would

I conclude by assuring you that even if my plan were to reach a failure—which shall not be I find myself forced to adopt it so leaving all other considerations aside; the dearth in which I find myself is the only thing

which I consider. After duly pondering on all that I have said, you will realize that I am not erring by refusing to enter into such a labyrinth for our next campaign and since my zeal is ever the same, I take the most suitable and efficacious means to put all things in order and to guide them to perfection, which I shall be in a position to flatter myself as having accomplished" (B N. 9158 - Letter to Dupleix of the 11 and 22nd April).

This free and easy letter was followed by an almost threatening one, shortly later, Days went by, money was not forthcoming, Bussy grew impatient. On the 5th May, Bussy declared that he was resolved to take over the new provinces notwithstanding all the objections made by Dupleix and even if the greatest calamities were to occur thereby. If Dupleix still wished that he should continue managing the affairs of the Deccan, he should send immediately full and unrestrained powers to Bussy with the commission of commander. Bussy however bound himself not to alter whatsoever Moracin might have done, but he refused to have any other superior than Dupleix (B. N. 9158).

Dupleix had not waited for this sort of ultimatum to reach him, to give satisfaction to Bussy. After making a closer investigation of all Bussy's early arguments, Dupleix came to the conclusion that he had acted wisely in having the Circars granted in his own name, not only to strengthen his own authority, near the Suba, but likewise to hide all the better, in the eyes of foreigners, the character of the grant Dupleix therefore wrote on the 20th April, that is, a few days previous to the date on which he was about to receive Bussy's above mentioned letter, ratifying all that had been accomplished till then, and he invested Bussy with the rank of commander-in-chief of all the armies of the Deccan. He only wanted that the

ceded provinces should be really and truly dependent on the king and company that Bussy should in no wise believe he had the right to appropriate them as his own and that he should govern them only so long as he would remain at the head of the French troops of the Deccan. He also wished that Bussy should not make use of his title of commander in chief when dealing with foreigners, but reserve it only to be used with regard to Indians. In all transactions with the English or the Dutch concerning the new provinces Bussy should act either in the name of the Suba or in that of the Mogul emperor only.

“ You should use this title only when dealing with the French whereas with foreigners you must behave as acting according to the powers granted to you by the Suba or the Mogul emperor and that the Indian or European troops you command were directly dependent on the Nawab just as you yourself seem to be. It would even not be wise to inform the Mohammedans of the patent conferred on you but merely to tell them that I had sanctioned all that the Nawab had done through you for the sustenance of our troops and that you had been appointed by me to collect revenues while the commander at Mazulipatam would be entrusted with the same duties in your absence. In such circumstances he would be your procurator. At all events it would be suitable that foreigners should be under the impression that we have no other interest in possessing that territory except in so far as the pay of our troops is concerned and that you are collecting the revenues only in behalf of the Nawab (1) (B N 9159).

(1) Previous to all this, in a letter to Moracm dated 27th December Duplex had already laid down the commercial relations which the French might have with the English or the Dutch from their new provinces. Fundamentally nothing was to be altered: I would be highly pleased, if

Although Dupleix had readily given in regarding the conditions under which the Circars had been ceded, he found it more difficult to consent to Bussy abandoning, even momentarily, his position of trust beside the Suba. At least three times, by his letters of the 10th and 15th March and that of the 28th April, did Dupleix request Bussy not to go to the coast where Moracin could attend in his stead; wherever he happened to go, he should be at easy distance to rejoin the Suba speedily. If notwithstanding all the advice, rather than orders which Dupleix sent him Bussy carried out his own ideas, it was all important that the greater part of the French troops stayed back beside the Nawab and that he should proceed with a mere handful of troops to the Circars: were not the sepoy's under Ibrahim Khan and the soldiers under Dugrez, there to give him all the help he needed? Yet finally Dupleix yielded completely and on the 28th April he allowed Bussy to meet Moracin shortly after at Bezoara (Bezwada). He was yet unaware of the sort of ultimatum he was about to receive; hence the concession he made was merely graciously inspired by a most conciliatory turn of mind.

Relations between Bussy and Moracin-Bussy started for the coast only two months later. He had been detained against his wish at Aurengabad not only by the opposition made by Dupleix and the misunderstanding with

you passed very strict orders that the English and the Dutch are not to be molested in the slightest degree as regards their commerce. You must allow them to enjoy the same privileges as were granted to them by the Mohammedans, but you must watch carefully that they do not build fortifications in the places they occupy for commerce. You will inform them as to what I have said regarding the privileges and reassure them that they will ever find in you the protection they may need for the safe carrying on of their commerce" (A, v. 3756)

Moracin, of which mention has already been made but by the war with Ragogy Bonsala.

When Moracin became aware of the conditions under which the Circars had been granted to the French he felt just as Dupleix had felt that Bussy had laboured merely in his own personal interests and he suspected that he must have derived some private benefit from the Aurengabad agreement some references very vague in Dupleix's letters allowed us to suppose the same. Whatever be Moracin wondered why he too should not draw some advantage, was he not called upon to reap what Bussy had sown? He reckoned that the development of the French interests on the coast, the to and from movements of the officers, the general shifting of the staff would increase his expenditure on account of the new style of living he would have to adopt. So in his letter of the 17th December, Moracin straightforwardly asked Bussy that an allowance of 20 000 Rs on the total revenue of the four provinces be granted to him once and for all, and that he should be given 2 000 Rs a month to meet his current expenses, otherwise he could not possibly face his needs and would ask to be discharged of his duty in March (1)

(1) It was on that occasion, that Dupleix wrote, on the 27th December a letter in which he put to Moracin the following questions: "Before I let you know my opinion as regards the indemnity you claim for your expenses, you ought to have told me what those special benefits which Bussy was to share with you were. I have some reason to be surprised at this sharing he talks about. I was under the impression that he was fully satiated, and this last letter spoke of his complete disinterestedness. I will never be his dupe again. Tell me, my dear nephew what those benefits are, so that I might take steps with full knowledge regarding your demand which I find well justified, speak openly to me, that is all I ask for I will do the rest (A. V 3758)

We do not have the reply sent by Moracin.

Bussy approved the reasons given by Moracin. Hence the misunderstanding between them did not arise from this incident, but it proceeded from the divergence of their views regarding the convention itself, also from the assignement of the rents and last, but not least, from the most distressed question of money.

The terms altogether personal under which the cession had been agreed upon, seemed such to Moracin that he was convinced he would have nothing more to do with those new provinces. This is what he made Bussy understand, while adding that if he did go to take possession of the Circars, the English and the Dutch would certainly be led to believe that hereafter those provinces belonged to the French and it would be an encouragement to them to come into some understanding with the Polygars to drive the French out of the country. Another reason, none the less important, was that if Moracin went to the Circars there was a risk of the French at Mazulipatam being attacked. How was he to defend himself?

Bussy rebuked somewhat sharply the above words.

If they were not prepared to go to the end, wrote he to Moracin on the 3rd February, then they ought not to have asked him to undertake such an enterprise. It was too late now to draw back :

“.....It is rather possession of a territory which is given to us without previous sanction from the English... If the French dreaded the underhand dealings of the English and the Dutch, then they should not have demanded those provinces. That some rumour should be kindled by the acquisition of those domains, was to be expected. What could those rumours do? They have to be done away with either by force or by negotiations. I repeat once again that the Circars have to be taken in the name of the

French nation and not in my own name I am here merely as a representative of the nation and whatever I do, is done in its name and for it alone' (B. N 9158).

Moracin replied to Bussy that he had never been disheartened, that he had merely thought it were better to remove the name of the nation or even the appearance of a national enterprise in the taking possession of the Circars. No sooner the English had heard of the grant that they got very busy while their chief at Ingeram had declared that he would die rather than allow the French to be in possession of the Circars. They had done all the could to bring about a reconciliation between Jafar Ali and Viziam Raja. Moracin had been fortunate enough to prevent this friendship. Once the French were steadfastly anchored in the province they could tell the English. I rule the time to look into my rights is passed

While concluding Moracin said In fact my friend it is out of place to be as punctilious towards the English, as you are. You may be sure that they will not act like wise when any thing clashes with their interests or their growth. It was of the utmost importance to use every possible means to prevent them from sticking their noses into this affair. I would feel highly flattered were they to complain that I had received them. As the English are too arrogant to admit that they should be left out of transactions of any sort of business, they deem as decant everything which they had not foreseen or in which they had been put aside' (B. N 9160 P 41-42).

The assignement of the rents was another cause of strain between Moracin and Bussy. Previous to the Hyderabad agreement of September the former had made complete arrangements with Viziam Raja with regard to the Chicacole province. But Bussy seemed hostile to the steps Moracin had taken. Now it was Bussy

who spoke as the man in authority. Happily Moracin succeeded in winning Bussy to his opinion and he obtained full powers to deal with the leases till such time as Bussy himself could attend to them, once on the spot.

Yet Moracin had complained to Duplex about finding that his intentions were being misunderstood. Nothing was more embarrassing to Duplex than to have to take sides either with his nephew or with the man to whom he owed all his renown and the maintaining of his prestige, in spite of his reverses in the Carnatic. Far from keeping alive their quarrels he tried his best to reconcile those two men. He answered at first to Moracin on the 9th March :

“You must excuse Bussy. His zeal and the money difficulties in which he finds himself upset him most probably, he will side with you when he is aware of all that you have done. He sees the things from a certain distance and would like all things get along as easily as he has had the good luck in succeeding”

Meanwhile Bussy had obtained the title of commander of the new provinces Moracin who had probably hoped for this rank was somehow vexed at not getting it. Duplex had once again to soothe the injured self-love of Moracin by a very neat apology of all the services which Bussy had rendered

Writing on the 28th April he says: ‘ Bussy and you are my friends and you are both dear to me; this alone should suffice for you both to have mutual regard the one for the other. Never forget the obligations the nation owes to a great man Give Bussy his due which he deserves I think you must also admit that Bussy has some experience, which you have not been able to get yet and which might have spared you some over hasty scares. You have

apprehended a little too warmly Both of you have the public good for the fatherland at heart Let this be always the aim which both of you look forward to it will help you both to overlook each other's short comings (A V 3756)

Dupleix requested Moracin to abide by Bussy's instructions and to ask for his advice in important matters, whether he was in the Deccan or on the coast.

It was high time that Dupleix set the two antagonists in their respective places. If Moracin complained that his intentions were misunderstood Bussy was none the less vexed On whom did he depend? On Dupleix or on Moracin? If it were on the latter he requested that some one else be sent immediately to take his place. Nothing could be achieved if his words and actions were unheeded

Bussy wrote to Dupleix on the 5th May 'I sacrificed myself for the greatness and welfare of my fatherland Six months after I had left Pondicherry my wealth was equal to that which it is now and though many an opportunity arose in which I could have increased it I refrained from doing so. Hence money was not the motive which led me back to the Deccan Even if I had been guided by such a motive the knowledge of the dilapidated state of affairs which I possessed, would have made me give up all hope of obtaining any I had informed you of this before starting from Mazulipatam Since then and I may prove it, did I ask for any payment and did I draw on the State money? I only asked for my actual expenses which I curtailed as much as I possibly could (1) I was forced to sell all my jewels and valuable Indian

(1) According to Moracin Bussy needed 15000 Rs. monthly for upkeep of his household.

damasks which I had with me and these fetched 38,000 Rs. which were used to feed our troops. I stood security for other sums which had to be borrowed from the *sowcars*. This year I would not be able to obtain 10,000 Rs. even were I to possess very large quantities of articles to mortgage. Besides all these sacrifices, I am even ready to make one more of an incomparably greater value than all the others which I mentioned. I mean the gift made to me by the marchioness of what she holds most dear (Miss Chonchon) and to which you have given your approval, but which both you and her ladyship defer to complete for the welfare of the affairs of the State I will do whatever both of you desire regarding this matter, but my calling at Pondicherry is necessary" (B. N 9158).

Dupleix by his letter of the 28th April sealed the crisis regarding authority, which the ceding of the Circars had provoked, as also the rivalry which followed. Each of the two antagonist was set in his own place, but all the advantages went to Bussy. It was the latter's will that had triumphed in all matters and even Dupleix, who had been against his views, had finally to give in and accept whatsoever Bussy wanted. Now under the external aspects of respect and faith, the French commander's power in the Deccan bordered on absolute independence.

Bussy's financial difficulties—Nothing now stood in the way of complete understanding between Moracin and Bussy and nothing more prevented them to become good friends as they had been till the day before. But, as a letter written by Dupleix on the 9th March explains fully, another more important matter, that of finance, which had been the cause of discord between Bussy and Moracin from the very beginning, still continued to keep them apart.

As a result of the *parwana* whereby the Circars had been granted to him for the upkeep of the French troops, Bussy realized that he was left without any funds from the fact that the contracts with the tenants also fell through simultaneously. A minimum sum of 200 to 210,000 Rs. were needed each month. Following the guarantees which had been given to them the French did not think it proper or prudent to ask for fresh subsidies. Chanavas Khan sounded on this point told Bussy he could realize at the coast the money due to him whereas there was no prospect of getting any at Auranga bad. Bussy had sold 38 000 Rs. worth of jewels and valuable clothes which had been offered to him as gifts by various Mohammedan lords, in order to provide for the most urgent needs. But this was nothing better than a make-shift. Except for any money which might be sent to him by Dupleix or Moracin Bussy could see no other way but to borrow from bankers at exorbitant rates the repayment of which had to be dragged along as shackles. Dupleix had no money to send but there remained Moracin. By his letter dated 10th January 1754 Dupleix urged Moracin to be as diligent as he could in order to send as much money as possible to Bussy while on the 27th he fixed that one lakh was to be sent monthly.

If Moracin had any money of which he could dispose of he most probably would have submitted to these instructions. But he had so far not received any amount from the tenants of the new provinces while he could not dispose of the income from the old ones without an order from Dupleix as that income belonged to the Company. It was quite easy to pass a resolution that one lakh of rupees was to be sent to Bussy each month, but this amount had to be found. Yet nothing was found either in February, or in March. In April Moracin at last

received 3 lakhs from Viziam Raja for the account of the tenants of Chicacole and Rajamundry. He gave 2 lakhs for the upkeep of the army which occupied the new provinces and sent one lakh to Bussy who received it only on the 17th May.

Bussy's impatience could be easily understood, he had to keep a constant check on his troops which continually threatened either to revolt or desert. In fact there was a certain time when daily ten desertions were recorded Dupleix himself wondered how Bussy kept going under all these difficulties. So he repeatedly urged Moracin to be zealous in sending remittance, as delay meant more and more desertions of the troops which would mean the end of the French rule in the Deccan, but he still did not consent to give up the income from Condavir.

What could Bussy do without money? On the 11th April he sent an account of his receipts and expenditure to Dupleix from which we learn that since the 1st September 1753, on which date he had been sent the cheques on the tenants, he had received from :

Dupleix	100,000 Rs
From tenants through Dugrez ...	122,000 —
From Mazulipatam	42,000 —
From Aurengabad and Hyderabad ...	200,000 —
From Calender Khan and his friends by successive loans	519,638 —
Total... ..	<u>983,638 Rs.</u>

With an outlay up to 15th April of .. 983,000 Rs.
Of which expenses for the army up
to the departure of Ibrahim ... 244,986 Rs

of Dupleix not to take possession of the Circars which had already been done by Ibrahim and Moracin but to make sure of the recovery of the money he needed and which was not coming in owing to some fluctuations in the trend of business.

Let us anticipate events and continue examining the accounts of the army up to the day Godeheu arrived in India, it is only a short period of two months. Again we are indebted to a letter written by Bussy from Ellore, to Dupleix, on the 5th August for all the details of information

On his arrival at Benzore (Bezawada) Bussy perceived that one of the causes which had led to the fruitlessness of the domains, was that their acquisition had been taken somewhat indifferently if not by Moracin himself, at least by his agents and that they had been careless in collecting the revenue, of which the zemindars had drawn a part undisturbed. On the other hand five months pay was due to the Sepoys under Ibrahim, while nothing had been levied on the provinces of Ellore and Moustafaganagar which had been placed under Ibrahim on the 16th April then removed from him almost immediately after to be handed to Assenaly back, the former dewan of Neamoutoulla Khan and later of Jaffar Ali and who at that time was the tenant of Condavir. As to Viziam Raja, he had paid nothing beyond the three lakhs Rupees he paid to obtain the lease of both Chicacole and Rajamundry.

On drawing up the statement of the expenses of his army and that of his debts Bussy came to the following figures into which neither the pay of the Europeans nor the cost of the artillery is entered

DEBTS TO BE PAID AND EXPENSES OF THE ARMY.

To Ibrahim for six months at the rate of 50000 Rs. a month	300,000 Rs
To the Indian troops which Bussy had taken along with him and to those at Aurengabad	328,000 —
Loans taken in the Deccan and for which Bussy had stood guarantee together with Calender Khan	486,225 —
Due to merchants and zemindars etc	..			300,000 —
Full pay to the army during the three hibernating months at the coast	210,000			
a month	631,500 —
Total	...			<u>2,045,725 Rs.</u>

Only 170,000 were due just then on the 426,225 Rs. borrowed. The balance could be refunded in a year or two
To cover these expenses, were due for leases by:

Assenalybeck...	85,000 Rs.
Charmale	100,000 —
Venkataram Raja, the tenant of the six paraparaganas	170,000 —
Finally, Viziam Raja about		700,000 —
Total	...			<u>1,055,000 Rs.</u>

Out of the amount due by Viziam Raja, only one lakh was to be expected actually.

The expenses of the army amounted to 210,500 Rs. each month but as Bussy had cut down by half the salary of

Ibrahim was reinforced by 500 cavaliers 150 *caitoquiers* and 200 Sepoys which made a total of 3,710 men sent to him by Moracin

The situation at that time was one of the utmost confusion Moracin continued to struggle in the midst of the political contradictions which he himself had extolled He daily altered his policy according as to whether success or reverse attended on Jafar Ali or on Viziam Raja At the begining of December he had entered into negotiations with Viziam Raja by giving him to understand that he would be given the lease not only of Chica cole but also that of Rajamundrv if he agreed to pay an advance of one lakh of rupees, he would be asked to pay 9 to 10 lakhs of rupees, as rent for the first year No sooner Jafar Ali came to hear as certain that the Circars had been ceded to the French than he realized that he would not continue long to remain the lease holder of the province So he got ready with 4 000 cavaliers and 30 000 peons to contest the entry of the French into the country Laaker Khan secretly advised him to oppose the French entry by advising him to follow in the footsteps of Mohammad Ali in the Carnatic and he exhorted him to become friend with Viziam Raja at any price so as to bar the way of the French To Moracin's distress, Viziam Raja gave ear to his proposals without accepting or refusing them Both the English and the Dutch naturally supported Jafar Ali while the chief at Nelepelly sent him some soldiers Amid all this uncertainty absolute anarchy reigned all over the country Neither the authority of the Suba nor that of Bussy impressed anybody No one cared to carry out instructions received The lease holders and the zemindars of the previous day fearing that their reign was about to close took advantage of the absence of authority to turn everything into cash immature

grains were harvested and sold at whatever price they fetched. There was every risk of misery falling on the whole country.

While despatching Ibrahim Khan and Dugrez with a small body of men to the coast, Bussy fully believed that the country would soon return to peace provided negotiations were used and not arms.

Writing on the 7th February, to Duplœix Bussy said: "My reputation is such that the so called people of the country will not stand against it; though this is useful everywhere, it is made use of here more than anywhere else, and success comes almost always through it". On the 26th February Bussy added: "One must be aware of the extent of the negotiations and the delicate nature of the affairs of which I have been put in charge ever since I am in the Mohammedan ministry, to appreciate all the difficulties I have gone through and yet to be astonished at the perfection to which I have had the happiness of leading all transactions. You alone, Sir, are in a position to do me justice, regarding this matter".

However the display by the French of their arms had been necessary to facilitate their negotiations. Bussy's forewarnings came true. No sooner did Jafar Ali become aware of the approach of the French troops, than he sent his wife and children to Vizagapatam to be kept under English protection while he himself took refuge with the Mahrattas at Nagpur (end of February). His retreat was made easy by a *Kaoul* or passport which had been given to him by Chanavas Khan and Bussy.

It now became easier for Moracin to have free and useful conversations with Viziam Raja. Panon, the manager of the French Factory at Narzapur, went to see Viziam Raja and was fortunate or able enough to persuade

him to go to Mazulipatam Sharp and lengthy discussions took place. A conclusion was arrived at concerning the transactions which had already been agreed upon, i.e. the provinces of Chicacole and Rajamundry were to be leased out for sixteen lakhs out of which the four lakhs which Jafar Ali had levied was to be deducted. Finally Viziam Raja paid down cash three lakhs of rupees on the 25th March and gave a written statement whereby he agreed to pay the remaining balance of 9 lakhs in three equal instalments every second month. The last instalment was to fall due by the end of September. Viziam Raja departed from Mazulipatam on the 2nd April after receiving the customary presents and rarities. As he distrusted the polygars of his new dependencies, he asked for a detachment to keep them in respect. Moracin consequently gave him 80 soldiers, four canons and 400 Sepoys under the command of Dugrez.

Hardly had this small body of men and those of the Raja reached Rajamundry than it came to be known to them that Jafar Ali on his way to join Ragogy had met Januji with 2 000 Marathas on their way to Bengal. Januji was prevailed upon to take advantage of the absence of Viziam Raja, to enter the province of Chicacole where they were met by a Polygar who volunteered to guide the expedition through the mountain passes. As warfare was the main occupation of the Mahrattas, Janogy entered the undefended province quite easily. He plundered it partly and pushed his exploits to the sea coast, then went on to the Dutch Factory at Bimblipatam which he likewise pillaged. This was the first occasion on which the Maharattas ventured into this part of India. Viziam Raja and Dugrez, not feeling strong enough to resist the Mahrattas, they thereupon asked Moracin for reinforcements. As many soldiers and sepoyas as could be

spared were immediately despatched by Moracin. This small army, met the enemy shortly after, some skirmishes took place daily up to the day (4th May) when the power of the Maratha army was decimated.

Januji, who had never thought of anything else but of plundering the country and not of conquering it, had no other care now than that of retiring with his booty. But instead of going back through the mountain passes, he proceeded to the south of the province of Chicacole, then through that of Rajamundry, forded the Godavery, bordered the province of Ellore and finally retired safely into his father's dominions. Moracin was quite ready to intercept his passage had he ventured into the province of Ellore. But when he saw that Janogy took another route, Moracin considered himself very fortunate that the company's own concessions had escaped so easily, so he abstained molesting Janogy.

Jafar Ali had followed Januji in his retreat. Bussy was content in having reduced him to powerlessness and was not harsh upon him. He even obtained his forgiveness from Salabat Jang and permission to return to Hyderabad. This campaign had however an evil affect on the finances of the French. Consequent to the province of Chicacole having been more or less devastated, Viziam Raja could not or would not keep to the agreement he had signed of paying 3 lakhs of rupees at the end of May. Moracin, who was awaiting for that money to send Bussy a part of it and to make use of the balance in purchasing clothes, was unable to satisfy the former and forced to cause some prejudice to the company's commerce.

The Maratha danger had been easily overcome, while Janogy's attack and defeat were not military feats of any importance. The most distressing result of those sorts of raids was the paralysing of the trade and the hind-

rance to the proper recovery of the revenues. The political position was rarely altered by them. Moracin did not seem to have acted in this connection according to Bussy's views. By handing over the command to Ibrahim, Moracin had given a mark of trust to an Indian officer and he had also attached some value to his military qualifications. Since Moracin handed over the vacant provinces of Ellore or Moustafanagar to Ibrahim from the very beginning he most probably had acted according to same reasons. But unfortunately he had by his side a man named Mirza Ismail Beck whom he trusted fully and another named Reddy, who was interpreter. Both these men were on intimate terms with Assenalybeck the lease holder of Condavir. The latter might have been better apt to hold that position, but whether for good or for evil the job had been entrusted to Ibrahim, who held it at that moment. A simple intrigue overthrew him. Hardly had he assumed his duties (16th April) than he was discharged of them and they were handed over to Assenalybeck. Ibrahim's military authority fell at once. So that when Ibrahim called upon the zemindars to come to his help each one declined. Bussy felt this affront keenly and complained to Moracin, but yet he respected his decision. It would be improper to show incoherence, to the Indians and to disturb the country by frequent revolutions even were they to be mere revolts within the palace.

War with Ragogy Bonsla - Troops are not partitioned without impunity. The Suba was in grips with Ragogy Bonsla a few days after Bussy had sent Ibrahim to the coast. This prince was probably vexed at the advantages given to Iashkar Khan in Berar and faithful to the habits of his race he invaded Hyderabad with 25,000 cavaliers, not so much to overcome the country as to

plunder it (end of February) Chanavas Khan implored Bussy to help in repulsing the invasion; in his opinion, the campaign would be one of three months which could have no other end but the withdrawal of the invader. If his defeat were to be loud enough, perhaps Berar could be taken away from him, as he had made himself too independent there. There already was a fortuitous successor offering 10 lakhs as the gifts of a happy advent.

Bussy started at once, but he was short of money and his men marched along most unwillingly. They had to be spoken to, frequently. On the 20th March, they were in close proximity to the enemy, after having burnt some villages here and there; this was the manner of carrying on war (1) Bussy had no anxiety as to the result of the hostilities. Aliverdi Khan had always repulsed the Mahrathas from Bengal without having sometimes to intervene himself; the zemindars alone had often sufficed to drive away the invader. Why should the French not be happy enough to do likewise? But the drawback was that the army did not have the same confidence, the French were too uneasy: "Every Frenchman, every dubash" wrote Bussy on the 24th March "spreads his own news to which each one gives ear, thus bringing about much villany. This is not the way to govern the vast countries we possess. Sometimes we must display the strength of arms, at other time negotiations are necessary, but there should always be firmness" By the 1st April, the army, by slow marches, had come up to

(1) Dupleix was against this barbarous manner of doing. On the 14th May 1754 he wrote to Bussy "If you could convince the Asiatics to give up that bad custom of burning villages, all the people of this country would be greatly indebted to you and certainly their gratitude towards us would be perfect. I know this custom is a secular one but it would be glorious to us to abolish it. Do your best to convince the Nawab, it may be that this example could determine the Marathas to do the same" (B N 9159)

within 25 *cossees* of Nagpur which was Ragogy Bonsla's capital city. Each day some indecisive clashes, without much bloodshed, took place. Ragogy who was laid up with paralysis could not lead the battle while his son Januji, gone as we know to Bengal was busy plundering the province of Chicacole. The old Mahratta chief preferred peace to war. Bussy could have crushed Ragogy and taken away all his states but the latter had more friends among the Suba's men than the Suba himself. Although Balaji Rao was personally interested in annihilating his rival his followers through a spirit of contradiction were manifestly opposed to the continuation of the war. There was nothing left to be done but to open negotiations.

Bussy was greatly perplexed. He would have been glad not to displease Balaji Rao by discontinuing the war while he thought that it might prove useful to be lenient to Ragogy whose territory was adjoining the new French provinces of Chicacole and Rajamundry. Without being the actual mediator between Ragogy and Salabat Jang Bussy preferred to have recourse to secret negotiations during which he seemed more keen on having Ragogy as a friend than on not having him as an enemy. The situation was somewhat delicate as it was necessary to avoid making manifest that Ragogy was dreaded or that his protection was being craved for. Bussy learnt, during these negotiations, that Ragogy had in mind to wage war against Viziam Raja for an affront which had been offered to him some years back. After several conferences Ragogy promised to forget the past. The terms of peace were not burdensome on the Mahrattas. Ragogy was to pay down 5 lakhs in cash and restore all the territories he had taken from Lashkar Khan. Bussy was convinced that the first condition at least, would never be carried out.

This peace was concluded about the 10th April. The troops had now to be led back to Hyderabad and from there to Mazulipatam. This was a trying task. As the troops had not been paid, they stubbornly refused to march; the Sepoys deserted, some of them sold their rifles for food and no loan was to be obtained. This made Bussy declare that he was resolved never again to enter into warfare for any reason whatsoever unless he had a definite assured base from which he could draw the necessary funds and bring about the reforms in the army, which had become absolutely indispensable; this base could be none else than the new French provinces. This occurred at time when Bussy was having discussions with Dupleix regarding the fundamentals of his policy, the nature of his authority and the length of his stay in the country. On this point, he it said that he agreed to stay in the Deccan till such time as all things were brought to perfection; but to attain this he would have to spend all his life and even a second life and even after all that length of time he might never see the end.

Bussy was held up three weeks by the refusal to march set forward by the troops, in the meantime the prestige of the French was decreasing. They were being laughed at in the Deccan. At last (17th May) after stooping a great deal and after having obtained a few thousand rupees from chilly-sellers and other petty shopkeepers of the army even up to the elephant's cornac, the Sepoys agreed to march up to Hyderabad but threatened to take to arms if they were not paid. The Europeans gave just as much trouble and this situation lasted more or less, actually for nine months. It was on that very day that the first lakh sent by Moracin was received. The return to Hyderabad was consequently carried out without further troubles.

The ceremony of the 7th June — Bussy did not continue staying long at Hyderabad. Having obtained full and free permission from Dupleix to go to the coast, he made haste to rejoin Moracin. Everything was got ready quickly and they were to start on the 7th June. Both Chanavas Khan and Salabat Jang did not see without some trouble Bussy leaving them the one and the other felt that their power was unsteady. In consequence hardly had Bussy gone away than they wished for his return, to make sure that he would come back they thought out a strange procedure.

On the 7th of June at 9 A M a great council was held at which were present 18 important lords of the province among whom were Chanavas Khan Abdul Fakir Khan the dewan of Salabat Jang Mr Muhammad Husain, Coja Camardi Khan *boxi* of the Moghul Emperor Mubariz Khan and his brother Mubariz Jang. The Suba who had been invited to be present requested Chanavas Khan to explain the object of the meeting to Bussy. The prime minister then told the audience with all the eloquence to which the people of the East are accustomed, that the Marathas were about to take away the Moghul empire and that only the Moghul army had fallen into incurable discouragement, the treasures left by the Nizam had all been exhausted by the frequent struggles which Salabat Jang had to fight, to maintain his power. By helping Muhammad Ali, the English hindered the return of the income of the most productive provinces. All these facts were well known to Bussy since he shared with the Suba's ministers in the direction of all business. Bussy's presence was therefore necessary to prevent their complete downfall. It was for this reason that when he was about to go and take possession of the provinces which had preceedingly been ceded to him, he

was asked to swear on the Gospel and to give his word of honour that he would return at the end of the rainy season. If he did not return it would mean the overthrow of the Mogul nation and they would be driven to have recourse to the English in order to defend themselves against the Marathas. Bussy found it difficult to give a definite reply, so he got out of the trouble by an ambiguity. He said that although, generally speaking Dupleix had left him to act as he thought best, he could possibly give only a conditional undertaking in this matter and that he shall give the final decision to Dupleix himself. After this statement, which seemed to satisfy the hearers, the Suba gave leave to Bussy to retire and he was led out with all the honour given to the great men of the empire.

Bussy had just come to hear of the nearest arrival of Godeheu in India. He was not terrified; he did not or could not know what the exact objet of his mission to India could be, but those of Dupleix might be endangered. So while reporting that very day all the honour done to him and the promises demanded by the Suba's council, he wrote to Dupleix that it was left to him to look into the circumstances and to make up his mind as to what was the best thing to be done; he then added that if after they had worked so diligently to procure such advantages to the Company, "if an evil decision is taken by some one, mine would be to retire immediately to my fatherland so as not to witness the crumble down of the glory, the honour and the riches which we have procured for the nation at the cost of so much labour and risk". The word "some one" probably meant Godeheu (1).

(1) As a sort of reply to Godeheu's arrival, Bussy gave out, that Saunders, who was on the point of returning to England, had been recalled by a request of the king of France

Two days later the 9th June was the parting day. The Suba came himself to wish good bye to Bussy and conferred the title of mensebdar to all his officers. The lords present confirmed what had been said two days previously that Bussy alone could defend them against the Maharattas and safeguard the security of the kingdom. Then they parted after the usual demonstrations which were sincere this time. Chanavas Khan was unlike Lashkar Khan, who dreamt only of getting rid of Bussy by some underhand contrivance.

Bussy's departure for the coast. Arrival at Pondicherry of Godeheu — The journey was without any incident up to Bezwada. The arrival of Godeheu was the only anxiety of Bussy, he wondered what arrangement the king's commissioner was going to make for India and he feared that the affairs of the Carnatic and those of the Deccan might get muddled up in the same discredit. Yet all things were peaceful here and if there was at present some financial sacrifices to be made they would be easily compensated the following year. It would be total blindness to abandon such sure benefits as those which he had secured for the Company, for some cheap terms. Bussy hoped that Godeheu would take no steps previous to coming to Hyderabad where he would witness the glory of the nation in all its splendour.

Writing to Duplex on the 18th June Bussy said: Nothing is more disgraceful to you and to me than to have laboured as we have done for the good of the nation and not be I don't say rewarded but even thanked owing to blindness into which the nation is plunged in which it wishes to remain always, regarding its own interests. It therefore rests on those whom the nation has chosen to study the situation, to realize the truth from falsehood.

After having seen the real and solid, they may also see the glorious and lustrous state of the French by coming up to Hyderabad”.

About this time Bussy received from Dupleix the most affectionate letters of the 10th and 11th June. He was given the fullest satisfaction regarding his financial difficulties, the income of Condavir was handed to him. His intention of not sacrificing himself, beyond measure, to the welfare of the Suba, was approved and finally he was given full powers to arrange all things, as he thought best, in the affairs of the new provinces

All that the French had done for the Suba, said Dupleix, had been done by gratitude, but this feeling should not lead them to lose all they had, in order to support him; they must abide by circumstances and Bussy was the best judge in the matter. No one ever intended to restrain his freedom of action or to make his stay in the Deccan an everlasting one.

“You still hold my fullest trust” said Dupleix “I have never withdrawn it from you and all that you tell me regarding this subject is quite useless; I know your feelings, so I was never sorry for having placed my trust in you. You may act therefore as you think best; I have no intention to hinder you in your enterprises. You will decide all matters of these provinces and of those of the Nawab just as you think proper I abide entirely by you as I have always done, especially since your return to Hyderabad. I feel, just as much as you, that while protecting the Nizam’s family we should not give back its original lustre but ever hold it somewhat dependent”.

Bussy needed nothing more to forget all rancour and for the first time, after long months, did he write a letter to Dupleix in which, while praying to be excused

for his vivacities in his preceeding letters he allowed his heart to speak quite openly and in a warm affection

‘ I beg you ’ said he please to take all that I have written to you or that I might still have to write to you as coming from a child, whose heartfelt desire is to see your honour and your glory and loves you most affectionately who is ever ready to sacrifice all things to attain these two ends. I beg you to forgive the son if in any of his letters anything was said which might have given you cause for sorrow I humbly request you, please, to attribute such sayings to the narrow and precarious position in which I found myself during a certain time. Please once again forget all that I might have said in excess I feel the strength of the arguments you give me. I give in most heartily for your sake and for mine and please be assured that I am ready to do all things without any restriction just now and in future. Please let me know approximately on what terms I should write to the Director (Godeheu)

We are led to suppose that in a letter which has not been kept, either from Dupleix or his wife some reference was made to Bussy’s forthcoming marriage with Chonchon and that the date, though postponed once more had been fixed for a certain time after some event of which we are not aware If it was not so the end of the above letter from Bussy would have no meaning

‘ I am glad, you have just fixed the time for my happiness. I shall wait patiently and am ready to do, even then just what you please The conclusion of this business (his marriage) shall not prevent me from taking up the duties once again, if you think it necessary

The taking up of duties meant returning to the Deccan no sooner all things had been settled on the coast. Yet such were not Bussy’s intentions when he left Hyderabad

He had then decided that after having placed all things in working order in the Circars, he would proceed to Pondicherry where he was probably to get married. What was there to fear in the Deccan where everything seemed so peaceful? But shortly after Bussy had left, new clouds had begun to gather. An unexpected revolution, which overthrew from the throne the Mogul Hamet Sha and replaced him by Alegr II, burst at Delhi. Planned by the great Vizir Shahabeddin, son of Gaziuddin, and realized by an understanding with the Maharatha princes Holkar and Balaji Rao, this revolution could have the most disastrous consequences on the Deccan. Without making any guess regarding the future, it increased for the present the ever threatening influence of the Marathas and it gave room to Shahabeddin to revive his father's rights, if such was his ambition. In consequence of this Salabat Jang and Chanavas Khan sent letter upon letter to Bussy praying him to hasten his return. In the meantime negotiations had been started between Salabat Jang and Balaji Rao to which Bussy was no outsider in view of an attack, in common, upon Mysore. It was merely to be a plundering party or to obtain the return of the revenues. In consideration of these new happenings and none the less through regard for the desires of Dupleix, Bussy had already consented to return to Hyderabad even before reaching the coast.

He reached Bezvada on the 5th July with his army which seemed a real "starved dog more disposed to devour him than to obey his orders" He hoped to be able to pay the men with the arrears due to his army; but he only met further difficulties, debts innumerable, expenses beyond receipts, finance either lost or wasted and so he was not able to make any arrangement regarding his men, whom he could not dismiss without previous payment of

the arrears due to them. There was no prospect cashing any money, the troops under Dugrez, which were with Viziam Raja, had lost complete sight of their mission which was that of collecting the revenues, while Viziam Raja had neither the means nor the will to pay what was due to the French. War could be waged against him no doubt, but this had its own inconveniences. Viziam Raja feeling that he could not oppose the French would probably seek shelter in some forest where he could not be followed while his retreat might induce the Marathas to renew their invasions and the English to cause the French some disturbance on various sides. After spending some days with Moracin, who had come to meet him at Bezwada, and having discussed with him the steps to be taken Bussy went to Ellore, from there he intended going on to Rajamendry but after second thought he determined to go straight on to Chicacole either to come to some understanding with Viziam Raja or to wage war against him, so he departed from Ellore with his army on the 6th August.

But Godeheu had reached Pondicherry by this date. Nobody foresaw the absolute disgrace which was to befall Dupleix and throughout the whole of July both Dupleix and Bussy had continued corresponding with each other as if the one and the other were able to conclude the various enterprises regarding which they referred the revolution at Delhi, the expedition against Mysore etc. certain phrases of this correspondence now seem so bitterly ironical, for example this one in a letter of the 13th July. You will do me justice in convincing yourself that you have my fullest trust. I can find no one better in whom to place it and as regards all the gracious things you say of me, I have only my thanks and my entire and boundless devotedness to offer.

Finally on the 4th August, by an official and cold letter, Dupleix made known to Bussy the arrival of Godeheu: "Mr. Godeheu, the commissioner of the king and the Company and Commissioner general of all the french possessions in Asia and in Africa, landed here on 2nd instant in perfect health. I received him with the respect due to his position and as a friend whom I was pleased to meet again. Hereafter you shall correspond directly with him on the business under your dependence and in accordance to the orders he will send you I have no doubt that he will inform the Nawab Salabat Jang of his arrival and that the latter will reply as he should do to a person commissioned by our monarch's orders As to yourself I cannot but exhort you to continue the zeal which helped you to place the honour of the king and that of the nation on the highest foot and which has procured the greatest benefits to the company"

BUSSY IN THE DECCAN.

1754 to 1758

BUSSY AND GODEHEU.

Only our imagination could help us to realize what Bussy must have felt when he heard of the disgrace which had fallen on Dupleix and of the latter's approaching departure At first he thought of following his chief in his retirement. If he were to stay back in India, would he not lose all hopes of marrying the daughter of Madame Dupleix and would he not be called upon to witness the

with which to pay the army instead of the uncertain drafts on the tenants. More than a year ago I hinted to the necessity of upholding Salabat Jang and I was listened to. I think that your letters must have confirmed this result and that hereafter no one will think otherwise. The Indian eye sees otherwise than does the European one, besides there is no medium course to be taken between the retaining of the whole of our immense concessions or their total restitution. It is difficult to fix the point where the medium course should stop.

Godeheu had been sent to India only to discover this medium course, but as his ideas were in no way different to those which Bussy had previously deliberated there is nothing but what was to be expected in his letter of the 10th September.

Now that Bussy was fully confident he no longer hesitated to express more freely the policy which he deemed best to be followed, not only in the Deccan but also in the Carnatic. He was fully convinced that the English were bent on displacing the French from the latter province and he likewise believed that in the North and on the coast of Orissa where the English did not possess any important settlement, there should be no open quarrel between the English and the French Companies in India unless war was declared between the two nations in Europe. There was nothing just then to justify a break in the relations or a war in Europe nor in Asia, yet with such a people it were good to be diffident, rivalry engendered bad chicanery while ambition always found some pretext when no good reasons were at hand.

The dealings with Muhammad Ali were more perplexing. Bussy declared that the interests of the French required that Mohammad Ali be recognized as the Nawab of the

Carnatic; by using their influence over Salabat Jang, the French might get the latter to accept such a designation. If this were done, Mohammad Ali would have no more cause to be an adversary of the French, the past would soon be forgotten by one party as by the other. The difficulty lay in withdrawing Mohammad Ali from the influence of the English. Bussy admitted that this was an insuperable obstacle. The English were masters of several places which belonged to Mohammed Ali and particularly of his capital city. Would it be an easy task to drive the English away from all these places even with the help of Mohammed Ali? This was very problematic.

As for the affairs of the Deccan, they were far too good to throw aside the advantages which the French might derive therefrom; Bussy thought, while being inspired by the general views which Godeheu might communicate to him, it was necessary that full powers be granted to him to retain or increase those advantages.

“I must warn you not to get alarmed if ever you come to hear that I have spoken boldly to the very ones whose alliance and friendship I mean to keep. Caresses and promises, which appear as suplications, lower the one who makes use of them while they render haughty the one to whom they are addressed. One can get on much better with what one has to do, by means of feint, as do the Asiatics with whom one has to deal and by making them feel that if one is not their friend, one shall be their enemy” (A. C. C. 86. P. 73-77).

Bussy had left the Circars one month before writing this letter on the 22nd February. After settling all things as well as he could, Bussy had gone back to Hyderabad at the beginning of January in order to make the necessary arrangements regarding an expedition to Mysore

which had been agreed upon long before According to an old custom, the ruler of Mysore paid his rent to his sovereign lord only after military pressure Nothing had been paid since the death of Nizam ul Mulk, that is to say since 1748 and the arrears amounted to about 50 lakhs, the annual tribute being about five lakhs

THE FISCAL EXPEDITION TO MYSORE

Godeheu's conditional agreement judged by the Hyderabad Court

Both Bussy and Godeheu were not very favourable to the expedition to Mysore At the time of the surrender of Law at Srirangam in 1752 the French had made an agreement with Mysore to conquer Trichinopoly The armies of both the nations were even then at Srirangam waiting for a favourable opportunity to restart or to push on hostilities Would it be wise of the French to join in an enterprise which, though not strictly speaking a military one yet might alienate Mysore and cause it to join their enemies just at a moment when the French were about to encounter great difficulties perhaps with the English? Bussy was too refined a diplomat not to foresee the danger and backed by Godeheu he at first tried with all the diplomacy of which he possessed the secret, to dissuade Salabat Jang from this project But his diplomacy failed for the first time The Suba was in need of money and necessity caused him to utter words which were not intended to bring joy to Bussy The prince had a very bad impression of the downfall of Dupleix and as the English took delight in giving out the report that this

downfall had been brought about by them, this was a first blow to the French prestige. Later on, towards the end of January, it became known that a conditional agreement, the exact terms of which were not yet revealed, had been concluded whereby Muhammad Ali was recognised as the Nawab of the Carnatic, leaving aside the eminent rights of the Suba. The French discretion regarding the Mysore campaign led to the belief that either they had lost all authority or that they were traitors to the welfare of the Deccan. The Suba had an explanation with Bussy.

“This attitude” said he “must be dictated by your own interests. Is this the return I get for the innumerable benefits with which I have overwhelmed the French? Should I not, on the contrary, expect their greatest eagerness for the welfare of my affairs? How else am I to re-establish my affairs but with this expedition on which I am resolved? Do you think I have not waited long enough? I have been deprived of my revenues, from the province of Arcot, for the past four years. Owing to my complacency and your arrangements, I do not even know from whom I am to claim my dues. Must I push my complacency still further and abandon the only opportunity I might have of going to Mysore to claim my rights? Oh! This time it is too exacting of me! It seems to me that in this occasion you should strive for my welfare with as much zeal as I have myself taken care of yours”.

This torrent of words, made more vivid by its tone and by gesture, annihilated Bussy. He had only feeble reasons to oppose these just reproaches. He was resolved to back out and he says that he would have given anything in the world to be exempted from playing such an unpleasant role. He dreaded that if he went too far, he might blast the reputation of uprightness which he had and in which laid all his strength. He would have been

exceedingly happy if the matter ended with this first reproach. But the next day the Suba renewed his complaints in full durbar (1). The whole court shared the feeling of indignation which animated the Suba and looked upon the French nation as a most ungrateful monster. The rumour became general fear alone kept the word traitor from being uttered. It does not appear as though Bussy had been present at this meeting but that very day he received the following letter from the Suba.

“I have understood and pondered over all that you have said and represented to me about our Mysore expedition. Till now I have relied on the friendship of the French convinced that they were keen about my interests and as for you I have considered you as my brother. But all that you say in favour of the zemindar of Mysore and the round about way in which you are trying to dissuade me from going to exact the tribute due to me lead me to think that I have been mistaken. Every notable man in my army is astonished that you should seem more zealous for the welfare of that zemindar than for mine. I appeal to your sense of justice. You are fully aware that since five years, out of consideration for your nation, I did not claim the tribute from the Carnatic. This rich province has now fallen into the hands of my enemies who have deprived me of more than one crore of rupees. The Marathas have despoiled me of one half of my kingdom of Aurengabad and of the greater part of Candesh and Berar. I admit that if it had not been for you, I might have lost the whole of those provinces. Chicacole

(1) The durbar or Salabat Jang's council consisted of six people—three, representatives of the Moghul viz the *amir ul momlank* or prime minister the dewan of the Delhi court for the Deccan affairs and the *bari* appointed for looking into documents, expenses etc. and three *amirats* or employees of the Deccan itself, the guardians of the records and government in general.

Rajamundry, Ellore and Moustafanagar, which the Hyderabad ruler considers as the apple of his eye, have been given for the maintenance of your army so that you might easily obtain what you need for their upkeep while you were expected to do in return all in your power for my welfare. You know how stranded I am to provide for the sustenance of my army, you have been a witness to the various cabals and revolts which resulted from this. The tribute, due to me by my vassals, is the sole source of revenue left to me. I was not able to raise this tribute during the five years it has taken me to bring order, with your help, throughout the Deccan. The perfidious zemindars pay in their tribute only when compelled to do so; the Mysore zemindar has paid nothing for the past six years. When my father and my brother appeared with their armies within his territory he gave them something like 30 to 40 lakhs. I always intended going to Mysore myself; the opportunity occurred only this year and I find that you are opposed to it. This is what leads me to believe that you are not interested in my welfare. As I get no tribute from the ruler of the Carnatic nor from the zemindar of Mysore, to what avail is the French alliance to me? There is nothing else left for me to do but to become a fakir. If you persist in opposing this expedition, give me back Mazulipatam, Divy, Devaracottah, Condavir and the other territories which were given to your nation purely as gifts and also Chicacole, Rajamundry, Ellore and Moustafanagar which were given for the upkeep of your troops; then I will set to work according to my own views and bring back order in this country with whatever help I shall be able to obtain.

“This comparison which would be made of the French and the English would allow me to fix my choice. The English have helped the meanest of my servants,

Muhammad Ali and have raised him to his present position. If you who are the allies of the lawful master allow his affairs to deteriorate where does your honour stand? You are an intelligent man, think of all that I have said. You have done so much for me, you seemed so attached to all that concerned me that I consider you as a brother (A. C. O 286 P 88-93).

The whole of this letter was so full of logic that Bussy realized that his situation became daily more and more embarrassing and difficult. He asked instructions from Pondicherry but Godeheu had just left hurriedly for France (16th February) and the Council of three administrators in charge of the government while awaiting the arrival of his successor Mr de Leyrit, declared that they did not think they had been empowered to give any orders in the matter. They considered this matter was too delicate for them alone to take a decisive step. Mr de Leyrit would have to decide it (letter of 21st March).

THE MYSORE EXPEDITION

Salabat Jang called out so insistently that his voice dominated everything else. As early as the 2nd March Bussy notified to the Council at Pondicherry that the matter could no longer be postponed, the French had to go along to Mysore with Salabat Jang unless they were resolved to lose all they had the very terms of the agreement, whereby the Circars were ceded to them obliged them to do so.

They started a few days later and as it was not strictly speaking a military expedition they met with no hindrance.

The inhabitants were aware that it was the usual way of collecting the taxes, so they withheld from any resistance, lest their own taxes be increased. On the other hand the troops too refrained from provoking the people or from being hostile to them. Only one tiny fort, along the path, refused victuals and had some shots fired on our troops; within an hour's time the fort had been silenced and the tributes doubled.

At first Salabat Jang did not intend to proceed beyond the boundaries of Mysore and resolved to wait there for the tribute to be brought to him, but he was told that Balaji Rao was about to attack Mysore from the Northwest in order to get his share of booty. But Bussy, who had secret relations with the prime minister of Mysore, made him understand that there was a way to avoid the attack. Since Mysore would have to pay out, whether he wished it or not, it would be better if Salabat Jang himself came up to the walls of Seringapatam where he would appear to the Marathas as the liberator of the country. The question of equitable contribution could then be settled. Things were carried out accordingly and the army set out marching.

Salabat Jang would have wished to use this opportunity to force the Raja to restitute all the lands and fortresses which he had seized since the death of the Nizam. He wished also the raja should come in person to pay his homage as an outward acknowledgement of his subordination. On Bussy's insistence, Salabat Jang agreed to give up these two claims. In the meantime a daughter was born to the Raja, so Salabat Jang, on Bussy's suggestion, was pleased to confer, on that child, the fortress of Ascola and its dependencies, as a jagir; this represented a gift of two lakhs of rupees. Bussy sent his confidential man, Haidar Jang, to be present at the investiture, the child was placed

on the knees of Haider Jang while a pearl necklace worth six to seven thousand rupees was put on its neck, in Bussy's name.

Thus Bussy had attained his double aim, viz the entente between the French and Mysore had not been broken up and the Marathas had stayed back in their country. There only remained the accounts to be settled between Salabat Jang and the Raja. This was quite easy. The Raja acknowledged being a vassal of the Mogul emperor whose lieutenant in Southern India, the Suba was. The Raja likewise agreed to pay 50 lakhs, of which 12 lakhs were to be paid down cash immediately, and 8 more lakhs within three months, 11 lakhs were to be given in jewels and the balance of 19 lakhs either in assignments or in letters of credit. This arrangement proved satisfactory to all and more especially to the Suba himself who owed 70 lakhs to his troops. The Mysore contribution was an appreciable amount to him so that Salabat Jang no longer hesitated to proclaim Bussy's fame with greater vehemence than he had used three months previously to doubt Bussy's fidelity. He wrote on the 21st March to Mr de Leyrit

"All that Mr de Bussy did during the past five years that he has been beside me is as nothing when compared to what he has done during this last campaign which has been most glorious not only to the French name but also the security and support of my gouvernement. I find no words to express all the praise due to him for all the trouble he has taken and for the careful way in which he reached his ends. I am under obligation to him for the money which has come into my treasury. All I have, I owe to his bravery while all my happiness is due to the

French under his command. Were he ever to leave me (1) I swear that I will then and there hand over my government to any man who wants to take charge of it and I will retire into some unknown corner. I think of him, only as a brother with whom I wish to share the honours of the subadary" (A. C. C. 2, 86. P. 98-101).

Even the Raja of Mysore acknowledged and sang the praises of Bussy. Towards the end of May he wrote to Bussy that he thanked the Almighty "for having come with your troops and those of the Mogul, your ally, to settle, through your mediation, all my affairs. So that although I had incurred some loses previously, I was in a position to satisfy the Moguls. I even swear by God that it is through your help that my life, my country, my honour and even my creed itself have been preserved. I have no friends among Europeans except Frenchmen; my one hope for the future is that you should always continue extending to me the same favour and protection as by the past" (A C. 3. 86 P. 101-103)

Mr de Leyrit had reached Pondicherry in the meantime. Bussy might have thought that he had seen the end of all future worry, if the daily invasion of the Carnatic by the English had not given him cause to think and fear that some day the Deccan too might be undermined by better organised and more powerful cabals than those which had caused him a great deal of anxiety the preceeding February.

(1) Bussy in his letters frequently expressed his desire to return to France. In reply to Salabat Jang's fears, Leyrit wrote on 30th June "Mr de Bussy deserves all the trust the nation has in him, his love for you alone might help him to bear all the hardships and fatigues which he has to endure ever since he is at your service It does not depend on me to keep him beside you as long as you may desire, I will try to persuade him to stay there. Rely on the French nation"

The re echo of the Mysore affair on the English policy

The more fortunate than truly glorious Mysore expedition gave the biggest impetus to the policy which the English were to carry out thereafter in the Carnatic, though it may not have actually caused it. The conditional treaty drawn up by Saunders and Godeheu on the 11th January stated among other terms that both the Companies would not intervene in the quarrels which might occur among the Indian princes and that each one would remain in its respective positions till such time as the two interested nations in Europe had come to some conclusion. But this treaty did not specify Muhammad Ali or any other prince nor did it fix the positions held by the English or the French troops nor did it give their enumeration. No boundaries were fixed. Therefore there was matter for controversy but when dealing with adversaries who are more keen on their interests than on truth every controversy easily turns acrimonious and carries a risk of war.

When Bussy was marching back lightheartedly with his troops from Seringapatam little did he think that the English were going to make use of his intervention to claim similar rights in other parts of India. In fact it was the argument which Pigot the governor of Madras put forward shortly after when the French reproached him for having interfered in the affairs of Madura and Vellore and their excessive entry into those of the Carnatic. Leyrit explained that the two cases were not alike, the reply was that although it might be true that the French had received no payment from Mysore (1)

(1) It is true that the French had not received any payment from Mysore, but Salabat Jang had made several personal gifts to Bussy through gratitude, a sword, a catara and a rondelle studded with small

yet they were being indirectly paid by the Circars. Why should the English not enjoy similar rights to receive subsidies from their allies and lend them a helping hand when necessary? The whole of the Franco-English conflict rests on this ambiguity which took its source at Seringapatam.

We give below a letter from Pigot, taken at random from among many similar ones, which explains, though it does not justify, the whole of the English policy. This letter was sent to Leyrit and is dated 1st February 1756.

“Please think, Sir, of your various enterprises since the conclusion of the treaty, all of which I have carefully noted. Please think of the amount of money exacted by Mr de Bussy at the head of a body of French troops, from the Raja of Mysore who certainly was never a vassal of your nation. Please note that you have had troops marched through the territory of Taurcou (a little to the North of Trichinopoly) and that you drove away the one who commanded at the time of the truce solely because he had not paid the customary tribute

“Please remember, the various marches undertaken by Mr. de Bussy in the Northern provinces, through territories of princes who undoubtedly were not dependent on him, the contributions he raised on all sides and the unlimited authority he established.

‘After thinking seriously on all that I have stated above, please be kind enough to compare the conduct, which we have held since the truce, with that of your nation which had no right whatsoever except that of possessing a day during which you were left free to govern a

rubies and diamonds valued at 4,000 Rs, a pearl necklace worth 2,000 Rs, a horse costing between 300 to 400 Rs, an aigrette worth 3,000 Rs a dagger of about 500 to 600 Rs. We do not know whether there were other presents as well Bussy's fortune and that of the other officers were made by the frequent repetition of such gifts.

part of the province in which rights if any, belonged to the Nawab. We only accompanied the latter when he went to collect the tribute due to him in such parts of the province which were subject to him at the time the peace was concluded' (A O C. 2. 91 P 229)

The distance between Seringapatam and Hyderabad as the crow flies is 550 kilometres. The return journey had no incident. On reaching the Krishna they found the river was rising every minute owing to heavy rains in the highlands. The troops did not dare to ford it. Bussy and Salabat Jang sat on the same elephant while the army taking advantage of a slight fall in the river followed two days later. Hyderabad was reached on the 13th or 14th July

Para III.— *The oscillations in Bussy's external policy*

As no military event took place till the beginning of the following year and as the internal politics of the Déccan too underwent no alteration we have to look to other sources for the items of information with which to fill in the gap of a fairly long period. There are to be found in Bussy's correspondence in which he relates his impressions, his views on the future and his various observations. We simply quote without pretending to establish any real logical link between the facts related.

Bussy's valuation of Indian politics — To start with, we give his opinion on the men and things of the Deccan. There are more or less what we have already known him to express. But these statements recur so often in his writings that we feel bound to heed his persistence in repeating them. In Bussy's mind, the Indian policy is made up of never ending intrigues and cabals. Bussy makes no secret of this for he openly relates such events

in his letters to Pondicherry and to Paris, to the governor and to the minister, the more so when he was involved in some difficulties.

“ The daily bread of the Asiatic is, so to say, the ceaseless succession of intrigues. Those with which I have been lately mixed up are mere trifles when compared to the intricacy of the cabals and the secret undoing and dealings which I had to unravel and discuss in order to establish Salabat Jang on the throne and to maintain him in that place ” (letter of 20th May)

“ Experience show that the Asiatic seeks to form an alliance only in so far as he finds some gain or that he has some fear that the ally might become an enemy. I make free use of this double standpoint to bring them to wish to have us as their allies; as I am fully convinced that so long as they hold these views nothing will ever shake or break asunder our alliance. Our alliance with the Rajah of Mysore is of a much lower standard than that with the Suba of the Deccan, it should be considered only in so much as the amount of money we claim ” (letter of 20th June).

“ I am surrounded on all side by traitors and murderers whose external attitude is that of the most sincere friendship. We must be always on the look out for intrigues and cabals and yet not let them be aware that we are on guard for this would instantly indispose their minds and seal their free conversations. The shares of the Asiatics are all the more difficult to discover and to avoid as they are always envelopped in a veil which shows them as most interested in the very one whom they long to ruin. As no two men have a common interest, so each one seeks his own and tries to gain favour either by intrigue, or by factions or by trachery ” (letter of 26th June).

Bussey knew the language of the natives and he also had much experience in the affairs of the country so it was quite easy for him to disentangle the most secret machinations and to bring them to aught. When the anxieties he had felt during his journey to Mysore had been somewhat alleviated his style of writing became less bitter. His attention was drawn to another still more perplexing question viz that of the English.

The dangers brought about by the policy of the English.

Bussey had played no part in drawing up the conditional treaty, he came to know of it and he understood the importance of certain of its clauses only by the excitement it had produced in Hyderabad, no sooner its motive rather than its terms became known on February 1755.

Two altogether different effects resulted from that treaty so far as the English were concerned. The durbar considered the authority taken by the English as an usurpation and as an outrage calling their utmost indignation but they also looked upon the ease with which the French had given in as a weakness almost amounting to submission. The French prestige suffered a considerable decrease thereby. The durbar was not over-grieved to note the humiliation of the French, might not the antagonism which would shortly arise from the claims of the French and the English, help the Suba to withdraw all the concessions he had made to the French along the coast? Bussey had already hinted to this in his letters to Godheu. It might also happen that Salabat Jang would be willing to acknowledge Mohammed Ali as the Nawab of the Carnatic while taking no heed of the badly protected French interests. If such a thing were to happen it would mean a victory for the English while the whole of the French authority would be destroyed not only in the Deccan

Bussy, who was of a nature not easily disheartened, thought that the Circars would compensate the French for the loss of the Deccan. Possibly too this prospect, far from grieving Bussy, had caused to him some satisfaction. Had he not always been opposed to the permanent occupation of the Deccan, where all that was needed was a small guard of honour beside the Suba ? The real strength of the French laid in seaport towns and their dependencies. Writing on the 1st August Bussy said : If the nation or the Company had not acquired on the coast of Orissa what it had lost on the Coromandel coast and if the advantages in the North did not compensate for those which their adversaries had usurped in the South, I ask myself in what state would matters be”

In the meantime Bussy thought as probable the war with the English. Treaties were not sacred to them. Writing on the 18th September, Bussy had said: “Treachery and outrages have been their wont for centuries. Facts would only activate their racy taste. Neutrality treaties between the two rival nations are as dreams which never come true. The English will acquiesce to all things but they will abide by treaties only so far as they do not mar their own interests”. If war were to break out, the French would have no one on whom they could depend for help, but themselves. To rely on Indian sympathy was vain. “If the Hindus felt that they were to get no advantage for themselves, they would either abandon or despise the one seeking their help. I have already said and I will say again, either you must dominate the Asiatic or you must be dominated by him. Honour and gain are attached to this maxim”.

Bussy was quite right in not depending on the sympathy or loyalty of the Asiatics of the Deccan. Towards the beginning of December, at a durbar held in the Suba's

Court, Mr Muhammad Husain and the Dewan o the Moghal emperor proposed that Muhammad Ali be acknowledged as the Nawab of the Carnatic and that they should seek support from the English. These arguments had already been brought forward in February they now reappeared with greater support and credit. The proposal was not yet sanctioned but the seed had been sown and it was to shoot forth and prosper.

The advantages to be derived from an agreement with the Mogul.

Faced by the possibility of a rupture rather than by an absolute threat Bussy thought that the best way to avert the danger usefully laid in seeking the support of the Mogul whose authority although dying laid on the Indian princes and even on Muhammad Ali. Whether on the suggestions of the French the emperor fail to recognize Muhammad Ali as the Nawab of the Carnatic or he admitted his claim, in any case the latter would be under obligation to the French in spite of themselves. The French would then be able to call together all the forces of Southern India against the English. Fate would decide thereafter whether these combined forces were sufficient to drive the English back into their settlements on the coast or not.

When the great vizir Gaziuddin the eldest son of Nizam-ul-Mulk and consequently the brother of Salabat Jang had entered the Deccan in 1752 with the intention of succeeding Nazir Jang and the ephemeral sultan Muzaffar Jang the Moghul emperor had been struck by Bussy's successes. Gaziuddin had died suddenly at Aurengabad. He had probably been poisoned, while his son Shahab-ud-din who had succeeded him as vizir at Delhi, seemed completely disinterested regarding his rights in the Deccan. His relations with Salabat Jang were

rather satisfactory. Yet he was watching attentively and with curiosity all the events of the peninsula, while Bussy's personality appeared to him as that of a man who deserved to be treated with consideration. It was owing to the suggestion of Shahab-ud-din that the Moghal emperor had conferred high sounding titles on Bussy, whereby nothing was added to the latter's authority. But a day did dawn when Bussy's authority was however to be put to good use. Alenguir II, the great Mogul, who reigned then, had been crowned in July 1754; he was witnessing his power contested not only on his Western boundary but also within his State; the loyalty of his forces was doubtful; they even were insufficient to protect him or give him peace of mind. The Marathas or the new Nawab of Oudh, Soudja Doula, offered to help him, but he would probably be called upon to pay very dearly for that help. Why should the French, who were foreigners and who had no territorial ambition in Hindustan, not be asked to guarantee the peaceful possession of his States in the same way as they had done in the Deccan for Salabat Jang? So early as July 1755 while Bussy was on his way back from Mysore, the vizir had written to him that by upholding Salabat Jang, he had upheld the Emperor and the empire; that the renowned deeds which he had performed for the Suba made those at Delhi long for his alliance and friendship. While concluding he requested Bussy to make no difference between himself and Salabat Jang, are they not of the same family, that of Asefja (Nizam-ul-Mulk)? and finally he offered to render to Bussy and to the French nation, every possible service at the imperial Court.

This very flattering letter was undoubtedly meant just to prepare Bussy to receive more positive proposals. In fact two months later, the Mogul wrote to him in Sep-

tember offering to take on his pay a French detachment to remain permanently at Delhi under his command. The vizir writing about the same time to Salabat Jang informed him that there was no truth whatsoever in the reports that Muhammad Ali was being supported by the Mogul. The letters or paravanas which he might produce were false documents written by a former representative of Balaji Rao at Delhi from where he had been expelled.

The proposals made to Bussy did not seem definite enough to enable him to follow them up. The only conclusion which Bussy drew from them was that Muhammad Ali was not being supported by the Mogul, consequently nothing further was done but an exchange of very costly presents which were greatly valued by the one as by the other. However by the end of that year the Mogul made more precise offers to get Bussy with a detachment of one thousand men. He mentioned three lakhs of rupees per month for the pay and the expenses of that army with an advance of six months pay so they should get ready for the journey all these expenses were guaranteed by the *sowcars* or bankers. A whole political plan was neatly concealed under these proposals. The Mogul intended with the help of the French to attack the Marathas who had become a real danger to the empire and it had become imperative that they be driven back south of the Narbudda.

Bussy understood that the realization of this programme would enable the French to finish then and there with the affairs of the Carnatic and perhaps also allow them to establish their preponderance over the whole of India. Undoubtedly a psychological hour had struck during which a distant future was about to be settled. But Bussy was not free to act as he pleased. He had to inform the governor at Pondicherry about this and he had to

await his advice as also that of the ministers at Paris. But was all that advice necessary? Bussy saw quite clearly that a war with England was becoming daily more and more imminent and that once war had been declared, the French would need all their troops to resist the English along the coast. The moment was therefore not opportune to enter immediately into engagements with the Mogul emperor. So Bussy moved very cautiously. Writing to Leyrit on the 6th February 1756: "I shall know to gain time without either breaking off or concluding any agreement with the Mogul emperor and his vizir". Bussy also said that Muhammad Ali had offered all the income of Arcot to the Mogul provided he were granted the firman of that province. Bussy's own ambition, at that moment, was just to paralyse Muhammad Ali's intrigues and to have his proposals rejected. Matters remained in suspense till the end of the year when, without any surprise, it was learnt that war had been declared in Europe on the 17th May between the French and the English. Circumstances had answered the proposals of the Mogul but they have remained as a precious testimony of the moral influence which Bussy had acquired over almost the whole of India.

The Maratha affairs and the ambitions of Balaji Rao.

Let us turn now to the Maharattas so as to get a glimpse of the French political situation in southern India during the year 1755. Towards the end of 1754, the English Company came to know that Bussy had obtained the concession of the Circars from the Suba. "They thought" says Orme "that negotiations alone would be insufficient to lead the French to give up such great advantages, accordingly they resolved to oppose the power of the French in Southern Deccan by the most efficient means". The best means they devised was to

make use of the Marathas who had become an everlasting menace to Salabat Jang. They hoped that this prince would send the French away through fear provided the Marathas did not help the English, but if in spite of all Salabat Jang continued to be attached to the French nation, they were determined to force him to sever this connection by means of a combined action with Balaji Rao.'

Clive, who had just returned from Europe accepted to carry out this policy. In the meantime the Bombay Presidency had undertaken with the help of the Marathas an expedition on a grand scale against the Angrias, those sea pirates who had paralysed European commerce, for over half a century by stopping and plundering every foreign boat. This war began in March 1755 and lasted till February 1756 by the complete and final defeat of the pirates. During all that time the project of intervention into the Deccan had been abandoned.

Bussy merely watched these movements with no desire to participate in them. Ever since Bussy had returned from Mysore he had avoided every step which might arouse the sensitiveness of the Marathas as an untimely manifestation of friendship. It was equally difficult just then, for Bussy to fight against Balaji Rao or to support him in the help he was giving to the English. Yet an opportunity was offered to him to take sides. He received the following letter from the peshwa in December

-I always admired your straightforwardness and your faithfulness in keeping the engagements you had made. Your nation never abandons its friends. Salabat Jang whom you support since long had always found in you a faithful ally ever ready to undertake all things for his welfare. You are aware of the alliance you made, when

you signed the treaty of peace at Balqui. I have kept to my word regarding the observing of peace. I expect you, on your side, will keep the promise made to lend troops to one another when either you or I needed them. I now need one hundred Europeans with an officer to command them and five hundred Sepoys. I await your reply”.

The tone of this brief letter was somewhat unusual. Bussy replied at once in the same concise way: “I read your letter and I noted its contents. You are quite right in saying that the French are constant in their friendship and that the word of a Frenchman is an unbreakable oath and that their friends have never had reason to regret being attached to them. You now ask me for one hundred Europeans and five hundred Sepoys. These are too few for the big plans you might have in mind. You will need at least seven to eight hundred Europeans and two thousand Sepoys. Our reputation is too precious for us to run the risk of losing it or to see any disgrace come to it. We are not accustomed to lend such few men as would be insufficient to guarantee the success of any enterprise. Neither you nor I promised to do a thing which is against our customs”.

By this reply Bussy got out of the difficulty with elegance: to refuse help would have been rather delicate, but to make help subservient to the strength of the detachment, was clever indeed, as Balaji Rao could not accept such a large number of men for he would no longer have been the master of his own States.

THE ORIGIN OF THE MORARI RAO AFFAIR.

The correspondance was stopped with this, and Bussy watched the struggle against the Angrias as a mere

spectator It was no surprise to Bussy to learn that the Marathas and the English were upset regarding the sharing of the booty This news brought neither joy nor distress to Bussy The French interests were not at stake in that struggle Bussy was more worried at that moment about a prospective quarrel which might arise between Balaji Rao and another Maratha leader who was not a dependent of him and whose ill defined territory extended round about Gooty between the Deccan and Mysore This leader was no other than Morari Rao, who was well known to the French for he had hired his services to Dupleix at the time of the siege of Trichinopoly The French still owed him fourteen lakhs Morari Rao claimed this amount persistently On the other hand he had all to fear in case of struggle against Balaji Rao Bussy thought that the French might be freed of their debt by a skilful mediation between the two antagonists.

The origin of the quarrel between these two men is rather strange. Some twenty years previously Shao Raja the Maratha king and his brother Sombaji had shared the *chotays* revenue of the Deccan between themselves. All the territory to the South of the Krishna had been allotted to Sombaji while the king took for his share all the Northern territory This king was weak minded and a lover of tranquillity so he rented out his rights to Balaji Rao while Sombaji rented out his territory to Morari Rao. When Shao died in 1740, Balaji Rao seized all the power, had the king imprisoned in the town of Satara, while allowing him to continue bearing the title of king he was in reality a prisoner Once this revolution had passed over Balaji Rao, thinking that there would be no one to oppose his plans thereafter sent his brother to the Carnatic in order to collect the *chotays* from the provinces to the South of the river

Krishna. Morari Rao asked for an explanation. Balaji Rao replied that he was in charge of all the details of government and that his authority was unlimited and that there was nothing left for Morari Rao but to consider himself as subject to Balaji Rao. Morari Rao said that he held his rights from Sombaji and that he had no orders to receive from Poona. Balaji Rao then stated that his authority did not proceed merely from the king of Satara but from the Mogul emperor as well, whose eminent rights no one contested.

This controversy held the germs of a quarrel which might have turned out very serious. For although Balaji Rao held uncontested power, yet a good number of those around him sympathized with Morari Rao. As annual collection of taxes was not the rule in Indian governments, this struggle remained dormant for several years. But at the time we are considering, Balaji Rao had become more exacting and was determined to claim *chotaye* from the whole of the Carnatic, needless of the rights of anybody else.

This quarrel could not have left Bussy indifferent. As early as July 1755 he had discussed with Leyrit the advantages and inconveniences of siding with Balaji Rao or Morari Rao. They both came to the conclusion that their behaviour should depend on circumstances, however it seemed to them that it were better for the French to side with Morari Rao in order to obtain that he should cancel the debt due to him in return for some compensation in the Deccan and their support so that Balaji Rao should not be too exacting of him. Their only fear was that Balaji Rao would give no ear to their proposals and that he might come to some understanding with Salabat Jang not only to attack Morari Rao but the French as

pean one, up to the present day, the interests of the company carried to limit far exceeding its hopes and even its desires; no, Sir all this is hardly believable and cannot be admitted unless demonstrated by proofs

Even if a man's self reserve is to suffer thereby there comes a time when he is pushed to affirm his personality the more so when play the state interests which are usually not well defended, Bussy who knew full well the worth of his devotion to duty and the hardships he underwent was all the more entitled to use such a language especially as the utmost indifference, for his services prevailed in high places his defence for in fact it was nothing else was justifiable.

Bussy was not the only one to make justice to himself, leaving aside Leyrit who, from the very start, had placed the fullest trust in Bussy and had approved him in all his actions, we shall mention the opinion of Duplant de Laval, Commissary of the armies, who had served for a short while with the army in the Deccan His opinion was undoubtedly shared by most of the Europeans

Writing to the Syndics of the Company on the 1st September Duplant de Laval said, The Company owes its aggrandisement to Mr de Bussy and the French army which established and maintained Salabat Jang on the throne of his ancestors. Jealousy though unjust, will be compelled to admit this fact while it shall also try simultaneously to decrease its merit. Ever since I am in the army as Commissary I have seen with my own eyes things of which I had but an imperfect knowledge. I have seen the height of the authority to which Mr de Bussy has attained, in the Deccan it is on basis of this that Salabat Jang has marked his gratitude towards the French and namely towards Mr de Bussy The high esteem in which he is held and the extensive power

which he sways have both astonished and captivated me. It is indeed suprising that a foreigner should take such ascendancy in the midst of such a proud nation and one which frequently envies domination as the Asiatics do. No state reason, no public good, no welfare of the nation appeals to them, everything is personal. From this diversity of interests it necessarily follows that a very great difficulty arises when called upon to act as mediator to so much variance and get to succeed in satisfying each and every one of the contesting parties. This is the *nec plus ultra* of politics and this has been Mr. de Bussy's role for the past five years. The French general is the oracle which each one tries to propitiate and whose decisions are respected by one and all; full authority is vested on him unanimously so much so that the interests of the various powers of the Deccan are modelled according to his will

“To reach such eminence it was necessary and is still so that Mr. de Bussy should spend days and days discussing the most thorny affairs which call for considerable tact and caution. Intrigues have to be made to match intrigues, mischievous proposals have to be confounded, the plots of the envious, whose jealousy is too timid to allow them to burst forth but whose secret underhand dealings go against the welfare of the Nawab and the glory of the French, have to be brought to none. His uninterrupted success during five years, speak sufficiently and much more forcibly than any letter or narrative might ever do (A. C. C. 2. 86, P. 15-18)

The reader is requested to excuse these lengthy quotations; but by slightly modifying the last sentence such quotations and texts strike the mind so much more vigorously than any analysis or commentary might ever do.

Para V *The Savanour affair and the settlement of accounts of the French with Morari Rao*

When the year 1756 dawned Salabat Jang's army, which had to be utilized, was on its way to Beder not knowing exactly which side it would have to proceed, later According to some the army was going to Berar where Balaji Rao appeared to uphold the rights or the sole pretensions to govern supremely the territories belonging to one of Bonsla's sons who had died in March 1753, while others hold that the army was going southwards where Morari Rao had raised an army of 15 000 cavaliers and 6 to 7 000 Sepoys to help the Raja of Savanour, who was being threatened by Balaji Rao just as he himself was. But if the army did really proceed southwards no one knew even at that moment whether it was to stand by or to fight against Morari Rao or Balaji Rao.

Indian diplomacy can be gauged in this irresoluteness which cannot be defined by strictly appropriate words. The preceeding year Balaji Rao had come to an agreement with the English to fight the Angrias but the English went to the malabar coast not so much to crush the pirates but to be near at hand and ready to fight against the French on the Bombay coast no sooner war had been declared between the two countries in Europe. The campaign against the Angrias was only the prelude to the struggle between the French and the English which was kept in abeyance solely owing to the conditional treaty between Godeheu and Saunders. The war against the Angrias being over the English had other troubles calling them to Bengal. Now that Balaji Rao was rid of troublesome and even disquieting allies what was he going to do? He did not intend to continue being the auxiliary of the English against the French, he could act alone if his interests required it. For the past

few years he had been aiming at weakening the Deccan and subdividing it. Unfortunately for him he had learnt to know the French and especially their leader. To all appearances it seemed the Deccan had nothing to fear so long as Bussy remained as its protector. Balaji Rao thought that he could undertake nothing against the Deccan unless he had broken the alliance between the French and the Suba. He therefore aimed at this, hopeful of success. He knew that the high dignitaries of the Nawab cursed, in silence, the hand which sheltered them and he was also aware that Chanavas Khan, the minister was almost openly hostile to the French. The Hindu intrigues are generally made and undone by means of vakils that is to say, orally. Therefore no document exists which states, as an absolute fact, that Chanavas Khan and Balaji Rao had concerted, so long ago as the end of 1755, to find some means for doing away with the services of the French, but an opportunity arose in the campaign against the Raja of Savanour wherein they were able to meet and discuss their plans almost openly.

The Nawab of Savanour was one, among many Indian princes, who owned a bit of territory on the borders of a country of which he nominally depended. Savanour is about 200 miles to the South of Hyderabad. The Nawab thought that he was not really Salabat Jang's vassal and that these two men joined hands to oppose a common front to their eventful enemies.

However before coming to this stage, there had been some talks about peace between the interested parties, early in 1756. But Balaji Rao had insisted on being acknowledged as the chief general of the Maratha army and that the whole *chotaye* of the Deccan be paid to him alone. This double demand of Balaji Rao had been rejected and

they had resorted to arms to decide the fāte. Balaji Rao's army was the first to be ready so he appeared with it at the gates of Savanour and began the siege.

Immediately some extremely subtle intrigues were started. As the Deccan army was marching very slowly Chanavas Khan hinted to Balaji Rao that the French were purposely delaying the march. At the same time he informed Morari Rao that the French and they alone had wanted the Suba to take up the cause of the Marathas. When Bussy reached within one day's march from Tungabadra river he cleared all this entanglement by immediately taking a step which confounded the cabal. He sent word to the authors that he knew all about their plans etc. as well as they did, while he sent a message on a camel to inform Balaji Rao of this. He acted so to convince the Maratha chief that if there was any delay at all in bringing help to him the opposition did not come from him. Bussy also meant to prove to Morari Rao that it was Chanavas Khan and no one else but he, who had started the idea of an agreement with Balaji Rao.

Real genius was called for to manœuvre in the midst of these numerous intrigues, yet we have not mentioned them all. The three chief Maratha jagirdars were secretly on the side of Morari Rao, the Pathans were for the Nawab of Savanour. Mr Mohammed Husain Khan favoured Balaji Rao while Holkar wanted to save Morari Rao. "This is the fine muddle in which I am placed" said Bussy philosophically "I endeavour to proceed cautiously with the suggestions of experience so that the conjectures become less embarrassing. Balaji Rao's army is full of Mogul lords whose fathers, brothers or nephews are in that of Salabat Jang in whose ranks many Marathas also are to be found. These contradictions which would be

revolting in Europe, astonish no one in Asia" (Letters to Leyrit of the 28th March and 24th April 1756 A.C.C. 292 P. 178-180).

Salabat Jang's army reach Savanour at last. The place was either surrounded or defended by such a large number of men that the exact number cannot be mentioned. The Maratha army was disposed in about twenty camps containing 70 to 80,000 cavaliers. The Nawab of Savanour and Morari Rao had got ready for a prolonged resistance. They had 38,000 men, 200 Europeans, 8,000 Pathans, 10,000 Marathas, 5,000 Sepoys and about 12,000 *cautoquiers* bearers belonging to various rajas and Polygars.

A clash between these two armies would have been formidable. They at first resorted to long talks. On the 5th April Bussy had a primary conference which was a mere formal one, with Balaji Rao while two days later a business conference was held. The peshwa found the succession rather confusing; evidently Chanavas Khan had not made the things very clear. Regarding his rights to the *chotaye* of the Carnatic the peshwas said that the transgressions of which he was accused, did not proceed from him but from brahmins to whom the rights had been leased; he promised to settle all the claims which might be made to him. He then spoke of the English who had, said he, played a trick on him by grabbing 40 lakhs of rupees which were to come to him from the expedition to the Angrias. He then spoke of the Dutch and the Portugues in various manner. Bussy said: "This conversation started and was continued in good friendship, but the end of the Savanour affair seems far off".

The siege was actually dragging on and Bussy was accused, in whispers, of delaying as he wanted to favour Morari Rao. To undeceive the Peshwa, Bussy resolved on a real attack, which lasted two days, but was decisive.

The pathanas who were looked in the place were terrified and both sides agreed to submit their quarrel to an arbitrator by whose decision they would abide

"This is the point I wanted to attain said Bussy to keep on the good side of the Maratha power whose esteem and friendship based on fear I need not to estrange the Pathans on account of the faussedar of Cuddapah who might give us some fears, finally to maintain my authority in the durbar and to restore to it the nation always more dreading and more necessary

"Morari Rao, whom I wanted to palaver while appearing to be against him and who was being backed by Holkar and other powerful chiefs was unwilling to give up his rights knowing the strong party which protected him I won over Holkar who has become a friend I did the same with Morari Rao while getting him to cancel all that he said was due to him by the French as also all the documents and agreements which had been drawn up between Mr Dupleix and himself

Peace was concluded about the 25th April Balaji Rao was paid the *chotays* while the Deccan durbar gave him some territory which had been taken from the Nawab of Savanour in exchange for other territory in the Aurenga bad dependency As for Morari Rao he had to consider himself very fortunate to have been allowed to keep Gooty with the rights dependent on If the siege of Savanour had been prolonged he would have lost all There was no gain for the Deccan except the theoretic rather than the real acknowledgements of its authority The only victorious ones were the French who pursuing for the past fifteen months the same plan with obstinacy and method had succeeded in exacting from the hands of Morari Rao his official cancelling of the debt of 14 lakhs of rupees. In *bona fide* it might not be the full

debt but however the best part. In fact Morari Rao's disclaim amounted only to 133,245 Rupees of which about twenty thousand were left off to him as a wise act of political foresight. This success was due to Bussy's patience and to his practical mind, but it was to be paid for very dearly.

THE BIG INTRIGUE OF 1756 AND THE ARMY OF SUGGOUR SENT TO BUSSY.

The Suba dismisses Bussy, the latter intends going back to the coast:—However skilful and mysterious Bussy's dealings with Morari Rao had been, Chanavas Khan began to realize that Bussy being more preoccupied about the welfare of his own nation, had sacrificed that of the Deccan to a great extent. This was one more pretext to do away with the services of the French. Unless the Deccan was to remain for ever under the protection of the French, the time had come to shake off the yoke which was more humiliating than oppressive. Now that Balaji Rao had become the Suba's ally, was he not disposed to guarantee the safety of the State?

Under whose inspiration did Salabat Jang resolve to share his powers with his two brothers Nizam Ali and Bassalat Jang? According to Bussy, this idea had come from Balaji Rao who had at the back of his mind the thought that this partition of authority would enable him to substitute himself in the place of the French. To make sure of the success of his plan, Balaji Rao had offered to place 25,000 men at Salabat Jang's disposal; having this body guard, the prince could do without foreign help—whether French or English.

These transactions had been carried on so stealthily that Bussy himself had been taken by surprise. He could hardly believe that the Suba had consented to this sort of abdication. But Bussy had to give in to facts. Towards the end of April surely before the 27th the Suba had gone alone to Balaji Rao and had a talk with him regarding the province of Arcot, of which the English had been masters *ever since Mr Dupleix had been driven away from Pondicherry* which showed that the king of France disapproved all that the French had done in India. He then spoke of the Delhi affairs and seemed to dread that the Mogul would attack him shortly because he had been vexed by the breaking of the marriage of one of his protégés with the daughter of Nasir Jang. With an air of discouragement or perhaps it was his way of admitting his weakness, Salabat Jang seemed disinterested himself of government and said it was owing to this that he had thought of sharing the responsibility with his brothers.

When Bussy came to hear of this proposal although he was well used to the most out of the way combinations he was simply floored. He immediately realized that it meant the complete downfall of the Muhammedan government in the Deccan and the triumph of the Marathas in Southern India. Ohanavas Khan, Mr Muhammad Hussain and other lords seemed to share Bussy's opinion but as Salabat Jang distrusted those around him while on the other hand he was convinced that the French had lost all their authority he may have sincerely believed that thereafter only the Marathas could safeguard and protect him. He therefore made up his mind to accept the help offered by Balaji Rao, so much so that by the end of April his power if not his States, had already been partitioned. Nizam Ali was associated with the empire in one way or another and he was given

the administration of the northern provinces; while Basallat Jang was made administrator of the Southern province with Adoni as his capital Balaji Rao had nothing easier to do now but to slip as wedge into this partitioned authority and cause it to break asunder. It was already being said that Bassalat Jang was willing to yield a part of his provinces as the price of Balaji Rao's intervention.

Though Bussy was aware of these transactions, he refrained from taking part in them. He was informed, about the same time, that his services were no longer needed and that he could withdraw to the coast with his detachment. Bussy was perplexed for a while wondering whether he was to obey or not. If he departed, he would leave the path open to the intrigues of the English and Muhammad Ali at the Court of Hyderabad. It might also mean the loss of all that had been granted to the French by the ceding of the Circars. Since the French no longer contributed to the protection of the ruler, they had no more right to the revenues. But if he were to stay he would expose himself to struggles with the Suba. The small number of his men did not permit him to attempt staying back. He incurred daily losses either through illness or through desertion. After weighing deeply all the pros and cons, Bussy came to the conclusion that it would be better for him to return to the coast and from there he could use his skilful tact to get out of this most desperate situation, in the best way possible. He even saw the possibility of turning this retirement to the interests of the French. He wrote to Leyrit on the 15th May :

“By making the English realize the sacrifice we have made, we might make what is happening now seem a plausible retreat. Our stay of six years besides the Suba

has not in any way helped us in the Arcot affair, where the English and Muhammad Ali did as they pleased without worrying about our rights. Under these circumstances we can hope for no help whatsoever from the Mogul nation even our alliance with them will be burdensome. We have no more need of the Moguls to retain what we have in the North than the English needed them for what they own in the South. I know the weak points of that nation. We have nothing to be afraid of them nor have we anything to expect from them. If we intend continuing taking part in their affairs then the expedition to Delhi (that is to say an agreement with the Mogul Emperor) would be very useful to us, otherwise I think we should keep within our own territory and await developments in Asia and in Europe (A. C. C. 2. 92 P 189 195)

The relations between Bussy and Balaji Rao remain friendly — Bussy wanted to remain on the best of terms with Balaji Rao, at least before his departure from the Deccan. Malleson says that Balaji Rao had made proposals to Bussy to join his service. Yet the *Peshwa* had contributed to the dismissal of Bussy. The latter knew this, but he knew likewise that Balaji Rao had not acted through hatred or contempt and that if he had been in Balaji Rao's place he would probably have acted in like manner. At any rate Bussy kept no spite to Balaji Rao, the Deccan affairs did not concern him in the least. He had never been of opinion that the French should stay an indefinite length of time in the Deccan. Who could say whether Balaji Rao and himself would not be called by circumstances on some more or less distant day, to join hands? India was the country of witchcraft and metamorphosis.

Balaji Rao had then and there an opportunity of giving a proof of the esteem he had for Bussy with the hope perhaps of drawing some advantage later on, if circumstances were favourable. In the meantime Chanavas Khan proposed that Balaji Rao should take advantage of the confusion which reigned and especially of the small number of Frenchmen, to provoke an incident following which the French would be attacked and exterminated to the last man. Balaji Rao having refused this, they hinted that it would suffice either to murder or poison Bussy and that once Bussy had gone no other Frenchman knew anything of the Indian affairs. The French troops being deprived of their leader would disband with all the risks of dispersal in a hostile and unknown land. Balaji Rao threw out this proposal also. Chanavas Khan continued for a short while more to give apparent tokens of the most cordial friendship to the French, as also those of the utmost gratitude for the services they had rendered.

Balaji Rao did better still. The small French detachment started its march back to the coast. Balaji Rao fearing that it might fall the victim of some ambush sent an escort of 4000 cavaliers under the leadership of Mulhar Rao Holkar, one of the primary high chiefs of the future mahratta confederation. Bussy however did not keep them. He feared that the protection which was being given to him might have to be paid for very dearly. So after a few days, he sent back the escort with many very polite words and still more tangible presents.

The retreat of the French army towards Hyderabad :— Bussy continued his uncertain march in ceaseless rain, but the expected ambush did not occur. While Salabat Jang's Deccan army went straight on to Aurengabad,

the small French troop marched on to Hyderabad whence it was to proceed to the coast almost immediately. If the war did burst out with the English as Bussy expected it would the retreat would be justified and the return journey would seem an honourable going away.

Just then a copy of the correspondence exchanged between Mohammed Ali and Chanavas Khan fell into Bussy's hand. As it is somewhat strange and rather short we give it *verbatim*. Mohammed Ali said: 'Your anxieties are ill founded while the reports that Captain Dupleix is returning with troops, is absolutely false. It has even been said that he was arrested on his arrival in his own country and that his *patcha* (king) is very much put out against him for all his doings in India and is very far from rewarding him as you think. You may therefore carry out our plans in that province and send me the *Sanad* (investiture). The people at Pondicherry dare not more, as for the rest that is your business. Your junction with Balaji Rao must have been made easy by your agreement.'

Chanavas Khan is said to have replied: 'Since long you promise fifteen lakhs for the *Sanad* of Arcot and besides to send some of your troops and also some English, no sooner the French had gone away I hope you will carry out these promises and that you will come via Nellore.'

The harmony between Muhammad Ali the English and the Deccan government had become so great that it was disquieting to the French retreat, while Bussy himself had never been in more alarming danger. English forces sent from Madras province were to come shortly and replace the French at Hyderabad and to throw them willingly or unwillingly out of the country.

Bussy hesitated a while as to what was the best thing for him to do. He was clearly aware of the two fold

plan which Chanavas Khan and those around him had made for obtaining, through the help of the English, the revenue of Aicot and recovering the Circars through the help of Balaji Rao Bussy wondered whether he really ought to go straight on to the Circars and be quite ready to have recourse to arms, if need be, or whether it were better to remain at Hyderabad and await the Suba so as to force him to dismiss Chanavas Khan. The latter seemed the best thing to do provided Salabat Jang agreed. His refusal would oblige the French to wage war against him. If this were to happen, the French might get help from Nizam Ali or they might request the great Mogul to intervene on their behalf. Bussy continued his march without encountering any serious obstacle along his path and finally reached Hyderabad on the 3rd June.

Skirmishes round about Hyderabad :— Chanavas Khan threw off completely the mask which hid all his intrigues. He enjoined the zemindars in the Circars and those in the province of Condavir, no longer to continue recognizing the French authority and not to pay any further taxes to them; he asked the Polygars of the South to come to Hyderabad to assist him with their men; he requested the assistance of the Maratha horsemen, left by Balaji Rao as bodyguard to the Suba. To make sure of the peshwa's faithfulness, Chanavas Khan offered Berhampur and the fortress of Ahmednagar to him. On the other hand Nizam Ali offered his friendship to the French while Holkar advised them to make a speedy agreement with the great Mogul. Leyrit who was being regularly kept in touch with Bussy's various moves, gave full powers to the latter to act as he thought best, according to circumstances.

Bussy remained almost three weeks encamped under the walls of Hyderabad, in almost perfect safety. He

could move in the city quite freely. The ascendancy he exerted on the natives was such that in spite of Chanavas Khan's ill disguised hostilities, bankers gave Bussy sufficient money to pay the arrears due to his troops, merely on his word. The situation however was so disquieting as to cause Bussy to write to Leyrit asking for a reinforcement of at least 200 men to be sent out to him immediately. Leyrit sent 150 men at once, while others followed a few days later.

No hostile act occurred till the 30th June. On that day, the Suba's vanguard consisting mostly of the Maratha cavalry approached Hyderabad intending to oppose the return of the French to their provinces. The decisive dice were about to be played.

Bussy began by a negotiation which failed through want of tact of Mayer, an officer of the hussars who had been deputed to carry it out. These followed a skirmish during which the French lost 3 men killed one of whom was the officer himself and 28 men disabled. This small advantage to the enemy brought about the desertion of a good many Sepoys, while the servants and cartmen abandoned their artillery pieces and food. Bussy could not start an important action afar without exposing himself to certain disaster. To the North West of the city and opening on to the tiny river Moussi there was a fairly large garden, surrounded by high walls, in which Bussy had made some military preparations. He hastily completed the defence and after meeting in council with his officers he took up his position in that garden on the 5th July. This garden still exists it was and is still known as Char Mahal. From that garden Bussy sent a well worded letter to the Suba requesting the latter to allow him to continue his journey to the coast. At the same time he

wrote to Moracin to send him 100 Europeans from Mazulipatam while he wrote to Leyrit to send him not 200 but 300 Europeans and a good number of Sepoys.

Up to the 28th August when the siege was lifted, there were daily skirmishes around the city which were neither disastrous nor did they bring about any definite result. On the 6th Bussy occupied a height overlooking the city as also the Char Mahal. Rice eatables and munitions were stored up there while the inhabitants were informed that their lives and their belongings ran no risk.

Some days later Bussy ordered a night attack in order to keep the enemy awake. A sally went forth consisting of 50 Europeans, 300 Sepoys and a gun. They took by surprise a post which was not well guarded and the Sepoys shared the booty among themselves. On another occasion, when attacked by the French under Du Passage, the Marathas had to fall back on Golconda which is four cosses away from Hyderabad. Once again Brandt sallied out with his German troops but rain interrupted the action. Meanwhile the enemy grew in numbers from day to day, while a report was given out that Muhammad Ali was coming in person to help Chanavas Khan. Muhammad Ali did not come but another man named Jaffer Ali, the dewan of Salabat Jang, did come with 3,000 men and 20 guns. Bussy, having heard that he intended to occupy a certain part of the city, forestalled him by taking possession of a building known as the Four Powers which was situated at the centre of that very place and which also overlooked it.

On the 11th Bussy sent Guyonnet to Mazulipatam to inform Moracin of the trying condition in which they were and to urge him to send speedily the help that had been asked for. On the 13th Bussy received a messenger from Muhammad Ali offering an agreement in view of

Chanavas Khan's dismissal The guarantees offered did not seem substantial enough for Bussy to accept this peace proposal Further skirmishes took place on the following days.

On the 20th Bussy's condition seemed turning critical. A corps of 300 Abyssinians and Arabs, which Bussy had raised at Surat to come to his help were attacked on the way Some of the men were taken prisoners while the rest were either killed or dispersed On the 27th Muzaffar Khan a most dangerous auxiliary came into the enemy camp This Muzaffar Khan had served under the French at Pondicherry at that time he was known as Abdher Rahman He had commanded a large native contingent and he had rendered very good services to Dupleix during the siege of Pondicherry Later he had set out in search of a more independent situation Under the name of Muzaffar Khan and at the example of Morari Rao he was trying to obtain for himself one of the principalities on the borders of the Deccan and the Maratha States His joining Salabat Jang's army was very useful to that prince.

To free himself from the encirclement which was about to encompass him Bussy had once again recourse to arms He ordered a huge sally but a large number of Sepoys deserted So instead of being able to counter attack he was forced to have his camp guarded by 30 Europeans. However on the 30th the enemy seemed willing for a general attack, Bussy placed his infantry on all the neighbouring heights and once his position made certain he ordered Du Passage and Reboux to attack the enemy The battle started at about 2 30 P M and lasted till night. It was a very hard struggle but not a decisive one The enemy's losses amounted to 400 killed or wounded and 125 horses killed. The French had 6 Sepoys killed and

about 40 wounded, among them were some Europeans. The sally had been so fierce that Bussy resolved to undertake such an action as rarely as possible, in future. He took this determination to spare his munition and to make desertions less easy. At that time Bussy's only hope, of being saved from destruction through slow but sure exhaustion, laid in extraneous help

The succouring army and its march through the Deccan.— Fortunately Leyrit and Moracin had not been deaf to the appeal for help which had been sent to them. On Bussy's very first appeal Leyrit had despatched to Muzulipatam on board the "*Saint Contest*" on the 5th July, 150 men from the European and East Indian troops under the command of Law. When Leyrit knew more of the gravity of the situation, he sent, on the 19th July 500 Europeans and 200 Sepoys under orders of Saubinet who was promoted to the grade of major for this occasion, but he had orders to hand over the supreme command to Law on joining him. Both reached Mazulipatam within a few day's interval Law started first while Saubinet did not delay in following him. Law reached Bezwada on the 20th July, with his detachment. Bezwada is a small fortified town 60 kilometers from Mazulipatam. It is situated at the foot of abrupt hills which slope down southwards to a narrow gorge of the Krishna river. The uniform plains which lie along the coast are left off at Bezwada and there is a gradual rise through other undulating plains to the Deccan. Law was detained there, several days, owing to the rains and it was during that time that the "*Favourite*" which brought the reinforcements under Saubinet arrived at Mazulipatam. All the French forces being united thereafter, the onward march was taken up on the 3rd August.

The march was without any incident till the 10th On that day Law met the enemy at Mognapara about 20 *cosses* away from Hyderabad Salabat Jang who had, at last returned to Galconda had in fact decided not to care about retaking back Char Mahal just then as it would fall of its own self as a ripe fruit if the reinforcing army were first destroyed He had consequently sent against this advancing army all the forces he could spare The French vanguard was composed of 400 Sepoys under Muhammad Khan, then followed a corps of French soldiers and the rest of the Sepoys. No sooner had the enemy been sighted than almost the whole of the Sepoy deserted. Muhammad Khan was in agreement with Muzaffar Khan in accomplishing this treachery The French were immediately attacked but being under the able command of Saubinet they easily repulsed the attack and crossed a defile where they were again exposed to a few shots. By the end of the day they had reached open ground where they spent the night The attack started again the next day but the French did not meet with serious resistance. If Muzaffar Khan had come to an understanding with the commander of the French Sepoys Bussy had won over two Maratha chiefs Januji Nimbalkar and Ramchander Jagow who had promised Bussy to take only an apparent part in the struggle and kept their word. The French were quit with the loss of a part of their baggage which fell into the hands of a third Maratha chief who had been left out of the secret (1) Melkapur was reached and Law thought advisable to stop there in order to get information about the country which was said to be made of gorges and defiles in the midst of which the whole army would be endangered

(1) The loss of this baggage was valued at 15 695 Rupees.

On the 28th August Bussy sent the following very brief report of the above events, to Leyrit: "This day (the 11th) has been none the less glorious to our troops than the previous day. The march was throughout a long and tiresome battle. The rearguard was frequently attacked with more than usual fury, but Mr. de Saubinet and his two platoons bore the efforts of the enemy during the whole march. Our troops, accustomed to manœuvre under his command, did marvels. He had two of his men killed and three wounded. The behaviour, of the officers on these two occasions, deserves praise and the third march they covered themselves with fame. Mr Law stooped at Milkapur just to give the rest which everybody needed and to mend two pieces of artillery; there was very great scarcity of victuals while the Sepoys deserted in batches".

At last on the night of 14th to 15th Law started again his march. Did he start on an order from Bussy to come at once as Malleson says, or was it after hurried but sufficient reconnoitring of the country? This is hard to say, but what followed is more important. Malleson's description is so precise and not over lengthy, that we think it useless to substitute our words to his. Malleson says -

"From Malkapur to the rivulet Cingoram the French had to cross a defile four miles long. Its passage had been rendered all the more difficult by the fact that the enemy had taken advantage of the four days during which the French had rested at Melkapur to put obstacles on the way. The defile led to a dense jungle, between which and the river the ground was fairly open. The land between the river and Hiatnagar was also fairly open.

"During this long night the French made vigorous attempts to traverse all four miles but d'Haramboure who

commanded the rearguard had to bear the onslaught for he was ceaselessly harassed by Kandogla the Maratha chief whom Bussy had not succeeded in winning over. During that time the vanguard was overcoming slowly though with much difficulty the obstacles lying along its path at one place. Those were felled trees, at another the enemy lay in ambush at a third there were sharp windings through which the cannon had to be manœuvred under ceaseless fire so on. The difficulties were so great that the French were able to cover only 3 miles by dawn.

There still remained one mile. With daylight the enemy's attack redoubled in intensity. D'Haramboure had his two field pieces firing constantly. But the enemy's cavaliers advanced with uncommon audacity up to the very mouth of the French cannons. At last the sun rose lighting the entry of the French into the plain. Then they formed in battle array and allowed the Maratha corps to come out of the defile and when they thought that a sufficient number had emerged they directed the fire from all their cannons towards the entrance of the defile. The result of this discharge was the dispersal of most of the cavaliers. However some managed to pass out and went ahead of the French to the bank of the river to prevent their crossing it. The small river flows into a deep ravine. The opposite bank was occupied by the enemy. It was all important therefore that Law should not be deprived of the closer bank till his men had taken possession of the distant one. It was agreed that, while Law and his infantry would cross the river, d'Haramboure would cover his passage with all his cannons and thus keep the enemy at bay. D'Haramboure did this with much bravery and ability. Once Law had crossed the river, then d'Haramboure sent his cannons one by one

to the other bank without interrupting the firing. The Marathas did not dare, nor could they oppose such a manœuvre.

Once the river had been forded the path became easy. The sight of Hyderabad restored energy to the weary soldiers. Though encompassed and ceaselessly harassed, the soldiers went on and on, helped by the partial restraint of Jonogi and Ramchander. They entered Hiatnagar only at 5 P. M. after marching ceaselessly during 22 hours. The losses were fairly numerous 25 Europeans had been killed, among whom 2 officers and 65 men were wounded. The Sepoys being in greater number suffered proportionately. It was estimated that the enemy must have lost 2,000 men.

“Four hours later, having heard of the arrival of the detachment at Hiatnagar, Bussy immediately despatched a corps of 140 Europeans and 1000 Sepoys with provisions and chariots to bring in the sick and the wounded. To prevent any attack while the convoy was on its way, Bussy assailed the Suba's camp with all his remaining forces. All things turned out according to Bussy's desires. The next morning at 10 A. M. Law entered Hyderabad without having met a single enemy since leaving Hiatnagar”.

In a letter to Leyrit, Bussy relates these events still more concisely. We cannot refrain from quoting that letter:

“Law started out during the night between the 14th and the 15th. Both officers and men were wonderfully valorous that day. A special protection from God saved them when marching through the gorges filled with the enemy and also while crossing the flooded river. Mr. d'Haramboure who commanded the rearguard repulsed the enemy several times, he also favoured the crossing

of the river, by keeping the enemy continually at bay. Heavy rain increased the difficulties of the way in some places which were impracticable owing to rocks and brushwood while innumerable enemies followed one another. No one but the French could have put up with all these hardships and not perish. The river was crossed in full sight of the enemy and in spite of them Saubinet formed a square battellion with his troops and they marched on thus to Hiatnagar which is at four cosses from Hyderabad which Law reached at 4 P M after 17 hours of ceaseless marching and fighting. Mr d'Haramboure kept the rearguard on which the enemy's attack had been most furious. No words can express adequately the prudence and intrepidity of Mr Law and of the brave officers he commanded (1)

The re-establishment of peace—Judgement on Bussy 1756
When the French detachment, which had been saved from disaster entered the town a camel rider was sent by the Suba asking for peace. Bussy replied that he would not make any objection to peace but whether it were peace or no peace he had nothing to fear as his troops had come into the city. Negotiations were at once started but there were immediately thwarted by the cabal which existed against the French, who intercepted all the letters. The final success was slightly delayed

(1) The history which is being written is not meant to be an apology of Bussy but a narrative as impartial as possible of his doings. We think that this very impartiality obliges us to reproduce in the appendix, another version of the same facts by Saubinet, in a letter to Chevreau dated 18th September. To clear our conscience we add that we do not agree with Saubinet in his appreciations, particularly with regard to Bussy's character and the part he played in politics. Saubinet describes these in such grossly exaggerated terms which alone suffice to refute all his sayings.

Three years later this same letter caused the French minister to leave Lally in India in preference to Bussy. As that letter had some political importance at that time we reproduce it as an annex to Chap. IV

thereby. To prevent any treachery to which Asiatics are prone to, Bussy insisted on the various chieftains of troops and the lords of the army that they should first come forward to visit him and hold themselves as surety of the interview which was to take place between the Suba and Chanavas Khan and himself. The dewan of the Emperor came personally to Bussy and acted as mediator to this guarantee; by these means all shuffling was at an end. Though Bussy had been given a guarantee by all the leaders of the army and that the Suba himself had passed orders and taken precautions to prevent any sort of uproar, yet Bussy went to the interview with the Suba fully armed and in such attire as to be dreaded. This interview passed off very quietly, however; it was short and affectionate and the past was spoken of only to say that it should be completely wiped off the mind. They set about making new paravans and destroying, through new official letters, the impression which might have been produced by all that had been written against the French. Bussy reserved in his mind for future decision whether Chanavas Khan was to be maintained or dismissed. Thus Bussy came out entirely victorious from one of the strangest adventures, known in history. Bussy insisted only on the dismissal of Muzaffar Khan and of the deserter Muhammad Khan. On the 20th August Bussy was re-established to all his honours, titles and dignities.

We borrow the narrative of the conclusion of this most wonderful epic from Malleson, because it comes from a foreigner's pen. Malleson says: "Never was any statesman exposed to so much difficulty and to such great hardships within so short a while. We do not think we err when we state that one single false step would have been sufficient to bring about Bussy's downfall. But

however carefully we might scrutinize his actions during this most critical period we are unable to detect the faintest trace of even one slight error. In spite of many attempts to lead him to evil ways, he never once deviated from what is just and upright, from the very beginning up to the end. His refusal of Maratha help and alliance his march to Hyderabad his determination to stay there instead of going to the ceded provinces his request to the governors of Pondicherry and Mazulpatam to have reinforcements sent to him, not to cover his retreat but to join him at Hyderabad, his formal order to Law to march onwards, his choice of the Char Mahal his flat refusal to negotiate unless things were restored to the state in which they had been previously all this proves that Bussy was an eminent general and statesman. We have no more reason to be astonished at the great influence he yielded and at the still greater reputation he enjoyed and we would not be surprised to note that Bussy's name had been mentioned, as that of an inviolable obstacle by the leading parties in England who opposed any aggrandizement in Bengal. According to them Bussy was to paralyse all their movements and when they expected it the least he was to drown them all in the sea. We cannot overestimate the tact the judgement, the presence of mind the sagacity or the bravery which this man displayed not at the height of prosperity but under the most trying and the most critical circumstances not when he had all the leisure to think out but when the pressure of events was at its climax, and that either glory or shame depended on the decision of an instant.

The expenses of the army — Thanks to the valour of the reinforcing troops Bussy had triumphed over the difficulties which seemed unsurmountable but this

triumph was made possible only because the English and Muhammad Ali were powerless to respond to the appeal made by Chanavas Khan. Just when all arrangements had been made to intervene, news was brought to Madras that the Nawab of Moorshidabad, Suraja Dowla, had attacked and taken Calcutta in less than 5 days (15 to 21 June) and that those of the English who had not been taken prisoners, had fled to the mouths of the Hooghly. The disaster seemed irreparable, but the English have a peculiar resistance in desperate situations, their cold saves them from discouragement. They held back the troops intended for the Deccan and despatched them on the 16th October to Bengal which they reached on the 20th December. Clive and Watson were in command of these troops.

This unexpected war saved the French troops in the Deccan and gave Bussy a chance of winning back in a moment all the advantages which were at stake and of consolidating his situation so as to give him the right to speak as the master who is being obeyed though not voluntarily accepted.

We have an official report of Bussy's troops rendered by Saubinet on the 1st October. It registers 83 officers, 653 Europeans, 65 Caffers and Abyssinians, 652 men attached to the artillery, 145 belonging to Brandt's brigade and 47 hussards — these are Saubinet's figures — total 1345 men plus 4000 Sepoys, 400 Abyssinians and 500 native horsemen. The grand total was 6045 men greatly varying in valour. The monthly salary, of the Europeans or assimilated to them, was 12611 pagodas; the pay if the second class amounted to 2041 pagodas and that of the Sepoys and Abyssinians 17142. To these figures must be added certain extraordinary expenses such as the food for horses and cattle used by the artillery which

amounted monthly to 5458 pagodas. Saubinet calculated the total expenses for that month of September to be 32504 pagodas and he said that this did not include, ' Bussy's house nor that of Haidar Jang, nor a great many out of the way expenses made by Mr Bussy of which the amount is unknown ' (1) (A. C. C. 90, fol 252)

Leyrit's opinion on the policy to be carried out — Once the Suba had submitted to him Bussy stayed almost three months at Hyderabad in order to establish his victory as also to await instructions from Leyrit, regarding his return. Though the prospect of an immediate war had been averted by the news of the fall of Calcutta which weakened their eventual enemies, yet Leyrit and Bussy had some anxieties working in their minds.

The revolution which had taken place in the Deccan during the preceding month of June had *disgusted* Leyrit — according to his own word — of the alliance with the Muhammedans. Any war whether it was for upholding and defending the Muhammedan interests began to appear nonsensical in Leyrit's eyes, just as it had already appeared in those of Godeheu. Leyrit also mentions that he had some reasons to be vexed with European military men and that this was one further

(1) Let us say as more information that according to the accounts kept by Saubinet, there were:

8 captains (d Haramboure, de Monchy de Changey le Maintier Riboux, Langlois, Mainville and Book) paid from 228 to 342 pagodas.

1 second commissioner drawing 175 pagodas.

8 lieutenants drawing from 137 to 160 pagodas.

40 people of various unnamed ranks from 68 to 114 pagodas.

Reverand de Montmellan drawing 219 pagodas.

Brandt's brigade with 4 captains, 2 lieutenants, 2 sublieutenants and 7 of the other ranks costing 9 160 pagodas.

The grenadiers on horse back cost 302 pagodas.

Bussy's bodyguards 124 pagodas.

reason for no longer wishing to keep up such an alliance. When Leyrit heard of the Hyderabad release he could not but rejoice at this happy result. He did not lose one single moment to convey to Bussy his satisfaction at seeing how wisely, bravely and prudently he had come out of a most difficult circumstance. But these very events brought a complete change of aspect to the interests which the French and Muhammedans had together for a long time; their ingratitude their treachery and their perfidy had been made to stand out in broad day light. This was a new standpoint which gave the French in India an opportunity to respond to the ideas which prevailed in France, at that time. "We must not lose opportunity" writes Leyrit to Bussy on the 19th September: "You realized long ago as I also have done, that it is of the utmost importance to us to be self reliant. Your letters of late are full of the necessity in which we stand of returning to our provinces. The moment has come and I hasten to repeat to you what I have already said in my letter of the 19th July. I have fully made up my mind and so I repeat what we should do. Come back, sir, with all your men, into our provinces. Your presence is needed there for the safeguard of the property and the

In a letter to Leyrit, written by Bussy on 21st October, the latter valued the expenses of his army at 2,863,870 Rs. making a round sum of 4,650,000 Francs,

To which must be added various sums necessary for this campaign making a total of 205,000 Rs or a round sum of 500,000 Francs,

Total 2,068,870 Rs or 5,150,000 Francs

His normal revenues were 1,400,000 Rs or 3,350,000 Francs.

He therefore had to find the difference of 668,870 Rs or 1,605,000 Francs, which he had to borrow and which were still due to several creditors. This state of affairs was all the more critical as the revenues from the Circars and the coastal provinces were due only from the 1st January next. Some had not drawn the full amount of the pay due to them (A. C. C. 2. 92. P. 233 - 236)

collection of the revenues belonging to the Compaay' He added that if their reconciliation with Salabat Jang absolutely necessitated some tokens of their friendship in such case Bussy might leave a small detachment of about one hundred Europeans to be with the Suba. If the French did this it was merely to prevent Salabat Jang from making friends with the English who would surely try every means of doing harm to the French in India in the event of a war breaking out in Europe Would the French succeed in preventing this? Leyrit was not quite sure about it In his letter of the 19th September Leyrit said 'Our success must prepare us for still further trouble from the English while their misfortune might reduce their arrogance Our arms have been victorious, they have been humbled on every side

In a letter which Leyrit wrote to the Controller General Moras on the 19th October he speaks in a more clearly and less reservedly manner than in his letter to Bussy "Since the rupture of our entente with Salabat Jang I do not think that it is any longer necessary for Mr Bussy to reside beside the Suba. I am told that Bussy still continues to be dreaded there, but that he is no longer loved and that the people long for his departure. I am anxiously awaiting for the reply to the letters I wrote to him ordering to return to our provinces. This arrangement is in accordance with the wishes of the Nawab who desires that we should remain there as jaguirdars that is to say we shall be obliged to send him troops and go to his help if he calls Mr Bussy has sufficiently drained us for the upkeep of the Nawab's army of arms munitions, money and men without much profit to us

BUSSY'S RETURN TO THE CIRCARS AND THE WAR WITH THE ENGLISH.

The situation on the coast of Orissa:— Acting on these definite instructions Bussy left Hyderabad on the 16th November with 500 Europeans and 4000 Sepoys, leaving to the Suba 200 Europeans and 500 Sepoys under command of Du Passage and proceeded towards the Circars. Bussy did not find the peaceful atmosphere which had reigned in the Circars twenty two months earlier. During his absence the Southern provinces had continued being administered by Moracin, while the Circars had been placed under the care of one of the Company's agents. The latter, named Mr. de la Selle, was a very pedantic man who had no acute mental discernment. He wanted to impose his own authority in the name of his own superiority and thereby brought on the greatest of difficulties, on himself. The real masters of the country were the rajas and the great lords who were willing to obey the French, provided their self-love was treated with some regard and that the orders given by the French were inspired by a deep sense of justice.

Difficulties had started in the early months of 1755. There were a certain number of people who believed that the governing of the new French provinces would and should be the means of providing rapidly a large personal fortune to those in whose hands the powers were vested. The manner in which Bussy had made known his way of thinking regarding that subject did not fail to create enemies. To the latter should be added the envious who had no personal motive, but who were offended on seeing another man's superiority only because their own mediocrity stood forth more visibly. De la Selle belonged to

both the above mentioned categories. Believing in the greatness of his own abilities, he asked Bussy several times, to leave the administration of the Circars to his own discretion. Bussy complained of this to Leyrit. While he requested that this subordinate be told that, if he did not give up his ways of being exacting he would be recalled to Pondicherry. Bussy warned de la Selle of this in very plain words (July 1755). In spite of all these admonitions de la Selle persisted in his possession of a carper so that what was expected happened he was recalled to Pondicherry in November and his place was taken by Duplant de Laval. The latter administered the Circars for one whole year without attracting the attention of his contemporaries, nor that of history in any way. He was entirely devoted to Bussy as his letters show and he did his work according to the methods of his superior which he merely had to apply. His chief occupation was to see to the incoming of the taxes which Viziam Raja was collecting under his control.

The Rajamundry insurrection — Yet Duplant de Laval was called upon in September 1756 to suppress the beginnings of an insurrection at Rajamundry. Although the letters Chanavas Khan had written stating that the French authority no longer needed to be recognized had not produced the result he had expected yet they had disturbed certain minds and introduced a relaxation in discipline. Once some five or six Sepoy-officers acting in their own names and in those of their comrades, planned to take the fort at Rajamundry where they thought such treasure was accumulated. Duplant's attitude in this circumstances though extremely prudent cannot be set up as a model, except under certain reserve. By a claim of the leaders to Duplant regarding their pay Duplant did not have all the money necessary so he

borrowed and gave them their dues. But the question of pay was only a pretext. The moment after being paid, they demanded with threats that the keys of the fort, those of the gunpowder magazine and of the armoury be handed over to them. Duplant, who had, at that moment, only twelve soldiers on whom he could rely thought it prudent to subscribe to their demand. When Moracin who was at Mazulipatam heard of the happening at Rajamundry, he immediately got ready to send a detachment of one hundred men supported by a corps of Sepoys. But he was asked by Duplant not to send any troops to Rajamundry unless Moracin wished to see himself (Duplant) and all his men massacred. This mutiny of the Sepoy officers had been reinforced by the help from Ibrahim Khan. The latter was the very same officer or Muhammedan lord to whom Bussy had given over the government of the Chicacole province. Following Ibrahim Khan's example, the *quelidar* of Rajamundry demanded the return of the payments which had been made, to the French, for the past two years. The situation was very critical and might have become desperate if Viziam Raja, the other chief whom Bussy had set up two years previously had not remained faithful to the French. Viziam Raja placed all his troops at Moracin's disposal. His intervention gave the leaders matter for thought. They did not dare carry on the revolt to its utmost stage. Bussy with his European troops and his Sepoys having come up in the meantime, all things returned to order without there being any necessity for repressive measures which, if applied even with moderation, would surely have left the leaven of hatred in the minds of the people. In spite of this Duplant lost his position. His place, in the general administration of the Circars, was taken by the Officer who had led the succouring army to

Hyderabad a few months earlier Law succeeded Duplant under Bussy's high command

When Bussy reached the provinces at the beginning of December he heard that the war between France and England which had been threatening for a long while, had at last broken out. The war had been declared on the 9th June but the news reached India only in November. No opportunity to destroy all the English settlements in India, seemed more favourable than that one. Calcutta had just fallen into the hands of the Nawab of Moorsidhabad, all the military of the Madras Presidency had been sent to Bengal while those of Bombay were too far away to play any useful part in the present events. Serious resistance could be offered from nowhere. Leyrit was lacking in audacity or in opportuneness. He did not want to be the first aggressor so he passed orders both to Renault at Chandernagor and to Bussy on the coast of Orissa not to do anything against the English. Bussy was very disappointed by this order. He had already made up his mind that by December all the English settlements in his proximity must inevitably fall and that thereafter he would be in a position to go to Bengal and help in utterly destroying the power of the English. Leyrit's order paralysed all his plans. He had to spend his time in administrative work with a view to hasten and increase if possible the incomes of the revenues which had become more than ever necessary to carry on the hostilities.

The Bobili affair - The Bobili affair occurred about this time or a few weeks later.

Ibrahim Ali Khan, who had a secret understanding with Salabat Jang to betray Bussy was returning along with the latter from Savanour. Bussy had an inkling of

Ibrahim's intention, while the latter, who was none the less on the alert, was awaiting for an opportunity, which might save him from disgrace or serve to turn the disgrace aside were his plans to fail. He had been baffled at Rajamundry, so he thought he could satisfy his desire for vengeance, by joining Ranza Rao, the Telegu Zemindar of Bobili, which is situated some fifty miles to the North West of Chicacole. Bussy thwarted Viziam's machinations by marching straight against that Zemindar, with 2000 soldiers, 10000 Sepoys, with cannon and other ammunitions of war. Haidar Jang rejoined Bussy, from Ellora and Rajamundry with 2000 cavaliers and 40.000 infantry. Viziam Raja too wanted to take part in this expedition. Through sympathy for Ibrahim Khan, Viziam advised him to leave Ranza Rao to fight out his private quarrels with the French. The latter too realizing the danger to which his friend would be exposed advised him just as Viziam Raja had done. Thereupon Ibrahim Khan withdrew to a short distance from Bobili. Viziam Raja found fault with Ranga Rao for having failed latterly to give him tokens of respect. A few days later Viziam Raja rejoined Bussy with 2000 cavaliers 40,000 infantry, 8000 artillery men, 40 elephants, cannon and ammunitions. Such are at the least these figures given by Ananda Ranga Pillay from information received at Pondicherry from the coast of Orissa, on the 26th March.

Once these forces united they went forwards from Chicacole and encamped in the vicinity of Bobili. Immediately negotiations, with Ranga Rao, were started; but as no basis of understanding could be reached, Bussy was the first to decide that the fort at Bobili should be attacked. He was vigorously opposed by a body of select men so that he was obliged to sketch a moment of retreat. On seeing this Viziam Raja mounted his elephant, ordered

his troops to advance drove back Ranga Rao's men came quite close to the fort, had some bundles of straw thrown into the moat crossed it scrambled up the walls on one another and entered the town of which he soon was master. This campaign had cost Bussy 18 officers, 3200 soldiers and Sepoys while the Raja lost 8 to 9000 men. Once the fort had fallen into their hands Bussy informed Viziam Raja that if any men were left alive they would turn out to be enemies against whom Bussy and Viziam would have to deal the following day. So Viziam issued orders to massacre the women and the children of whom about ten thousand were killed besides many inhabitants and soldiers among whom was Ranga Rao himself. Probably some personal hatred must have roused this desperate act. The French flag was immediately hoisted over the town, sugar was distributed to the army and festivities were ordered.

But hardly had Viziam Raja and Bussy gone back to their respective tents than a survivor of Ranga Rao's army came to Viziam Raja's tent under pretext of bringing some news of Ranga Rao's younger brother who had been wounded in action. After searching him for arms he was allowed to enter the tent but the guards had failed to discover a folding knife hidden in his clothes. Once he was in the presence of Viziam Raja, the man said he had a secret message to deliver and having been granted permission to approach Viziam Raja he stabbed the raja in the lower abdomen and killed him on the spot. Needless to say that he too was killed then and there. Viziam Raja was 49 years of age. An astrologer had foretold a short time before, that his days were numbered. He had a brother named Jagapati Rao to whom

Bussy immediately gave the fort of Bobili and its revenues amounting to about two lakhs of rupees (1).

This war, of a private character, so to say, had nothing to do with the relations between the French and the English. It was not even a threat to their settlements on the coast which were not of great importance. After the Bobili affair, Bussy felt that his authority was really well established both in the Circars and in the provinces of Mazulipatam and Condavir. Being convinced that he had nothing to fear from the English at Madras, Bussy thought to make good his successes and the prestige he had won for the French nation in the remotest parts of India. He wanted to proceed along the coast up to Bengal where he would complete the downfall of the English. Just when these plans were being matured, in his mind, news was brought to him of the fall of Chander-nagor on the 23rd March. This fact was sufficient to prove to him that his plans were unattainable thereafter so he had to be satisfied working in a more humble sphere; that is to say, to try to expel the English from their small factories at the mouth of the Krishna and the Godavery. Leyrit at last realized that the French need no longer be circumspect in dealing with the English, so he authorized Bussy to act.

The capture of Vizagapatam — Nellipelly, Bander-moulanka and Ingeram fell into the hands of the French without any resistance. The taking of Vizagapatam, a much more important town in the North of the Orissa coast, seemed indispensable. It also offered greater resistance. When Bussy received orders to seize that city, he was, at about 200 leagues from it, engaged in collecting the rents from the zemindars who according to the Asiatic custom paid their tributes only when forced to do it.

1 Of. Ananda Ranga Pillai's Diary Tome X P. 333—336

The march to Vizagapatam the capitulation and the fall of that city has been lengthily described (P 103 to 116) in *Mémoires sur l'Indoustan* by colonel Gentil who was serving as sub-lieutenant at that time This narrative itself is the exact copy of the written statement of the operation drawn up by those who took part in it (A C C 2. 93 P 129) So we do not think it useful to go into details about the event the more so as it makes very flat reading

The greatest trial of the campaign laid in the temperature which is markedly oppressive during the months of May and June on the coast and in the march over rocky and mountainous lands. After much fatigue Bussy arrived close to the town on the 25th June. He began by occupying without any resistance all the places by which the English might escape then he summoned the governor, William Parceval to surrender the city to him unless he was prepared to undergo all the disasters of a storming and an assault. D'Harambure who was in charge of the access of the town had a battery fitted upon a hill overlooking all the surrounding places and then the governor's reply was awaited. Parceval was intimated and he also realized that resistance would be difficult, so he replied that he agreed to surrender in order to avoid bloodshed provided the whole garrison was allowed to go out with their arms and baggage to wherever they pleased and that the inhabitants would not be molested. Bussy required an exact answer by 8 A M the following morning. He made the English understand that once this delay passed the decisive action would take place. The English governor complained that the time given to them was too short and asked to be allowed till 11 A. M. Bussy agreed to this on condition that the English did not use these extra hours to cheat him. This

letter brought about the desired result. The governor surrendered himself to Bussy's generosity. At the hour fixed, the terms of the capitulation were drawn up in the usual form of such acts and signed by both parties.

Bussy was received at the gates of the city by the governor and his council who handed over their swords to him. According to the chivalrous custom, of those days which was rarely laid aside, the swords were immediately returned to them while the whole garrison was disarmed and all the posts were occupied by the French.

Bussy had hardly entered the town when he received a letter from Mrs Clive, the wife of the hero of Plassey and other places. She happened to be at sea on board the "*Marlbrough*" which was on its way to Bengal. She asked for the release of five sailors who were on shore at the time of the surrender and in return she promised to have five French prisoners of Chandernagor released, Bussy granted her request most readily.

Once all the military formalities were over, an attested inventory was drawn up, of the actual contents of the factories belonging to the English company. The list was not long. On being informed that the French would soon attack them, the governor and his councillors had placed on board their ships which happened to pass by, the money, the merchandise, the books of the English as also the belonging of the staff and other private individuals.

Once all military precautions had been taken, Bussy gave full vent to his generosity. He returned to the governor the amount due on thirteen statements of losses which the English officers were said to have sustained without even attempting to ascertain, whether there

to hand over this wealth to him. On receiving a refusal Chanavas Khan declared war on the governor. Dowlatabad capitulated at the end of a month. Chanavas Khan had the command given to himself and he placed it in the hands of a man devoted to him. He intended asking Salabat Jang to come to the fort under pretext of visiting it and of retaining him therein, in the meantime Nizam Ali would be proclaimed as the Suba and the French expelled shortly after. To still further assure the success of this endeavour the Mahrattas would be asked to intervene they were to appear as enemies to dissimulate their role more successfully. The appearance of the Marathas would justify the raising of an army which would be profitable to Nizam Ali. The forces of the latter would join those of the Marathas and Salabat Jang would easily be preceptitated from power and a new reign would start. As for the French, they would be asked to rejoin Bussy on the coast.

The Maratha intervention did take place according to the plans sketched out beforehand. Wivas Rao the peshwa's son, entered the Deccan, but another regulator of human affairs known as hazard entered simultaneously to frustrate the complete success of the machinations. In August a mutiny had burst out at Aurengabad owing to some arrears in the pay of the Sepoys. This delay was customary so much so that Chanavas Khan did not pay much attention to the claims which were being made to him. The troops were insistent and they also demanded the dismissal of the minister and the appointment of Bassalat Jang as the custodian of the seals. The Suba whose power was not directly threatened, though hostile to this double exaction, thought the soldiers should be given satisfaction. So Chanavas Khan was dismissed, while Bassalet Jang took over the real manage-

ment of the affairs. The troops were not yet satisfied, while the life of Chanavas Khan was in actual danger. The latter felt that he could no longer command fortune to subserve him, so he thought it more prudent to retire to Dowlatabad whose fortress was deemed impregnable.

Some of those who longed for the downfall of the Suba, but who wished to remain apparently loyal, had hoped that the Suba would go to Dowlatabad to offer his sympathy to his ex-minister. If this were to happen arrangements COULD be made to insure that the visit lasted as long as the Suba's life, but apparently the French officers, whose duty it was to defend the person of the Suba, represented to him that he might fall into a trap and be the victim of his reliance. Salabat Jang merely demanded that Chanavas Khan should make an act of submission, but he, of course, refused to do this.

This meant war. Bassalat Jang called to his help his brother Nizam Ali who was at Berar, while Chanavas Khan applied for Maratha assistance. According to their customs, the Marathas began by pillaging the country. Their depredations were such that it seemed necessary to bring together all the forces of the Deccan to stay their incursions. Chanavas Khan himself came over to the national side, while Nizam Ali took upon himself the supreme command of the operations. Salabat Jang deeply resented this renewed assault on his sovereign rights; yet after some angry explanations from one party and some assurances of loyalty from the other, the accomplished fact was accepted by Salabat Jang.

While these events were taking place information was brought that Ramchander Jagow who was marching with the remains of his army to render assistance to Salabat Jang, had been besieged by the Marathas in the small town of Sindkeir. Nizam Ali started at once to help

Ramchander Jagow and he would have inflicted an out and out defeat on the Marathas, had not the conqueror and the so called vanquished turned up together at Aurangabad, a few days later showing signs of their sincere friendship. Probably these two men, reverting to the policy they had already stitched at Savanur, two years previously, yearned in common for Salabat Jang's downfall which was too slow in coming. Nizam Ali behaving already as if he were the sovereign had, by a secret understanding, given to Balaji Rao a part of the territory which yielded a revenue of 25 lakhs of rupees.

The downfall and perhaps too the death of Salabat Jang was only a matter of days, when Bussy hastily returned after having marched across 400 miles in 21 days and reaching Aurengabad in February

BUSSY'S RETURN - THE DOWNFALL OF GHANAVAS KHAN - THE DOUBLE MURDER OF HAIDAR JANG AND GHANAVAS KHAN

Bussy's unexpected return caused a flutter in all minds. Except Nizam Ali, everybody lost his balance, while Ghanavas Khan was not the slowest in presenting his respects to Bussy. It appeared to be the courtyard of miracles. Each one played a role which illfitted him and yet the whole harmonised well. All things seemed to fair well, for a few days. Bussy began by calling on Salabat Jang as on a superior, next he met Balaji Rao in a tent especially prepared for this interview and probably he recalled memories of days gone by to which the present state of affairs lent some real relish. He also called on

Nizam Ali but there was less trust on this occasion. Bussy did not call all that interview without having taken every precaution, a strong escort accompanied him. Finally Bussy met Chanavas Khan with whom the relations were merely formal. A thorough reconciliation with Chanavas Khan, whose interest were, now, to serve the French unreservedly, might have been a happy solution, but Bussy had been the victim of that man's artful designs twice previously. So without putting Chanavas Khan altogether out of the Suba's council, Bussy preferred to give the first seat to one who had served him for the past three years with such loyalty as is rarely met with, in India. This man was Haidar Jang whose activity had been displayed on several minor occasions.

Haidar Jang, whose career was about to be so resplendent, though short, was the son of Calender Khan the *fusedar* of Mazulipatam, at the time when that city was ceded to the French. When Calendar Khan was ordered, a few months later, by Nasir Jang, either to drive out the French or to make them prisoners, he carried out those orders with great tact and precaution. Once Mazulipatam had returned into French hands, Dupleix thought that the administration of the whole country should be placed in the hands of Calendar Khan as a pledge of gratitude, when the latter died in full vigour of life. The natural genius of his young son Haidar Jang gave bright promises. Bussy, who had just been appointed to the government the Circars, kept this youth beside himself and gradually made him his confident and his link with the Indian princes. Having inherited his father's qualities, Haidar Jang daily, so to say, increased them and continued carrying out negotiations, treaties and intrigues in which he became a refined master. His unexpected elevation to a higher post, while increasing

his influence also brought him many enemies in its way. The unraveling of plots is one thing while the governing of a country is quite a different thing so much so, that his access to power did not turn out to be the token of a long life nor of any security to him.

It was not possible for Haidar Jang to continue being on good terms with Chanavas Khan for any length of time. So, at the end of a few weeks Chanavas Khan made up his mind to retire to Dowlatabad and to fortify himself there. Events followed so briskly and so rapidly that it is not possible to state exactly whether Chanavas Khan took this resolution in agreement with Nizam Ali and Basalat Jang or not. Whatever be of this, Dowlatabad had been in close proximity to Aurengabad Bussy hastened with an armed force to subdue the rebel and seize the fortress by the arms if necessary. Though Dowlatabad is level built on a plain overlooked by some hillocks leading to the famous grottoes of Ellore the fortress itself rises abruptly as a sugar loaf at one of the entrances of the city and is one of the most inaccessible citadels of the whole of India. It could be overcome only by treachery or by a lengthy siege. Bussy preferred to bribe the *quellidar*. He proposed to visit the place in order to admire the lovely panorama to be enjoyed from the summit of the fort. His proposal being accepted, he was invited to breakfast. Bussy went with an escort of 300 Europeans who stationed at the foot of the fortress. To do them honour the *quellidar* ordered the garrison which held the upper parts of the fortress to go down and kept only about 40 men to receive his guest. The breakfast was served in a large hall Bussy leaving his men outside entered only with his officers, while the *quellidar* had neither men nor officers with him but only servants. Bussy being requested to sit declared to his host that he

could not accept his invitation because he was obliged to take him prisoner and seize the fortress. The *quehदार* appeared greatly surprised but offered no resistance. He handed over his dagger. Simultaneously, the soldiers whom Bussy had left outside disarmed easily the small guard of honour belonging to the Indian governor.

At a given signal, the French escort which had stationed at the foot of the fortress took to their arms to make sure of the Indian garrison and met with very little resistance; notwithstanding this two or three men were killed. Chanavas Khan was taken prisoner while most of Nizam Ali's troops, bribed by some presents, sided with Haidar Jang.

The peshwa, who ardently wished to possess Dowlatabad, made vain attempts to obtain it from Bussy, the latter refused the request in the most polite, yet in such unequivocal terms that, Nizam Ali, on hearing of these transactions, promised to cede to the peshwa that place and others as well, if he would help him to seize the vice-royalty of the Deccan. It was now Balaji Rao's turn to refuse taking such an engagement.

We are not aware whether Bussy and Haidar Jang had heard of these proposals at the time they were being made; but whether they were known or unknown, the presence of Balaji Rao at Aurengabad, Nizam Ali's restless activity, Bassalat Jang's apparent or real indifference to the settlement of the affairs and the degree of prostration to which the Suba had fallen, created a most crucial situation which gave room to the most contradictory inferences. We are nearing the supreme drama.

It was not possible for Nizam Ali and Haidar Jang to come to an agreement, their interests were too definitely contradictory. If the former aspired for the throne, the latter's duty was to maintain Salabat Jang and the

great men of outstanding eminence in the enterprises of the French in India. So we trust the reader would bear with us a little longer while we complete the chapters we have translated by a short epilogue in which Mr Martineau has briefly summed up Bussy's last years in the same manner as he recorded the origin and early years of the hero in the introduction

EPILOGUE

On starting from Hyderabad with his soldiers Bussy had gone to Bezwada where he met Moracin with all the French troops from Mazulipatam and the Circars who were also on their way to Pondicherry in accordance to orders received from Lally. Proceeding by way of Ongole and Nellore they met Lally at Wandiwash on the 26th September. Lally greeted Bussy with propriety but with the hastiness and tactlessness to which he was wont, he did not know to conceal his vexation at seeing Bussy come without bringing with him the large sum of money he had asked for the needs of the army. Misunderstandings the consequence of which have proved so disastrous to France, started from that instant.

Summing up the period from his return to Pondicherry Bussy wrote in his memoranda of 1766. Mr de Lally calls me I leave all to obey his orders, I arrive, within a few days we are disabused of each other. I speak to him of war and of ways of prosecuting it advantageously, he speaks to me of money and asks me for ways of acquiring it; I thought he had great plans, he thought I had great riches; we were both mistaken. Shortly after I am considered as a useless man, they do not know the

reason why I came. From indifference we pass on to unfriendliness; it is true this unfriendliness is not stated in the letters written at that time, yet it transpires and the veil between the lines which covers it is so transparent that it may be easily discerned. The first letters written after leaving Madras they hint to Mr. Lally's restraint to avoid discovering the free vent of his ill—feelings; but the bitterness of his talks betrays him and almost causes the mask to drop”.

Shortly after his return to Pondicherry Bussy received information of his appointment to the rank of Brigadier general of the Royal armies. But as he realised that his situation in India was becoming more and more difficult owing to Lally's animosity he asked to return to France. He was kept from carrying out his intentions on account of a step taken by some of his colleagues. D'Estaing; Cullan, La Fare, Verdière and Landivisiau, all five of whom were Bussy's seniors in rank accepted to serve under the latter's orders. By this act of self denial, perhaps the only one of its kind recorded in history and also one which is as praiseworthy to Bussy as to themselves, they sent a joint letter to Lally in which they said “The high regard we have for Mr. de Bussy, his merit, all that we know of his past deeds of valour and those which he can still perform, the great esteem he enjoys, the good use which might be made of it, the necessity of keeping up this reputation, the advantages, which we believe could be drawn from increasing it are the motives which urge us to appeal to you to allow Mr de Bussy to serve as chief Brigadier”.

Although he had not succeeded in having Lally to accept his own views on Indian politics, Bussy had acted as second brigadier during the siege of Madras. Shortly after Bussy was made prisoner, on the 22nd January

Dupleix and the Company Once his business had been over he retired to his estates of Castelnau and it is there that the ministers of Louis XVI went to seek him and to entrust the command of an expedition to India during the war of the North American Independence.

One of the first consequence of the French intervention in this war was the loss of their establishments in India where no preparations had been made to withstand an attack from the English

However the matter of French intervention had been considered even before the start of the hostilities, against the English In 1777 Bussy was asked to express his ideas about such intervention and to say under what circumstances the French could intervene in India He expressed his opinion in a memorandum of about 20 pages under the title 'Réflexions sur les affaires de l'Inde - "Reflexion on Indian affairs - Although this memorandum bears no date it is quite certain it had been drawn up previous to the disturbance of peace with England

Bussy begins by expressing his admiration of those who to find employment in India at any cost, only put forward the advantages of an expedition and withheld the inconveniences which they either ignored or carefully concealed As for himself Bussy would be very sorry to compromise his good name and the glory of the minister in an enterprise undertaken without the necessary means to come at a happy success Bussy went on scrutinizing the actual situation of the English which had been greatly fortified during the past 20 years and which may be further consolidated by the likely dismissal of the Mogul emperor and of Nizam Ali the Suba of the Deccan But wherever should be their intervention the French should at first negotiate with the Indian princes Such transactions were absolutely indispensable to the success

of the French enterprise. It was besides necessary that the operation might be in concordance with the importance of the expedition by means of a concentration of the French troops at the Isle of Franco. Bussy ends his memorandum thus. "It would be useless to give further details here or to try to fix up a definite plan. The scene is so moving and changing in Asia that the interests of the powers and the state of things differ from day to day, consequently the operations will have to be decided upon according to the circumstances there....."

Yet when the war did actually break out against the English, Bussy was not the first one to be selected to keep them in check in India. Concerning the operation on the seas the command was at first entrusted to captain Tronjolly, next to Chevallier d'Orves and finally to Bailly de Suffren. As for the operations in India they were entrusted to Duchemin. The French territorial forces however reached the Coromandel coast only on the 5th February 1782, four years after the disturbance of the peace with England. During that interval all the French settlements had fallen into the hands of the English.

When Duchemin had been appointed, it was understood that he would in all probability be replaced by some other more qualified than himself, not so much for the conduct of the military operations than for keeping the English in breathing and for worrying them by negotiations with the Indian princes, who would be in the way of their movements and activities. The man alluded to was Bussy.

His appointment was not only normal but no other appeared more lawful or better suited. [Does this mean to say that, after attaining a certain age and when enjoying great wealth, Bussy had provoked this appoint-

ment or that he had accepted it unconditionally? Not in the least. Before starting for India Bussy had thought it fit to have an explanation with the Minister the Marshal de Castries on the conditions of his mission and to a certain extent on its uselessness. Bussy did not conceal to himself that the operation did not present itself in the most favourable conditions nor with full probabilities of success.

Our situation is more serious than it seems" said he "the English have all the advantages territorial income strongholds and a large number of paid troops, while we have nothing not even a bit of land and we have doubtful allies who might have been reduced to powerlessness when our troops reach there.

As to the object of the expedition itself although he did not refute the minister's views, Bussy thinks 'he may assure that the constitution of the French government was averse to the idea of becoming a territorial power in India and he declares that the French have no other aim but to destroy the English power and to annihilate their trade. But though the idea of becoming once again a great territorial power in India was far away from their minds yet if the French succeeded in making any conquests they should retain a bit of territory where they could trade freely and the place should be self supporting. This, in short, was the policy he had already suggested to Dupleix when he was the absolute master at Hyderabad and of the Deccan, viz of returning to the coast and strengthening their position.

Once the expedition had been finally decided upon Bussy left Paris on the 13th November 1781. He was detained a considerable length of time in the Island of France where he lost a great number of men from scurvy and where he himself fell seriously ill, so that he

reached Cuddalore as late as the 16th March 1783 with seven men-of-war, three frigates and twelve transport ships. He had hoped to find Haidar Ali there, but unfortunately this prince had just died and had been succeeded by his son Tippu Saib. The latter had not inherited any of his father's qualities and it so happened that he turned out to be the absolute arbiter of the French fate. Tired of waiting for the French squadron, Tippu had gone inland leaving only a small body of military men on the coast, at the time of Bussy's arrival. Expecting an attack, at any moment, by the English army of 19,000 men of whom there were a little more than 2,000 Europeans while he himself had only 3,500 Europeans, 3 to 400 Caffers and about 4000 Sepoys; Bussy wrote almost immediately to Nizam Ali and engaged him not to listen to any proposal which the English might make, and he also wrote to Poona inviting the Mahrattas to take part in the war.

Bussy was not unaware that the success of the negotiations was most problematic. Although all the Indian princes were anxious regarding the growing influence of the English they also looked upon Tippu as an usurper who should be crushed at the earliest opportunity, before he had time to create any right and affirm it. The rightful sovereign of Mysore was still alive at Seringapatam. He had, it is true, no authority but nevertheless he was the representative of traditions which it was all important to maintain. As for the other Rajas or Nawabs, dynastic solidarity was not a vain word among them.

Bussy first glanced towards the Deccan, the early scene of his exploits and where his memory still lived. It was he who had saved from captivity and perhaps also from death, the reigning monarch, Nizam Ali in 1753. In those distant days, Bussy had also extended his protection to

Bassalat Jang, the brother of the ruler and who was now the chief of the province of Condavir. In those gone days communications were not safe between Cuddalore and Hyderabad, so Bussy sent the letters he had written to those princes by way of Poona and the Maratha country.

While proposing to renew the ties of friendship which had existed between himself Nizam Ali and his household, Bussy stated as he had done to Tippu that he had returned to India merely to drive the English out of the country and to restore their properties to the Indian princes. He strongly recommended Nizam Ali, not to give ear to any proposal coming from the English but to issue orders to the commanders of the various provinces, especially those of the four Circars which the English had seized and from which they derived much help in the form of food and money, not to help the English in any way whatsoever. Bussy also advised Nizam Ali to send troops and cavalry immediately to take back possession of the four Circars. Did Nizam Ali not have beside him a small corps of French partisans under the command of Aumont, a nephew of Dupleix and who had formerly been under Bussy's orders? Aumont was a most trustworthy man to whom Nizam Ali could open his mind freely.

Frankness is not a current virtue while in politics it is none at all in any part of the world. Nizam Ali while most heartily wishing to see the English depart from India, was not free enough to link his interests with those of Tippu, the French associate rather than their ally. Bassalat Jang, Nizam Ali's brother whose combined help was likewise indispensable to success was openly preparing a campaign against Mysore to recover certain territories which Haidar Ali had lately seized. The military

or political help of the Deccan was likely to fail to the French.

Another motive lay at the back of Nizam Ali's reserve. However repugnant it might be to the selflove of the French, it must be noted textually here. We found it in a letter written by Nizam Ali's minister to Mr. de Montigny, the French representative at the Court in Poona: "The French nation had certainly," said this minister, "had much attachment to the affairs of the Circars in days of yore, but things had been going on very badly ever since the affairs at Pondicherry had led to malversation for want of prudence in those of authority there". The whole of the doings of Duchem in was being recalled in these prophetic terms.

Nizam Ali's concurrence with Bussy, in the struggle against the English, was therefore very problematic; help from the Mahrattas who were much further away from the scene of the operations was more doubtful still; as to Mohammad Ali, the Nawab of Arcot, for the past few years he had no longer been the real ruler of the country whose title he bore. The debts he had contracted with the English, had alienated his independence. Bussy had no other help to hope for but that of Tippu, in his struggle against the English. But Tippu had withdrawn to the south of his State under pretext of wanting to wage war against Trichinopoly. In reality Tippu did not bestir himself in the least to send provisions and transports to the French. Bussy had therefore to rely solely on his own forces and on those of Suffren to keep up the struggle against the English.

On sea Suffren gave battle to the English squadron on the 20th June. As the preceeding battles, it had a happy result but not a decisive one. As for Bussy, after holding out against the enemy during two non decisive combats

on the 7th and 13th June he was getting ready to give a third battle on the 30th when messengers from Madras brought the sure information that the preliminaries of peace between the French and the English had been laid out at Versailles on the 20th January and that they had been ratified by the Court at Versailles on the 9th February. Hostilities immediately ceased in India.

Bussy says that it would be no easy matter to describe the astonishment and the effects produced on the minds of Asiatic powers by such a sudden announcement of peace. They had hardly heard of Bussy's return to India and had barely time to send *wakils* to him. Then were some eight to ten of these *wakils* on their way to meet Bussy from the most distant regions who shall be much disconcerted on their arrival. A Raja from the four Circars had been transacting very important business for brother rajas who had not till then paid any tribute to the English. Peace had frustrated his endeavours.

Giving his appreciation of the scheme, which some so called French diplomats, such as Saint Lubin expounded at this time either on politics or on trade and to the French government. Bussy did not hesitate to call those schemes and to write about them as "the summit of absurdities and dementia. Bussy held that relations with Indian princes were to be had and could be had only through the intermediary of *wakils* who knowing all the customs of the country and picking up the various languages were therefore in a better position to negotiate to the satisfaction of the French than any one else. He had managed very well through their help while he was in the Deccan and the English, just then acted only through such men.

In general terms, the treaty to be concluded after the ratification of the preliminaries should bear on the

reestablishment of the political, commercial and territorial situation such as they had been in 1776. There were three main points to be settled. the exchange of prisoners, peace with the allies of the belligerents and finally the return of the conquest which might have been made by the one or the other. The settlement of these various questions took nothing less than seven months. The most delicate point was the reestablishment of peace between Tippu and the English, because it embodied a certain amount of selflove and personal interests on either side. The final settlement was concluded only in March 1784. Bussy had played his customary wise part in all the proceedings.

Another delicate point to be settled was the restoration of the port of Trincomalley in the Island of Ceylon. The English had captured this port from the Dutch who had been allies of the French during the last war. This question had not been fully decided upon at the time of Bussy's death but it no longer seemed to denote any unsuipassable difficulties. To settle the questions regarding the French settlements themselves, Bussy had fixed his abode on the 15th August at Oulgaret, two or three kilometers from Pondicherry, being unwilling to take back the town itself before all the disputes with the English had come to an end.

During these eighteen months, the French were graciously tolerated at Pondicherry but they had no right to raise any contributions. They had to live almost exclusively on funds coming from France or on loans which, though they eased the present difficulties, were burdens on the future. Yet there was no disturbance whatsoever among the people nor was there any known discontent among the officers and other employees. This happy journey among reefs was undoubtedly due to the moral

credit enjoyed by Bussy and to the devotedness of his immediate co-workers whom Bussy had known to win by the peculiar grace which proceeded from his personality and by his authority which was never manifested in a harsh imperative manner

Let us now think we are in the period when Pondicherry was effectively re-occupied by the French as it did really happen shortly after. How did Bussy look upon the the future of the French in India? His thoughts have been left to us in a letter which he had written to the minister Mr de Castries so early as the 28th September 1783 and in another of the 4th August of the following year. In the first of the above named letters Bussy definitely stated that neither Pondicherry nor Karikal nor Mahé, was suitable spots for the French to settle in, the former owing to its proximity to Madras and the two others owing to their having very little importance in trade and their small population. On the other hand there was no use depending on Tippu Saib or the Mahrathas. As to the idea of attacking the English in the valley of the Ganges either by landing in Bengal or by more romantic landing at the mouth of the Indus in the region neighbouring Tatta, it was nothing more than an empty dream. It was in another region that Bussy for a moment thought possible and advantageous to the French to settle provided they were prepared to try the adventure. The region he had in mind was Pegu and the whole of the western coast of the Malay peninsula.

Let us quote his own words. Pegu is the land of most decided anarchy, revolts are very frequent among the two religious sects who divide the people of Pegu proper and the Burmans. Rangoon at 36 leagues from the seat of the king's residence is the place where the timber-yards are situated and the only spot which would suit us.

Its acquisition is not practicable. Only by means of a permanent superior force of arms, could we become masters of it and retain the mastery. Have we the means to do this? The English had attempted to settle on this coast but they failed utterly and they had to witness the perishing of all those whom they had left there.

“Since long I hear about the Andaman islands. The natives of Nicobar and Carnicobar are the only traders in cocoanuts and saltfish which are the only products of these islands. I am told that the inhabitants are cannibals. Several European captains had the intention of visiting this island but they never did so. I intend sending some one to reconnoitre as early as I have sufficient of steady means I come to the conclusion that mountains and valleys having been seen, there must be seaports as well.

“These are only plans without any surety of our being able to settle there. Besides is it possible to hope that in 30 years or so, the place could be brought to the point of utility which may justly expect from it? Pondicherry has proved to us the length of time necessary to people a settlement, although founded at a time when the French and the English were on an equal footing and had more or less the same means”.

On no side did Bussy therefore see a settlement, a territory or a town in which France could fix herself usefully. Summing up in a few words what he had written in 24 pages, Bussy wrote by way of conclusion :

“The general principles to be followed with Indians are few in number. A superior land and sea force should be sent with plenty of money to be distributed. Only in this way will the attention of the Asiatic princes be attracted, and you will decide them to share your fate.

This in short is all, especially for us who have and may hope to have no allies nowadays. All else that anybody might say would take its rise in charlatanry which had so long masked the truth.

"There is no firm hope of having a settlement in any part of India with sufficient territory to pay for the upkeep of the said settlement.

There is no hope of making allies from whom we may draw any advantage.

"There is no appearance that we shall be able to carry on the free sure and independent trade which has been assured to us by the final agreement with His British Majesty. In our present position and in the position I foresee we shall stand hereafter in India, our so called *free* trade will always be subject to that of the English, our *sure* trade will always be exposed to the difficulties which the English may put in its way especially in Bengal our *independent* trade will be very dependent indeed everywhere in India. Consequently our commerce shall always be very precarious and of very little advantage to us, it will bring about the ruin of some business men"

These last lines written on the 4th August were to be Bussy's last testament. He died five months later on the 7th January 1785 at about 10 p. m. from an attack of gout which finally affected his heart. He had just finished to play whist with the Intendant Monneron. Thus passed away a man whose name tops the whole of the colonial history of the French in India in days of yore.

CONCLUSION

Bussy sleeps his last sleep nowadays at Pondicherry in a grave which cannot with certainty be said to be his own. He rests in a cemetery which may not be the one

in which he had been laid at first. The very tombstone over the grave bore till lately a partly erroneous name. Strange fate indeed of a man who held in his hands for a while the destinies of India and whose name had remained popular in the legends of the country ! A subject of profound melancholy for the historian who cannot understand why the memory of men whose lives have been exemplary should not always end in an apotheosis ! Bussy, whose career we have just followed while regretting, at time, not to have found suitable expressions to exalt not so much the greatness of his policy, but its wisdom, was truly a great man in French colonial history, the greatest man of the old regime and one who will hold a very esteemable place in the new one. He was certainly not superior to Dupleix for the daringness of his plans ; but Bussy transcends Dupleix by his judiciousness and by his discernment without which the most lofty ideas frequently only are merely unfortunate products of imagination.

We have seen how Bussy, in the early days of his career had showed himself as continuously on the watch to enter deeply into the minds of the local inhabitants and into the characteristics of their respective governments, while he brought to this study a method which either pertained naturally to his intellect or which had been highly developed by his early education. The charm which he knew subsequently to give to his letters or to his reports reveal him both as a diplomat as well as a scholar.

Arrived in India after a stay of 3 to 4 years in the Island of Bourbon, he had at first no opportunity to display his qualities ; the French were then at peace with the English as also with the more important Indian Principalities. But war soon started and, as all colonial war-

fare of those distant days, it did not call for a display of great military abilities to bring good results, but success on the battlefield was more often the result of clever diplomacy Bussy as the other officers took part in the siege of Madras and that of Pondicherry without having had an occasion of distinguishing himself in any way whatsoever Only a stray bullet striking him gave a posthumous renown to Paradis, who seems moreover to have been a man of a real valour The events which soon followed gave Bussy the opportunity to manifest himself as a leader He led the siege of Gingee and capture that so-called impregnable fort so rapidly and with such dexterity of action that he struck the minds of all his contemporaries so much so that when he offered his services, to Duplex the following year to lead a body of Frenchmen to Aurengabad in order to support the feeble candidature of Muzaffar Jang as the Suba of the Deccan his name met with no opposition, the star of Gingee guided him

Then it was that began for Bussy the most wonderful epic which stands out even to this day as one of the most astonishing events of the French colonial history We have related this epic with all the moderation of praise due even to the most great events. Some years ago while stationed at Djibouti we heard one of the members of the *Marchand mission* to whom we had expressed our admiration for the way in which they had traversed the whole of Africa tell us in all simplicity You exaggerate any French officer would have done as much! 'Bussy might have held a similar language when he reached Aurengabad, at 800 kilometers from Pondicherry without any resistance, on the 18th June 1751 The praise due to Bussy is less for having succeeded in this daring march, than for having held the country during seven years with

the same effective forces evidently rejuvenated, against high Indian Lords, including ministers themselves who longed for the departure of the French and who were ceaselessly laying plots to reach their object, to which murder sometimes was added.

Within two years the authority of the Suba having been firmly established. Bussy asked Duplex to recall him and the whole of the French army to Pondicherry. The Company had never ceased to advise its agents to refrain from territorial aggrandisement in India where the population was superabundant and where the local authorities seemed strongly constituted. Bussy pointed out that the French factories along the coast were ample for their commerce and that it was unnecessary and perhaps also dangerous to stay in the Deccan where they ran the risk of being forced to take sides in the quarrels between the Indian princes to the detriment of their trade. This was not Duplex's opinion. At that time he was keen on carrying out his policy of conquest in the Carnatic and wanted to make this province a French colony. He therefore refused to allow Bussy to return, rather he ordered Bussy in the name of the king and of the nation to remain in the Deccan; the relations between the two men were too close to call for stronger words such as commanding and obeying.

If Bussy had a systematic turn of mind, he would never have found a more propitious opportunity to become the leader of a doctrine. His admonitions might have perhaps excelled those of the Abbé Raynal, of Voltaire or even those of Montesquieu who held that colonial policy was a lure and a danger. Bussy's prestige gave him a peculiar authority in this respect. But Bussy was only a military man and as he was not entrusted with the responsibility of carrying out political affairs, so he merely

obeyed or rather gave in with somewhat reluctance to the requests made to him. On these occasions he behaved as one who had an unpleasant duty to perform and puts all his endeavours to carry that duty through to the best of his ability. In spite of some difficulties which sometimes complicated his task, this acceptance of duty brought on five more years of triumphal success to his sound judgement, his refinement and his diplomacy. Having at his disposal but a small army with which he could not possibly impose his will by force of battle Bussy set himself to avert war by breaking up the coalitions formed against himself and he triumphed with such apparent detachment and tact as have rarely been equalled. When important decisions had to be taken, he avoided taking a seat among the councillors of the Suba but he had the knack of inspiring those decisions and bringing them to a favourable ending. His last political victory had been won only a few days before Lally's harsh command recalled him to the coast the supremacy of the French in the Deccan and perhaps too over the whole of India seemed to have been assured for a long time to come by that victory.

The struggle which went on then in the Carnatic is one of the most lamentable events recorded in history. It was entirely due to Lally's disquiet, suspicious and jealous temperament. It was the most irksome and assuredly the hardest trial which Bussy had to endure during the whole of his career. While the whole army acknowledged in him qualification to command superior to those of the real commander and while even his fellow-members were ready to submit themselves to his authority he had to be continually on the watch to avoid the pitfalls laid to his spirit of discipline by Lally himself and to respond to ill disguised provocations by a happy combination of

deference and scorn which were the only weapons left in his hands to reduce too thoughtless an adversary to the incapacity of harming him.

Later Lally's law-suit in Paris was the supreme conclusion to the Indian affairs. The verdict rendered was the final exchange of arms in the duel which had lasted eight years while the penalty imposed responded closely to the threats which the antagonists had flung at each other. These threats which were simply a display of rhetoric at the beginning, ended in definite accusations which justice could no longer ignore. It is not our business to honour or blast either of the heroes of this most lamentable drama. Lally's final condemnation might be deplored without laying any blame on the patiently thought out attack made by Bussy and which brought about that condemnation.

The souvenirs of this drama, which had been kept up in the judicial memoranda of Lally's son, were hardly effaced when the war of the American independence broke out. The king's government thought this was a favourable opportunity on which to graft an expedition to India. Bussy had left Pondicherry twenty years earlier and he was 62 years old at the time; yet he was the one chosen to lead the expedition. The remembrance of all his exploits brought everybody's approbation to the choice. As Bussy had a better knowledge of Indian affairs than the ministers, he doubted very much that it would ever be possible thereafter for the French to reconstruct a French empire in India, all the same he accepted the mission which was being entrusted to him only as a means of weakening England by restoring independence to those states which had fallen under the English authority. He thought the French should be

content as previously with a few settlements along the coast for their commercial purposes. This was the opinion he had already expressed in 1753. He had doubts even as to the realization of this more restricted ambition. In his eyes the English had already too strong a hold for the French to succeed in crushing them. Bussy however accepted to attempt the adventure so he went, leaving in Paris a young wife, a fairly large fortune and perhaps also the hope of returning as Marshal of France if the enterprise turned out fully successful in spite of his forecasts.

When Bussy reached India, peace had already been concluded in Europe on the *statu quo* basis, so his prognostics were realized though for another reason. The English rule indirectly strengthened by the treaty of Versailles was mightier than ever and the last Indian independent states progressed slowly to servitude. Bussy had nothing else to do but to execute the terms of the treaty. This task, which seemed quite simple, was in reality extremely delicate. The English wanted to keep back Trincomallee which they had captured from the Dutch but which the French had taken away from the English. Bussy, having some suspicions of the evil intentions of the English, was determined to have Trincomallee actually restored to the Dutch. Negotiations went on for a whole year without any result and Bussy died before the question had been fully decided. He had at least succeeded in assuring temporarily that Trincomallee should remain a Dutch possession, which it did till the next war. This was Bussy's last success. In this case also the result had been brought about by his qualities of diplomacy. Those qualities were even more useful to Bussy at Pondicherry which was not yet restored to the French but where he had been authorised by the gover-

nor of Madras to settle temporarily. Strange situation indeed and one which might have been very humiliating, but which did not prove to be so owing to the fact that Bussy was able to keep up personal relations of most perfect courtesy with Lord Macartney without giving up any of the French rights as also without untimely claims to them.

By all that we have related of Bussy and by every act of his career he ranks among the great men of the XVIIIth century, not so much as military genius but as diplomat. Had he given battles his fate would have been more lustrous; had he been killed in a desperate struggle at Cuddalore, he would have shared with Montcalm the greatest glory of the ancient regime. But to the success which entailed human lives Bussy preferred pacific victories in which every man's self-respect could be spared as a future safeguard between reconciled adversaries. In the Greek pantheon, Pallas Athénée, the goddess of wisdom and war would claim Bussy as one of her most perfect disciples.

What was the value of Bussy's policy in relation to that of Dupleix, his protector, chief and friend. We are not here to compare in a more or less felicitous manner the characters of these two men, the one haughty, domineering absolutely in his ideas and obstinate in their realizations, the other a greater master with a more supple mind knowing better how to adapt himself to circumstances and drawing his inspiration from them. History has less need to know what was their own genius than to judge their policy in the frame in which it has been carried out during 1753.

The policy of Dupleix is clearly defined, while he himself has taken the trouble to make it known in detail, in

his memorandum of 1753. Up to that year the French East Indian Company and also the king were distinctly hostile — at least so far as Asia was concerned — to territorial acquisitions which according to their own statements would inevitably draw the French, sooner or later together with the Indian princes into intrigues and quarrels, the consequences of which would interrupt business for a greater or shorter length of time. Even if trade were to be held up only for one year it would mean a considerable loss to the shareholders, while if trade were to be stopped for several years it would cause the ruin and perhaps the fall of the Company. But what would be the use of a colony without funds and trade? How would it thrive? It was then that Dupleix had the idea of securing a fixed and independent income which could possibly be had only by possessing a certain extent of territory around the factories. From thence emanated the policy of conquering of the Carnatic up to a distance of 50 to 60 leagues around Pondicherry. If the French could manage to be the masters in a more or less disguised form of this extent of territory they would be in a position to obtain sufficient income to provide for their staff and also secure the necessary advance of funds to enable the local industries to carry on their annual activities.

This is the whole of the modern theory of colonization the one which triumphed after the death of Dupleix. It is easy to understand that it found so much supporters in years to come. England owes what she is in India to-day to the same theory and it is in the name of a similar doctrine that the French possesses Algeria Central Africa and other places. It is why the name of Dupleix will long continue to be in high esteem even though his conceptions were found fallible later on, as it does happen to all

human ideas which wear out some day and transform themselves at the will of necessity.

Yet at the time when this theory was conceived no other policy was more inopportune. Since the year 1744 France was engaged either in diplomatic intrigues of a very delicate nature or in real conflicts with England and some German states, and it would have been more useful to her to keep in those circumstances all her land and sea forces in Europe. It is perhaps because France had scattered her army partly in India and more especially in Canada that she lost the Seven Years war. At that time although it was possible for England to look, at her ease, to the whole world, the primary interests of France should have retained her in Europe. When the house is on fire, no one thinks of the stables; Voltaire was quite right.

While residing in voluptuous Hyderabad and Auren-gabad and getting news from France only after a length of 6 to 8 months, Bussy could evidently not be aware of the motives prompting the policy of the French government regarding which the *Secret du Roi* (Secret of the king) relates all the intricacies. But he knew the instructions of the Company and he stood faithful to them; repudiating a policy of mere prestige he strived solely to safeguard the commercial interests which had been entrusted to him. By abiding to old forms he believed, as many a man of his days did, that the real strength of a nation lay primarily in the continuity of a homogenous territory of sufficient extent which could withstand every provocation from a more populous or more exacting neighbouring State. All else is but superfluous and fraught with danger.

Bussy should not however be considered as the protagonist of this almost exclusive concentration of the real national forces. Never did he express this doctrine as a

dogma and he must be judged only from his special views on the Deccan and regarded as the representative of the policy which places the defence of territory and the conquest of the natural frontiers of a country above every thing else.

Bussy cannot be blamed nowadays. We do not know where is the real greatness, each one understands this according to his own ideas. Military greatness is undoubtedly the greatest. Notwithstanding all the errors of judgement of the present day it remains the most enviable because it is the most necessary one. Civil glory comes next in rank. But when a statesman makes use of it to ward off external dangers not by successive capitulations which never overcome the difficulties, but by a series of stern yet supple acts, in which cunning has often to play its part against frankness in such cases civil glory too must be called greatness because it always means abnegation of self. Under this head no other man deserves to hold a more eminent rank in history and to stand in one of the foremost places than the tiny Lord de Bussy who became the master of a great country by the sole virtue of his patience and his diplomacy.



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